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Abstract

While there is widespread disagreement as to just what addiction is, the
two most popular models are the moral model (i.e., addiction is a moral failing)
and the disease model (i.e., addiction is a kind of disease). Both of these
models have serious problems, for theory and for practice. Furthermore, since
competing models for addiction have different implications for treatment, law,
social norms, and so on, it is important to find a single model for addiction that
works in every arena.
We need an account of addiction that avoids the problems of the disease
models and the moral models. That is, it must be able to accurately describe
the lived human experience of addiction, account for all the major features of
addiction, and accord them appropriate weight. Furthermore, it should point
us toward treatment options that will work, social policies that make sense, and
laws that are fair. Finally, the new model should reflect the complex nature of
responsibility, and should avoid overly simplistic attributions of blame.
This dissertation presents an alternative definition of addiction, one that
is fundamentally different from both disease models and moral models of
addiction. Rather than describing addiction as a moral, psychological, or
physiological defect of the addict, this proposed model, herein called the
existential model, describes addiction as a compulsive, inauthentic habit: a
compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse. Compulsion and habit
are frequently included in descriptions of addiction, but authenticity and
addiction is relatively new. The existential model rests on the idea that
vii

addiction is an inauthentic response to the experience of angst, or existential
anxiety. These inauthentic responses to angst may begin as compulsions and
become entrenched as habits, or begin as habits and become compulsive. In
either case, these are addictions.
There are implications of this model for theory and practice, as well as
indications for further research. Perhaps the most interesting implication of
this model concerns the importance of strengthening individuals' authenticity,
both to protect against addiction and to recover from addiction.
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Chapter One: Philosophy and Addiction

Toward dipsomania there are many attitudes. To the theologian it
is a sin; to the moralist a vice; to the lawyer a frequent cause of
major crime; but to the student of medical science it is a disease. 1
When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. 2
Like many topics in applied ethics, addiction is on our minds and in the
news. Everyone has opinions about it, and nearly everyone knows someone
who has struggled with it. The fact that some people regularly engage in
drinking, gambling, or some other activity to the point that they endanger other,
ostensibly more important desiderata like health, relationships and work
arouses our scholarly interest, our desire to help, and our morbid fascination.
Addicts can be infuriating to work with professionally and heartbreaking to
know personally. Addiction can present difficult legal problems (should addicts
be sentenced differently than non-addicts when an offense involves their
addiction?) treatment issues (can we help addicts who don't want to be helped?}
and public policy dilemmas (how should doctors manage severe chronic pain
when there is a risk that patients will sell their prescription narcotics to - or
have them stolen by -- neighborhood addicts?) Because of the nature and
significance of the debate, addiction has inspired a literature that is mind
bogglingly large, diverse, and unwieldy. Clearly, this is a topic worthy of serious
critical attention.

1 Yandell Henderson, Liquor: A Plea/or Dilution. (New York: Doubleday, Doran and
Company, Inc. 1935) p. 124. Dipsomania is a Victorian term for alcoholism.
2 Anonymous

The

Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term "addiction" first

appears as a term used in Roman law:

ad means to or toward and dicere means

to say. To be addicted to something or someone was to be attached to it by
decree. While initially this was a legal term, e.g. a tenant was "addicted" or
bound to a piece of property by a lease, later it came to mean that one was
bound to a practice, habit, or vice. Around this time, the word acquired the
familiar negative connotation. Today, addiction is used colloquially to describe
anything from just really liking something to the excessive, compulsive
consumption of something harmful. More precise usage is harder to pin _down:
competing models of addiction spar with one another and vie for universal
acceptance.
The most popular conception of addiction in the United States today is
that it is a disease, but that description is by no means the only one.
Furthermore, many who do endorse this disease model do so uncritically and
without a sense of the implications of this belief. The idea that addicts behave
in the bewildering way that they do is because they are in the grip of a disease
that compels them to do so is attractive to some; however, many others find
such descriptions unsatisfying. Many people are invested in the answer: how
addiction is defined affects the livelihoods and life's work of many professionals
and paraprofessionals in a variety of fields. It alters the narratives and self
conceptions of countless individuals who have personally struggled with
addiction. A great deal hangs on whether addiction is a disease, a moral failing,
a habit, or something else entirely-- and on who says so.
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Like many issues, an historical perspective on addiction illuminates the
Present situation. Addiction today impacts many professional dimensions,
among them medicine, law, public health, social work, and education.
Additionally, there are treatment programs administered by paraprofessionals,
and those "run" by nonprofessionals like 12-step programs of recovery. It has
become an odd amalgam of all of these and more: an incompletely medicalized
phenomenon, the cures for which range from cutting-edge brain imagery and
neuropharmacology to listening to what the old-timers at AA tell you to do when
you get thirsty. The history of thought on addiction is fascinating in itself; what
is especially of interest here is that surprisingly little progress has been made in
the last 150 years or so. 3 The history of addiction - discussed here through
the lens of the history of alcoholism - revisits the same concepts over and over
again, dressing them up in the vernacular of the day. The principle notions of
the nature of addiction reflect opposing beliefs about whether or not addicts can
control themselves or whether they are in the grip of a disease that has them in
its control.

A History of Alcoholism in America

The history of addiction vacillates between moral models of addiction and
disease models of addiction. While other ways of understanding addiction
surface occasionally, these two basic models are the ones that continue to

Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom. (New
York: Cambridge University Press. 1998) p. 5.
3
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appear, in revised forms, over the last 200 years of debate on the subject. Both
of these have advantages, but each has serious difficulties that make them
unsuitable to explain, define, and ameliorate addiction.
The history of alcoholism is, perhaps, the most instructive of the
addictions.. This was the first addiction to receive the attention of the medical
establishment in this country, beginning with Benjamin Rush in the eighteenth
century. Moreover, since alcohol use was legally and socially problematized
here before drug use was, it makes a good case study for the larger issue.
Perhaps most importantly, however, is that this history of alcoholism is also a
clear example of the way in which the two major models of addiction fall in and
out of favor for explaining the phenomenon of excessive drinking. What it
means to have a drinking problem has changed substantially throughout the
history of the United States. Each change has reflected the norms, values, and
events of the era in which it occurred. Despite the many re-evaluations, there
still is no satisfactory answer to questions such as, What does it mean to be an
alcoholic? and, What ought we do about alcoholism?
An historical overview of American beliefs about alcoholism
contextualizes the current debate. Beliefs about why some people drink
destructively inform social policies about drunkenness and alcoholism. During
the times that we believed heavy drinking was a vice, we considered it
appropriate to punish drunks. During the times we believed that heavy
drinking was a disease, we considered it appropriate to hospitalize and
rehabilitate alcoholics. The changes in ideology on this topic have reflected and
been reflected in trends in other areas of inquiry: medicine, politics, sociology,

4

and public health, to name a few. Contemporary thinkers are not free from
such influences. Late twentieth century and early twenty-first century ideas
about alcoholism reflect a growing concern for pluralism and personal
responsibility, as well as a fascination with science and a faith-like belief in the
power and goodness of technology. The tension between these two
commitments produces an interesting tension in addiction: our concern for
personal responsibility points us away from considering addiction a disease,
while our investment in science points us toward it. As I shall argue, the time
has come to reject the moral-disease binary and consider the topic afresh.
The Early Years
During the colonial period, most people drank what would be considered
alarming amounts of alcoholic beverages by today's standards. Alcohol was
considered necessary for good health, partly because it was bound to be safer to
drink than the often-polluted drinking water that was available in the colonies
and in England. A good drink was, additionally, thought to have the effects of
being warming, soothing and nourishing; important qualities for foodstuffs to
have in a time when physical and psychological discomforts were numerous.
Indeed, abstinence from drinking was thought to lead to crankiness and ill
health: one life insurance company increased its premiums by 10% for
abstainers, who they thought to be "thin and watery" because of their refusal to
drink! 4 Colonists loved their beer and wine, and brewed versions of it from
whatever was available - including such unlikely-sounding ingredients as corn

John Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition. (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons. 1973) p. 26.

4

5

silk and goldenrod5- if the more standard ingredients were scarce. Hard
liquor was also considered a necessity, for nutritional, medicinal and festive
purposes. 6 The sense of alcohol as such being somehow illicit, which is familiar
to contemporary Americans, seems to have been absent in the colonial period.
The effort and inventiveness that early Americans devoted to procuring
alcoholic drinks suggests that drinking was an important feature of daily life.
It is important to note, however, that despite the colonists' high rate of
consumption -- nearly double the per capita rate as today7

--

drunkenness was

not tolerated. Drunkenness, especially if accompanied by disruptive behavior,
was a crime, punishable by fine, imprisonment, or whipping. Habitual
offenders could be forced to wear a mark of shame, after which they could be
refused the right to buy liquor. 8 During this period, people were far too
interdependent for them to allow members of society to threaten social order
with the effects of drinking too much. The loss of the ability to work, increase in
crime, lack of interest in the family that can result from alcoholism was an even
greater threat to social order then than it is now; the vast increase in material
wealth and the diffusion of economic responsibility, along with social programs,
law enforcement and the like have afforded some protection for families of
alcoholics. Before the social, economic, and industrial changes of the
nineteenth century, however, each individual's contribution to the social and
economic stability of community was vital.
Jack Mendelson and Nancy Mello, Alcohol: Use and Abuse in America. (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company. 1985) p. 9.
6 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Mark Edward Lender and James Kirby Martin, Drinking in America. (New York: The
Free Press. 1982) p. 14.
8 Mendelson and Mello 11.
5
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Colonial preacher Increase Mather issued this statement about the
difference between drink and drunkenness in 1673:
Drink is in itself a good creature of God, and to be received with
thankfulness, but the abuse of drink is from Satan. The wine is
from God, but the Drunkard is from the Devil.9
Mather's pronouncement, together with the sanctions against drunkenness,
suggests that the colonial perspective on alcoholism was that drunkenness is a
voluntary and sinful act. The notion that excessive drinking could be a disease
was not available to most people yet, and those few habitual excessive drinkers
attracted the attention of the law enforcement rather than physicians. 10 There
seems to be no discussion at this time of drunkenness as bad for the individual.
The focus on the social harms of excessive drinking is what one might expect
from a time when the focus was -- of necessity -- on the social group as a whole.
The operative model of alcoholism at this time was the moral model:
drunkenness was a vice, a moral failing that was best handled by legal and
social sanctions.
Rush was Right?
The work of Dr. Benjamin rush marks a new perspective on immoderate
drinking. His classic work An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits on the

Human Mind and Body (first published in 1784 and revised several times) is
regarded by many to be predictive of twentieth century disease theories about
alcoholism. Rush, concerned with the newly formed republic, warned against
Increase Mather, Wo to Drunkards. reprinted in Lender and Martin 1.
Richard Howland and Joe Howland, "200 Years of Drinking in the United States:
Evolution of the Disease Concept." in John Ewing and Beatrice Rouse, eds. Drinking:
Alcolwl in American Society: Issues and Current Research (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978)
p. 43.
9

10
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excessive imbibing lest the very social and political project that is the United
States of America be lost. Like many of the early republicans, Rush believed
that one of the major reasons that independence from England was necessary
was that the comparatively luxurious standard of living in that country was
producing low moral standards there. England's decline in values was being
imported to America along with her goods, and was thought to have a bad effect
on society here. The Revolution was expected to bring about the return of the
virtues and values that make true liberty possible: sobriety, thrift, self-respect,
duty, hard work, and so on. 11
Rush, in keeping with these values, advocated complete abstinence from
hard liquor. Drinking such spirits, he believed, inevitably leads to physical and
moral ill health for individuals, which would additionally lead to a breakdown of
the social order. Unlike those in the nineteenth century temperance movement
and the twentieth century's Alcoholics Anonymous, he had no quarrel with
beer, wine, and like potions as long as they were taken in moderation. He did,
in fact, believe that drinking these milder alcoholic beverages contributed to
good health and happiness. 12 Stronger liquor, however, he believed to be
destructive in itself, as well as the cause of other destructive habits. This
seeming contradiction is likely the result of his belief that beer, wine and such
"contain so little spirit, and that so intimately combined with other matters,
that they can seldom be drunken in sufficient quantities to produce intoxication

Lender and Martin p. 35.
Benjamin Rush An Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and
Mind, eighth edition, 1814. reprinted in Yandell Henderson pp. 200-202.
11

12
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(!) "Ardent spirits" were thought to be different from milder drinks in

which the amount of alcohol was too small and diffused to have much effect.
In a later edition of his book, which he distributed widely, he published a
"Moral and Physical Thermometer" which detailed the consequences of drinking
temperate and intemperate beverages. 14 Drinking water, milk, beer, wine, cider,
and porter would yield health and prosperity, he thought, while drinking
punch, rum, gin, brandy and the like would lead to progressively bad ends,
from debt to prison to the gallows. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of
Rush's work is that he described inebriety as progressive. He believed that
drinkers of hard liquor were in control of their drinking only at the beginning of
the disease process, and that in later stages found themselves at the mercy of
the alcohol. At such an unfortunate stage, he proposed, victims of strong drink
should be confined to asylums until they had regained control of themselves.
He proposed such a facility be built in his native Philadelphia and be called
Sober House. The idea that alcoholism begins with what appears to be normal
drinking and inevitably progresses to increasingly bad consequences (unless
something happens to halt this progression) is echoed in AA literature and by
advocates of the theory that addiction is a brain disease in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. Like AA, he maintains that excessive drinking is a
disease - and a progressive disease, at that - but characterizes its cause and
cure in terms that are non-medical.
1 3 Ibid. , p. 189. Why Rush believed this is a matter for speculation. It is possible that
the percentage of alcohol in beer and wine was smaller at that time than it is today, or
that other differences in diet and exercise caused the alcohol to be metabolized
differently. Another possibility is that standards for intoxication were different at that
time.
14 Ibid. , p. 43.
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Rush is widely credited with being the first to popularize the idea that
drunkenness is a disease, though the idea dates back to third-century Rome. 1 5
Rush's disease concept of alcoholism included moral and spiritual dimensions:
he lists a variety of physical, behavioral and moral symptoms that characterize
this affliction. Interestingly, his proposals to destroy the desire for ardent
spirits include shame, religion, associating ardent spirits with unpleasantness,
and "exciting a counter passion in the mind," 16 while his proposed cures for a
bout of drunkenness include inducing sweating or vomiting, bleeding, cold
baths and whipping. 1 7 For Rush, it seems, a bout of drunkenness is primarily
physical, while the chronic effects of ardent spirits is primarily moral.
Moreover, the destructiveness of ardent spirits is inherent in the substance
itself, he thought; those who indulged in them without getting fully intoxicated
would meet the same fate as their more inebriate brethren. 1 8 This last point is
especially interesting and possibly paradoxical, as the "disease" that he
discusses is "drunkenness" - not alcoholism, inebriety, chronic drinking, or
any such term. 19
It is clear that Rush did not have an exquisitely-crafted notion of what
the disease-making features of excessive drinking were. However, Rush's
perspective on alcoholism is interesting for several reasons. For one, he was
concerned with the medical aspects of drinking, while previous perspectives
15

Archer Tongue, " 5,000 Years of Drinking. " in John Ewing and Beatrice Rouse, eds.

Drinking: Alcohol in American Society: Issues and Current Research. (Chicago: Nelson

Hall, 1978) p. 37.
1 6 Rush pp. 2 16-22 1 .
17 Ibid. pp. 2 1 3-2 16. I t should be noted that the purpose of whipping was not for moral
punishment, but rather "acts by exciting a revulsion of the blood from the brain, to the
external parts of the body."
18 Ibid . , p . 194.
10

were primarily concerned with the social consequences of drunkenness. While
the cures he recommended for the disease were primarily non-medical, Rush
was among the first in the tradition of physicians attending to drinking as a
disease. Secondly, his characterization of drunkenness as not wholly voluntary
reflects the Enlightenment interest in the freedom vs. determinism debate. Of
related interest is his concern for the addicted as people whose dignity and
liberty were at stake, not merely as disrupters of the public. His concern for
agents whose freedom was being restricted by an attachment to alcohol also
reflects Enlightenment concerns for the individual and society. Lastly, his
focus on the progressive nature of alcoholism rather than simply the problem of
episodic drunkenness was a new and often-cited insight in later studies of
alcoholism.
Temperance and its Competitors
As he well knew, the ideal of temperance was not popular during
Benjamin Rush's lifetime. Americans, especially working-class Americans, were
not interested in giving up their liquor and did not take his warnings seriously.
During the nineteenth century, however, public concern about the problem of
drunkenness grew. One reason for this was that there was a steady increase in
group binge-type drinking of hard liquor from 1 800 - 1830. 20 Prior to that time,
most Americans drank in two different ways: most took small amounts of spirits
regularly throughout the day (beginning with breakfast) and also drank very
large amounts at celebrations or other social gatherings, perhaps 10 or 1 5
times a year. In the early nineteenth century, the former pattern dropped away,
19 Ibid. , p. 189.
11

while the latter increased. 2 1 Further, the correlation of heavy drinking with
crime and low productivity continued to cause concern. The incompetence of
inebriated physicians and clergy was increasingly the focus of attention, and
alcohol was now being implicated as a contributor to ill health . 22
Additionally, as the role and nature of women came into debate, so the
belief in the essential delicacy of women and the sanctity of the home was
embraced. Temperance was considered a virtue for women because it was
thought to befit their nature, and for men because they were thought to owe a
debt of protection to their wives and families. The devastating effects of
drunkenness on the family were notorious:
'Mid pleasures and palaces, though we may roam,
Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home.
But there is the father lies drunk on the floor,
The table is empty, the wolfs at the door,
And mother sobs loud in her broken -back'd chair,
Her garment in tatters, her soul in despair.23
Alcohol, now associated with poverty and violence, was thought to threaten the
Victorian values of home as a separate sphere from the outside world. Finally,
as German and Irish immigrants began to arrive, nativist sentiment often fueled
the temperance movement. The newcomers' enjoyment of beer and liquor was
criticized as potentially harmful to the health of the public, as was virtually
every other habit that set them apart from those who had settled in this country
earlier. 24

20 W .J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic (New York: Oxford Press , 1 979) p. 1 50.
21 Ibid. , pp. 149- 1 5 1 .
22 Mendelson and Mello p . 25.
23 Nobil Adkisson, Ruined by Drink c. 1 860. in Lender and Martin p. 4 1 .
24 Andrew Sinclair, Era of Excess (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p . 20.
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Early nineteenth century temperance groups subscribed to a version of
Benjamin Rush's theory of drunkenness: a disease brought on by drinking hard
liquor. From 1830 on, however, many groups increasingly maintained that
heavy drinking was not a disease, but a moral failing. 25 This moral concept of
addiction gained popularity as it did partly because the temperance movement
was allied with church groups; the two joined together to fight moral problems
of several kinds and gathered both support and dogma from one another.
Furthermore, these church-temperance groups tended to come from rural
communities, where news of urban problems was especially alien and
frightening. 26 The temperance movement of the nineteenth century called for a
return to traditional values; underlying this was the belief that drinking alcohol
was a departure from such values. (The idea that frequent binge drinking, as
opposed to drinking as such, was the problem seems to have been lost.) The
appropriate response to drunkenness, they thought, was to make all drinking
illegal and to punish those who continued to drink or distribute this substance
that was wrecking homes and communities.
The belief that excessive drinking was a voluntary and sinful habit
remained widespread in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, especially among
Protestant reformers; many reformers thought of drunkards as criminals and
sinners. It was not considered fruitful to help the drunkards themselves, as
they did not need "help" so much as others needed for them to be made to
behave responsibly. While most temperance workers concerned themselves
with closing the saloons that served the offending substances, some focused on
2s

Howland and Howland p. 46-4 7 .
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punishing inebriates themselves.27 In either case, temperance advocates
believed that the solutions to the problems of alcohol were primarily moral,
religious and political.
A new, more zealous version of the moral model of alcoholism was
emerging. Fueled in part by the devastation of the Civil War and its aftermath,
temperance promised order, respectability and prosperity. The idea that social
and economic ills were the fault of sinful individuals was appealing to many,
and that cutting off all access to drink would solve the problems (a difficult to
accomplish, but uncomplicated solution) seemed a good solution. The moral
model espoused by the early temperance movement showed concern for the
drinker as an individual, reflecting Benjamin Rush's Enlightenment concern for
personal liberty as well as for social order. In contrast, the later temperance
movement (perhaps reflecting frustration at the steady rise in alcohol-related
problems and desperation following the war) was driven by a more simplistic
''moralizing" moral model .2 8
The disease concept of alcoholism remained alive, however, especially
among medical professionals. Physicians adopted the disease model in
increasing numbers as the century progressed. One of these, Dr. Edward
Turner, opened the State Inebriate Asylum in Binghamton, New York in 1864.29
Patients at the Asylum were subject to severe treatment, as the physicians
associated with the project believed inebriety to be a variety of lunacy. Patients
26 Sinclair p. 1 8 .
2 7 Howland and Howland p . 46.
28 Mello and Mendelson p. 43. This perspective resurfaces in the 1 980s under the
influence of Ronald and Nancy Reagan. Their answer to the nation's drug problem was
that everyone Just Say No to Drugs, while they cut funding to rehab centers.
29 Valverde p. 70.
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in physician-run lunatic asylums at the time were subjected to such
"treatments" as cold water baths, emetics, and physical restraints.30 Other
medical treatments for alcoholism were gentler; these include the
administration of gold chloride, various dietary cures, and "rest cures" in
halcyon country retreats.3 1 These cures, of course, were only available to
inebriates of sufficient status and money. Interestingly, some variations of the
disease models prevalent at the time differed according to the class of persons
to which they applied. Lower-class male inebriates were supposed to have
generally weak constitutions, such that they could not resist even mild
impulses to drink. Upper-class male inebriates were thought to have strong,
virile constitutions, but even stronger desires. Women generally were thought
to have been "seduced" into inebriety, perhaps by unwittingly ingesting the
heavily alcoholic patent medicines that were popular at the time.
It should be noted that the medicalization of alcoholism - regardless of
the variety of medical treatment - was generally opposed by temperance
activists. Early temperance workers thought such a project minimized personal
dignity and responsibility, 32 while many later temperance workers thought
individual drunkards beneath their concem. 33 However, some physicians
advocated temperance, based on their conception of inebriety as a disease.
Massachusetts physician Samuel Woodward called for a legal prohibition of
intoxicating beverages, arguing that they produced insanity, diseased liver,
delirium tremens, and inebriety. In his view, "a man is no more to blame for
30 Robert Whitaker, Mad in America (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2002)
31 Valverde p. 72.
32 Ibid. p. 7 1.
15

intemperance" than for any of the other, more established diseases that
drinking alcohol produces .

34

His description is not devoid of moral undertones,

though, as he acknowledges that the first dosages of alcohol are voluntary.
Further , some physicians of this era had a hybrid (moral-medical) notion of
inebriety, based in part on the idea that the will is located in the brain. This
perspective inspired cures that were medical in nature (e. g. administration of
opiates and other drugs) but for the purpose of "strengthening the will ."35

The

combination of moral and physical cures is wise, and surfaces again in the
twentieth century. Overall, however, medical practitioners of the day conceived
of alcoholism as more a physical problem than a moral one.
Some groups of nonprofessionals, too, believed that alcoholism was not
simply a matter of moral laxity. These groups had a different perspective from
physicians or temperance advocates. Some were groups of reformed drinkers
who met regularly to encourage one another to stay sober. One of these, the
Washingtonians, was much like the twentieth century organization Alcoholics
Anonymous. Interestingly, they derived their name from George Washington,
who liberated the Republic from the oppression of England; they saw their role
as, similarly, to liberate themselves and other drunkards from the oppression of
alcohol.36 Thus, they are to be counted among those who believed that their
freedom would be increased by voluntarily placing limits on their behavior and by fortifying their decision with the support of community. I shall return to
the importance of community in preventing and healing addictions in chapter

Howland and Howland p. 46.
Mello and Mendelson p. 39 .
35 Valverde p. 62.
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four. Asking a supportive community for help has a profound effect on the
individual and on the community. The power of such a measure should not be
overlooked. Washingtonians believed that the most important problems with
excessive drinking were the effects it had on drinkers themselves, and that
social disruption associated with such excess was a secondary problem. Their
mission was to help those who wanted to stop drinking to make positive,
sobering changes in their lifestyles. They took an aggressively non-political
stand on temperance; whether or not alcohol should be illegal for all, they were
convinced that alcohol was bad for them. 37
Though the movement was short-lived, 38 it is worthy of note because of
their rejection of the two dominant models of alcoholism and their individual,
pragmatic approach to the problem of excessive drinking. They rejected the
moral model of alcoholism on the grounds that such sanctimonious preaching
did far more harm than good. They rejected the disease model on the grounds
that excessive drinkers needed fellowship and support, not medical treatment.
Their ideology and method were down to earth: they were concerned about the
damage that excessive drinking was causing, and realized that the social
pressure of tiling a sobriety oath while in the company of others enabled them
to abstain. This improved their lives, and they found that others followed suit
when they heard reformed drinkers tell their tales of woe and redemption and
offered the suffering an opportunity to sign a sobriety oath. "The heart's blood
of Washingtonianism was the confessional narrative. Instead of cerebral
36 Mello and Mendelson p. 37.
37 John W. Crowley, Drunkard's Progress: Narratives ofAddiction, Despair and Recovery
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) p. 15.
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clergymen talking down to the inebriated unwashed, drunkards gave hope and
inspiration to one another through the unadorned telling of their own life
stories. "39 Although some of their most famous speakers joined the temperance
movement after the Washingtonian movement disintegrated, the Washingtonian
movement itself was characterized by doing what works -- without the
dogmatism that characterized the other perspectives.
A final perspective worthy of note is the Salvation Army. Combining the
religious component of the temperance movement and the pragmatism of the
Washingtonians, the Salvation Army had an ideology and method all its own.
While they did provide treatment in the form of rest homes, which resembles
some of the medical model treatments, members were otherwise suspicious of
the medical profession's efforts with regard to drunkards. In particular, they
objected to the coercive measures that medicine used on poor inebriates. 40
While the Salvation Army's perspective might be described as a moral model of
alcoholism, such a moral model would differ significantly from the later
temperance's moral model. Rather, the Salvation Army saw the moral failing
that pertained to alcoholism as belonging to society, for allowing the social and
economic conditions in which alcoholism would flourish. They believed that
drunkards needed to reform themselves, to be sure, but their environment
needed to change in order to support their transformation.
The Salvation Army differed from all of the previously-mentioned
perspectives in that they went out of their way to make sobriety attractive and

38 Sinclair p. 37.
39 Crowley p. 7.
40 Valverde p. 90.
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fun. 4 1 Their interest in converting saloons into bars in which soft drinks could
be served in familiar settings reveals their belief that drunks were not bad or
diseased people, but rather people who were in need of more opportunities and
alternatives than they had. Rather than viewing alcoholism as physical
disorder or a sign of moral weakness, they considered it a normal part of life for
the urban poor; a normal response to a bad situation. And while it is true that
most of the Salvation Army's attention was devoted to the poor and the troubles
they faced, they also recognized that every class of society had its challenges.
They operated inebriety homes for paying patients as well as the for the
lumpenproletariat. 42 Perhaps Mariana Valverde put it best when she describes
the Salvation Army as believing that " [d]rinking heavily is simply an aspect of
life in a fallen world. "43 A related idea is that addiction results from the
existential anxiety people of any class experience cannot be accommodated by
either the disease model or the moral model. I shall expand on this possibility
in chapter four.
The nineteenth century, then, was a time of competing perspectives on
the problem of drinking in general and alcoholism in particular. The moral
model that influenced the temperance movement was perhaps the most widely
accepted, but a variety of disease models were developing and gaining influence.
While these two movements were locked in an acknowledged battle for the
popular view of alcoholism, a third approach (composed of the Washingtonians
and the Salvation Army) largely put ideology aside and concentrated on their

41 Sinclair p. 8 1.
Valverde p. 9 1.
43 Valverde p. 89.
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own unique and pragmatic solutions. All in all, popular sentiment was moving
toward abstinence from alcohol.
Prohibition and Beyond
By January of 1 920, when Prohibition officially took effect, many
Americans were already living "dry" for one reason or another. 44 For one , many
places had local ordinances that prohibited the sale or the consumption of
alcohol by that time . Secondly, wartime rationing policies and wartime anti
German sentiment (many brewers and distillers were German) had encouraged
many people to drink less or to stop drinking altogether, and they had
maintained their sober habits. Further, the temperance movement had
succeeded in convincing many people that they should voluntarily give up
drinking. The moral concept of alcoholism was at its zenith during the early
years of Prohibition. Attempts at reforming problem drinkers reached a low
point; many felt that Prohibition itself was the only solution needed. 45 Even if
inebriates continued to drink, they reasoned, they would often be in jail, and
they would die out soon enough. Moderate drinkers would stop drinking
because of the force of the law and would never become inebriates. The
children of this generation would grow up in health and happiness without ever
knowing about the perils of "demon rum."
And it actually seemed to work that way for a short while . While
Prohibition-era statistics on alcohol consumption are variable and unreliable,
most do show a significant decrease in drinking in the United States during the
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early Prohibition years. 46 Before long, however, satisfaction with the eighteenth
amendment waned. This change of heart occurred for two main reasons. To
being with, it simply did not deliver as promised. While alcohol was more
difficult to come by than it was before Prohibition, it was by no means
impossible to get. Those who wanted to drink still drank. Though data on the
subject is too scanty to say for sure, the available data along with anecdotal
evidence suggest that only light and moderate drinking among the native
working class stopped, and that heavy drinking was largely unimpeded. 47 And,
contrary to "dry" predictions, young people were among those who defied the
law, dashing the hope that drinking would end with their parents' generation. 48
Further, since liquor making was unregulated, much of what was produced was
of poor quality and questionable safety. Some drinkers suffered violent
sickness and blindness as a result of imbibing bad liquor; many others died. 49
Additionally, the temperance movement had promised a drop in crime and
poverty once alcohol was illegal. However, since both crime and poverty were
associated with binge drinking, the crime rate did not drop (in fact, organized
crime gained a great deal of power at this time) 50 and some people began to
suspect that poverty caused alcoholism rather than the other way around.
"Moreover, the campaign for the prohibition of liquor seemed to many to
be the thin end of the wedge, the prelude to a reign of terror by moral zealots

Rorabaugh p. 232.
Mello and Mendelson p. 89, Howland and Howland p. 52.
48 Sinclair p. 239, Kobler p. 252.
49 For example, according to Mello and Mendelson (p. 87) almost twelve thousand
people died of alcohol poisoning in 1 927.
so Sinclair pp. 22 1 -233.
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over the habits of America. " 5 1 A second reason for Americans' disenchantment
with Prohibition was an increasing concern for personal liberty. Americans
don't like to be told what to do , especially if it is supposed to be for their own
good. This concern for freedom contributed to a revival of the disease concept
of alcoholism in a revised form: the suggestion that alcohol was a problem only
for people who had a sensitivity to it gained popularity. The temperance belief
that drinking meant trouble always and for everyone began to wane. Similarly,
the new wave of pluralistic values contributed to the idea, developed later by
E.M. Jellinek and Alcoholics Anonymous, that individuals ought to decide for
themselves whether drinking is a problem or not. The underlying moral model
of alcoholism began to fade as Prohibition went on and people began to talk
about the repeal of that amendment. "Freedom of choice" was a rallying cry
that contributed considerably to victory for the "wets" .

52

Perhaps it seems paradoxical, then, to observe that Prohibition advocates
saw their cause as an attempt to increase freedom by limiting freedom. 53 It is
easy to see how Prohibition can be regarded as simply freedom-limiting and
coercive - an attempt on the part of the conservative, nativist middle-class to
impose its values on everyone else . However, a more interesting perspective
concerns the humanitarian side of Prohibition. "Drys" had taken aim at other
social problems as well as drinking: "Poverty, tuberculosis, unsanitary living
conditions, prostitution and inhuman working conditions were related targets

s 1 Sinclair p. 18 1 .
52 Howland and Howland p. 53.
53 Deets Pickett, Alcohol and the New Age (New York: The Methodist Book Concern,
1926) p. 1 19.
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for Prohibitionists. " 54 These and similar problems effectively limited freedom for
many Americans; in many cases Dad's freedom to drink meant that Mom was
not free to feed and clothe the kids - or to protect them from violence. Take
away one possibility - the possibility of drinking - and so many other
possibilities will bloom. Or so they hoped. As the World League Against
Alcoholism argued in 1928:
Freedom in a community does not imply unlimited opportunity to
indulge questionable desires. Rather, the limitation of such
desires opens the way to growth and increases the capacity for
freedom as well as opportunities for its expression. Freedom from
the narcotic force of alcohol permits one to function more, to enjoy
more, to be more than he othetwise could be. 55
The prospect was so attractive that some families who drank and did not believe
it caused any problem for them supported Prohibition, on the grounds that it
would be better for society if alcohol were not available for anyone.
It didn't work, but the failure of The Great Experiment is instructive.
Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that simple solutions to complicated
problems are bound to fail. Restricting legal access to alcohol without
addressing the problems that contributed to the excess that inspired
Prohibition is a mistake that we cannot afford to make again. Further,
attempts to impose universal values in a pluralistic society are bound to fail.
Americans are a complex bunch; then as now, we drink for different reasons
and in different ways. Additionally, measures that give the government too
much power are bound to fail. One spectacular feature of Prohibition, for
example, is the simpleminded zealotry and outright corruption that often
s4 Mello and Mendelson p. 82.
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characterized its enforcement. 56 However, Prohibition has a positive
contribution to make to addiction studies as well. The notion that liberty can
be enhanced by artful limitation of liberty is worth revisiting. The trick is to do
so in such a way that individual liberty is truly enhanced, rather than simply
enhancing individuals' liberty to make the choices that we want them to make.
A crucial feature of such artful limiting of freedom is its initiation by the
individual whose liberty it is supposed to enhance .
The thirteen years of Prohibition were witness to a fascinating
transformation of thinking about drinking in America. Prohibition sailed in on
the hope that Vice would be abolished . This simple solution was supported by
a fairly simple moral model of drinkers and drinking. By the end of Prohibition
in 1 933, however, the moral concept of alcoholism -- and the belief that total
abstinence for all was the solution to alcohol-related problems - had reached a
low. The time was ripe for a new theory or theories of alcoholism.
AA. E.M . Jellinek, and the "Classic" Disease Model57
The "classic disease model, 11 popularized by Alcoholics Anonymous, refers
to the disease model of addiction in its most classic form, rather than the
classic model for diseases in general . We might take the classic model for
diseases in general to mean, in the tradition of Boorse, Szasz, and others, to

55 Hany S. Warner, Prohibition, An Adventure in Freedom.{Westerville, Ohio: The
American Issue Press, 1928) p. 1 42. my emphasis.
56 Kobler pp. 27 1 -300.
57 Here I retain Herbert Fingarette's designation of the AA/ Jellinek version of the
disease model of alcoholism as the "classic" model. This disease model differs from
Benjamin Rush's disease model and the "new" neurological disease model, among
others.

24

mean a departure from physical health: a strictly physiological concept.ss This
"classic" disease model is actually in conflict with AA's "classic" disease model of
alcoholism, as AA holds that alcoholism is a disorder that has physical,
emotional, and spiritual dimensions. The idea that alcoholism is a disease, but
a disease that is not simply biological, is not new with AA. Nineteenth century
diseases like neurasthenia and hysteria, for example, had physical, emotional
and behavioral features. Indeed, we are now developing an awareness of the
multidimensional nature of many, perhaps most, such phenomena . If such
diverse experiences as grief, compulsive overeating, and diabetes have both
emotional and physical features, we need to decide how to decide which of these
are diseases and which are not. I shall address the merits and dangers of
describing addiction as a disease in chapter three.
Alcoholics Anonymous, founded in 1935 by two reformed alcoholics,
bears a striking resemblance to the self-help groups of the nineteenth century,
the Washingtonians in particular. Membership is voluntary, the group takes no
position on outside affairs, and the only goal of meetings is to support members'
sobriety. One important difference is that, while the Washingtonians rejected
the disease model, AA subscribes to a disease model of alcoholism. Unlike
Benjamin Rush's disease model, however, AA holds that alcohol - even hard
liquor - is a problem only for those who have a sensitivity to it and need not be
avoided by those who have no such sensitivity. Those who do have this
sensitivity must scrupulously avoid

all forms of alcohol - members are even

ss Christopher Boorse "On the Distinction Between Illness and Disease" reprinted in
Meaning and Medicine: A Reading in the Philosophy of Health Care ed. James
Lindemann Nelson and Hilde Lindemann Nelson (New York: Routledge, 1 999) p. 16.
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warned not to use Listerine mouthwash or pure vanilla extract, as these contain
alcohol. Like Rush, AA. maintains that alcoholism is a progressive disease that,
untreated, will lead to social and legal problems, physical debility, and
ultimately, death. It is characterized by an inability to drink moderately - or a
compulsion to drink immoderately - which Rush attributed to the effects of
hard liquor on everyone, and which AA. attributes to the effect of any amount of
alcohol on those people who have the disease. 59
AA takes no position on the etiology of this disease (there is some
allusion to the possibility that alcoholism is an allergy to alcohol, but this is
undeveloped . ) 60 It does, however, claim that it is a disease in and of itself and
not a symptom of another disease or social condition. That is, those who claim
that they drink because they are depressed, anxious, impoverished, or in an
unhappy relationship are just fooling themselves; they drink because they have
the disease of alcoholism and for no other reason. This rather circular way of
defining alcoholism leads to the AA adage that treatment for another problem or
disorder will not take care of the alcoholic's drinking. Further, since alcoholism
is a disease, AA members consider moral models of alcoholism inaccurate and
unjust. Shaming or punishing alcoholics for drinking, they argue, is ineffective
and has the additional harmful consequence of making them unwilling to come
forward to get them help they need.
Another major tenet of AA is that alcoholism is, thus far, incurable.
We are like men who have lost their legs; they never grow new
ones. Neither does there appear to be any kind of treatment

Alcoholics Anonymous. Alcoholics Anonymous, Third Edition (New York: Alcoholics
Anonymous World Services, 1976) p. xxvi.
60 Ibid.
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which will make alcoholics of our kind like other men. We have
tried every imaginable remedy. In some instances there has been
a brief recovery, followed by a still worse relapse. Physicians who
are familiar with alcoholism agree there is no such thing as
making a normal drinker out of an alcoholic. Science may one day
accomplish this, but it hasn't done so yet. 6 1
It is noteworthy that M looks to science to make a normal drinker out of an
alcoholic. M's approach - as opposed to some of its dogma - is non-medical.
In fact, many physicians refer their patients to AA, but physicians themselves
are "cast in a supporting role" by M. 62 The fellowship of other recovering
alcoholics, not "doctor's orders" , is what M offers its members.
Members do believe that they can achieve remission of their symptoms
by abstaining from all alcoholic beverages and following the AA program. Being
"in recovery" is not the same as being cured, as symptoms are thought to recur
if the alcoholic begins drinking or stops attending meetings. Further, once
individuals develop the disease of alcoholism, they cannot recover simply by
abstaining from drink; the spiritual and emotional symptoms of the disease
must be addressed by attending AA meetings and by practicing the "Twelve
Steps" of AA. The first three steps involve acknowledging that one is
"powerless" over alcohol and expressing willingness to tum one's will and one's
life over to a "higher power" (which, while requiring a spiritual commitment,
does not require a belief in God or participation in a religion.) The last nine
steps involve examining one's life for defects and "becoming willing" to be free of

6 1 Ibid. p. 30. my emphasis.
62 Valverde p. 1 23.
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these.63 Those who merely abstain from drinking are not really in recovery, but
rather are "dry drunks" who will continue to experience many of the symptoms
of the disease of alcoholism.
Many of the features of AA's version of the disease concept of alcoholism
were corroborated in the research of biostatistician E.M. Jellinek. In

The

Disease Concept of Alcoholism, 64 he reinforced the AA model of alcoholism as a
chronic, progressive disorder caused by a physiological sensitivity to alcohol
that results in a compulsion to drink to intoxication. On this model, which he
calls gamma alcoholism (there were four other varieties as well, each
distinguished by a different Greek letter), the disease progresses in stages. In
the beginning, gamma alcoholics have a certain degree of control over actual
drinking behavior, though perhaps less than most people. In later stages,
gamma alcoholics are "compelled" to drink to intoxication, even if they intend to
drink moderately or even to abstain . Gamma alcoholism differs from the others
in that only the gamma variety constitutes a disease. " .. . [A]nomalous forms of
the ingestion of narcotics and alcohol, such as drinking with loss of control and
physical dependence, are caused by physiopathological processes and
constitute diseases." 6 5 The other forms of alcoholism that he identifies - and
he suggests that there are many other forms as well - do not have the loss of
control or the tolerance/withdrawal symptoms found with gamma alcoholics.
It should be noted that the addict's own experience of drinking had not
hitherto been a criterion for alcoholism. More objective criteria, such as the
63 Alcoholics Anonymous. Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions (New York: Alcoholics
Anonymous World Services, 19 52) .
64 E.M. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism. (New Haven: Hillhouse Press, 1960).
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amount individuals consumed, the responsibilities they neglected or the
damages they caused were the common yardsticks by which problem drinking
was assessed before Jellinek's disease model became popular.

The important

feature - loss of control - is a feature of the alcoholic's experience, not
behavior or physiology (although it may be supported by these.) This feature is
celebrated in AA: "We do not like to pronounce any individual an alcoholic, but
you can quickly diagnose yourself. Step over to the nearest barroom and try
some controlled drinking . . . " 66 People who genuinely want to control their
drinking and find that they cannot fit the profile of gamma alcoholics.
For Jellinek, this loss of control has physiological causes. He offers some
ideas about what these might be , and suggests that these and other ideas
should be researched thoroughly. 67 That is, for Jellinek, only the individual can
say whether she is a gamma alcoholic or not now, but perhaps someday
scientists will be able to look in her brain and see if she actually experiences
loss of control. In contrast, for AA loss of control is related to the contention
that alcoholics are powerless over alcohol (step one) , and that turning one's will
and life over to a Higher Power is the way to recovery (step three) . Jellinek
views loss of control scientifically; AA views it spiritually.
While Jellinek himself acknowledged the limitations of his work, arguing
that much more research is needed to establish some of the claims he suggests ,
many of those who quoted him did not. AA took many of the findings that fit
most closely with its own doctrine out of context and presented them in an

65 Jellinek p. 40.
66 Alcoholics Anonymous, p. 3 1.
67 Jellinek pp. 145- 149.
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unqualified manner. Further, some suspect that one effect of Jellinek's work
was that many who read about his research as AA presented it began to
interpret their own experiences , uncritically, through the example of his model.
The disease model wore the mantle of science, and was more credible than their
own, initially murky, self-descriptions. In the same way that earlier generations
of alcoholics thought of themselves as degenerate because that is what they
were told about themselves, alcoholics who knew about AA and Jellinek's model
thought of themselves as having a disease that compelled them to drink.
. . . his work had the practical effect of reinforcing the AA colloquial
axiom, "one drink, one drunk" and of encouraging people to speak
of alcoholics as driven to drink by an "overwhelming desire," an
"irresistible craving," or a "compulsion. " 6 8
Additionally, AA itself has been criticized for its emphasis on spiritual
matters, for its focus on powerlessness (which has been said to be
disempowering to women and racial minorities, who are already powerless over
many factors in their lives) and its insistence that its members abstain from
drinking entirely. It has been compared to a religious cult that indoctrinates
members into believing they are sick and need to depend on the organization for
their health. In AA's defense, it must be noted that it does not present itself as
the only method for treatment for alcoholism, 69 that it is not a moneymaking
organization, and that it does not attempt to isolate members from the larger
community. Additionally, AA suggests that acknowledging powerlessness over
alcohol empowers, rather than disempowers, all of its members; knowing what
Herbert Fingarette, Heavy Drinking. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 988.)
p. 20.
69 That is, the official AA dogma is that other paths to sobriety may work for some
people. Some AA members, in contrast, are judgmental and condescending towards
anyone who has the temerity to try it any other way.
68
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one is powerless to change allows one to concentrate on what one is able to
change. In the case of alcoholics, AA believes that they are unable to drink
normally but are able to abstain from drinking. In any case, if membership is a
measure of success of a program, then AA must surely be counted as a success;
as of this writing in the fall of 2002, AA has more than 100,000 groups and over
two million individual members worldwide. 70
Moreover, there are features of the "classic" disease model of AA and
E . M . Jellinek that ought to be retained. While disease models are probably not
the best way to conceive of addictions, as I discuss in chapters two and three,
the experience of compulsion that addicts of all sorts report - and evince - is
an essential feature of addiction. Jellinek characterizes this as "loss of control"
which is a metaphysical statement, and has been roundly criticized (see below .)
However, the feeling ofloss of control refers to the experience of addicts, not the
actual abilities. Furthermore, Jellinek's description of different kinds of
problem drinkers is important, although this feature of his work seems to have
been duly noted and then cast aside in the treatment world. In a passage that
now seems ironic, he notes:
By adhering strictly to our American ideas about "alcoholism" and
"alcoholics" (created by Alcoholics Anonymous in their own image}
and restricting the term to those ideas, we have been continuing
to overlook many other problems of alcohol which need urgent
attention. 71
His observation foreshadows the contemporary, emerging belief that treatment
ought to be matched to the individual rather than strict adherence to a single,
standard method and measure of success . Finally, parts of AA's method,

70
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especially those which use community for support and strategies to extinguish
old habits and build new ones, are sound, coherent, and likely its most effective
components. The role of habit in the development and deconstruction of
addic_tion is particularly useful, as I will argue in chapter four.
Challenges to the Classic Disease Model
Two basic challenges to the classic disease model have emerged: the first
is the movement to reject disease models of alcoholism outright, while the other
is a new, refined disease model. Some version of the disease model is the most
popular understanding of alcoholism today; however, it is not without its
critics. Since these challenges are critically discussed in chapters two and
three, I will mention them only briefly here.
Despite the popularity of the disease model and its incorporation into
American discourse, many thinkers do not subscribe to it. One of the reasons
for this is the collection of objections to AA mentioned above. A more
philosophically interesting reason, however, is that researchers have become
suspicious of single-model explanations for complicated problems. Some argue
that there is no such thing as alcoholism; rather, there are patterns and
narratives that involve problem drinking. These patterns resist easy
categorization; there are, perhaps, as many kinds of problems with drinking as
there are problem drinkers. The nature-vs. -nurture, moral-vs. -disease
controversies have missed the point entirely: there are no "magic bullets" for
alcoholism.

1 1 Jellinek p. 35.
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In his 1 988 book Heavy Drinking: The Myth ofAlcoholism as a Disease,
Herbert Fingarette attempts to debunk the disease model of alcoholism and
replace it with a pluralistic account of his own. Problem drinking, he argues,
has become unnecessarily and inaccurately medicalized. Treatment for
alcoholism has become big business in recent years. Inpatient and outpatient
clinics and hospitals specializing in the treatment of alcoholism employ millions
of people, many of whom are paraprofessionals, many of whom describe
themselves as in recovery themselves. Further, the medicalization of alcoholism
has convinced many that the only alternative explanations of alcoholism are of
the judgmental, moral-model type. The medical model of alcoholism is simply
wrong, he argues: the plethora of experiences reported by those who have
problems with drinking belies the possibility of a single "disease" with a single
etiology.
Thus there is no one story of how people become heavy drinkers.
Nor is there some mysterious demon afoot - at each point the
heavy drinker's conduct is an intelligible version of normal
cognitive and emotional behaviors. 72
This kind of challenge to disease models of alcoholism is reflected in
contemporary features of the law. Alcohol and drug abuse are not admissible
mitigating behaviors under federal sentencing guidelines, and there have been
legal developments in several states that disallow intoxication as a defense. 73
As of January of 1997 in the state of Tennessee, alcoholics are not eligible for
disability benefits. Interestingly, the resurrection of the moral model for
alcoholism is not always echoed in legal decisions regarding other addictions.
12 Fingarette p. 109.
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In May of 200 1 , for example , a federal judge spared a woman from j ail after she
who had stolen a quarter of a million dollars from the company she worked for.
He stated he believed her "shopping addiction" was a factor in the crime. This
case is thought to be the first in which a federal judge reduced a criminal
sentence because of a shopping addiction. 74
The other kind of challenge to the "classic" disease model is the new,
revised disease model. This new model is a challenge to the older one in the
simplest sense: experts who espouse the disease model tend to espouse the new
one , though the older versions are still influential, especially in paraprofessional
and nonprofessional circles. The new disease model differs from the
Jellinek/ AA model in several respects. For one, the science that supports it is
vastly more rigorous and sophisticated. The new disease model holds that
addiction is a brain disease , characterized by a compulsion to use addictive
substances caused by the neurological changes that result from drug use.
Secondly, this new model more clearly articulates the psychosocial dimensions
of addiction, and more readily acknowledges the individual differences between
addicts . While the "classic" disease model tended to have relatively simple,
universal answers as to the cause and cure for addiction, the newer disease
model encourages comprehensive, individualized treatment planning for
addicts.
There is a problem, however, with automatically extending the new
disease model to alcoholism. The new disease model is advanced primarily by
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NIDA, the National Institute on Drug Abuse , which is a branch of the NIH.
Their focus is on drug abuse; the NIAAA {the National Institute for Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, also a branch of the NIH) concentrates on alcoholism.
While NIDA and NIAAA each classify drug abuse and alcoholism {respectively)
as diseases, the quality of their rationale differs. NIDA's conception of drug
abuse as a disease is based on the persistent effects of drugs on the brain. In
contrast, NIAAA's conception of alcoholism as a disease relies on notions of
craving, tolerance and withdrawal. 75 These criteria are also found in the DSM
IV under the heading "substance abuse/ dependence" . 76 However, they are
contentious, and have been rejected as outdated by some leading researchers
today.
If tolerance and withdrawal were the only problems of addicts,
"treatment" would consist of detoxification . . . while the individual
receives medication to block the withdrawal symptoms . . . . We now
know that detoxification is, at best, a first step in beginning
treatment and that achieving the drug-free state is not a
particularly significant accomplishment. 77
The new disease model will very likely catch on in the thinking about
alcoholism as it has in research on drug addiction. Just as Alcoholics
Anonymous made way for Narcotics Anonymous, now the lead is reversed and
innovations in drug-related research are ahead of those for alcohol.
Addiction Beyond Alcoholism
The very topic of addiction beyond alcoholism is controversial. While
alcohol's legitimacy as an addictive object is unquestioned, few other objects are

s http/ / :niaaa@nih.gov 09-06-02.
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universally accepted as such. Heroin and certain other drugs make the cut,
but others - notably cocaine and marijuana - do not produce withdrawal
symptoms and so are not considered "physically" addictive by those who still
adhere to that criterion. (As noted, despite the fact that the "tolerance and
withdrawal" criteria are considered outdated by most drug abuse researchers ,
they do persist in parts of the treatment world.) Beyond drugs, there are
nonchemical addictions , such as shopping and gambling, and so-called
intermediate categories of possibly addictive objects such as food, exercise, and
sex. (The basis for including exercise and sex as quasi-chemical addictive
objects is the endorphins that are supposedly released during these activities.
However, other thrill- seeking behaviors, such as gambling produce a euphoric
"rush" as well, which recalls neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp's remark that " life
causes persistent changes to the brain. " )
What "counts" a s an addiction, then, depends on whom you ask. O n one
side of the debate, psychologist Stanton Peele argues that "addiction may occur
with any potent experience . " 78 Since certain experiences are potent for some
people and not for others, this draws the boundaries with a generous hand
indeed. UK psychologist Jim Orford takes a somewhat more moderate position,
identifying six "core" addictions: drinking, gambling, drugs, eating, exercising,
and sex. He notes,
Although people can potentially become excessively attached to
any activity, and there is no easy dividing line to be drawn
between those activities to which people often get so attached and
those that rarely cause addiction, it threatens to diminish the

Stanton Peele, The Meaning of Addiction. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1 985)
p. 25.
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importance of the topic by too readily extending the concept in
these ways. 79
Orford is responding to those who advocate reserving the term "addiction" for
substance abuse, as well as those who would include having cornflakes for
breakfast. His list may be criticized for not including work, acquisition of
material goods, and technology - common objects for excessive appetites today
- but his concern regarding the dangers of easy inclusivity is sound.
Comparatively more recent addictions are also worthy of note, perhaps
especially technological addictions. These have only arisen in the last thirty
years or so , perhaps because technology has only recently become interesting
enough and widespread enough to even be a candidate for addiction. An
interesting thing about that is that it is during this same time that disease
models of addiction have enjoyed widespread popularity, and yet technologies
that have been accused of being addictive , such as television80 and the
Intemet8 1 are, obviously, nonchemical. For many, the chemical component of
alcohol and drug addiction is what makes disease models plausible. In fact
some, notably sociologist Jon Elster, argue that nonchemical "addictions" are
addictions only in a metaphoric sense. 82 Could watching too much TV be a
disease?

Jim Orford, Excessive Appetites: A Psychologi.cal View of Addictions Second Edition
(New York: Wiley, 200 1) p. 6.
80 Many citations are possible here, a recent one is Robert Kubey and Mihalyi
Csikszentmihalyi, "Television Addiction: No Mere Metaphor," Scientific American (Feb.
2002) pp. 74-80.
8 1 Kimberly Young, Caught in the Net: How to Recognize the Signs of Internet Addiction 
and a Winning Strategy for Recovery. (New York: J. Wiley. 1998) .
s2 Jon Elster, Strong Feelings. (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1999.)
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A few themes emerge from this historical review. For one, the history of
addiction, like the history of alcoholism, reveals more circularity than linear
progress. As criminologist Mariana Valverde notes, contemporary debate about
the nature of alcoholism reflects the same dialectic as it has for two hundred ·
years. The same questions, many of them variations on the inquiry into
alcoholics' freedom, are asked and answered in strikingly similar ways today
with regard to Internet addiction as they were in the eighteenth century about
excessive drinking. 83 Contemporary discussions about freedom and addiction,
Valverde argues, proceed with a blithe lack of awareness of the debates that
have preceded them. Thus, they ask the same questions and encounter the
same - and ultimately doomed - answers about freedom, responsibility, and
people who drink too much.
Another theme in the history of addiction is that conceptions of addiction
reflect the social, economic, and political climate of the day. The abstemious
nineteenth century sentiment that was prevalent among the upper classes
echoed the prevailing social values of denial of the will and the body. In
contrast, the working classes of the same era, who worked hard and played
hard, did not always agree with their more genteel neighbors. Similarly, the
move toward what Valverde calls "enlightened hedonism" - moderate
indulgence in pleasure - became more prevalent after WWI when post
Victorian values were gaining popularity. Each shift in thinking about
addiction is supported by a related belief about freedom and responsibility,

83 Valverde p. 14.
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which, in turn, is embedded in a larger social and cultural context. Thus, the
same two models appeared over and over in different guises.
A final theme in the history of addiction is that addiction has resisted
medicalization and psychiatrization. There have been attempts at various times
and in various places to define addiction, its etiology, and cure solely in terms
of rn.edicine and/or psychiatry. They have, without exception, failed. Nor has
addiction been successfully subsumed under epidemiology, sociology, or any
other of the social sciences. Each attempt by a field or discipline to "claim"
addiction as its own has been met with only limited success. Addiction borrows
from many fields of study, but has remained a project with an identity of its
own.

Some Philosophical Issues in Addiction

Addiction, then, is a profoundly interdisciplinary topic. It has, until
recently, received relatively little attention from philosophers; however,
addiction and philosophy have much to say to each other. Enduring
philosophical issues related to addiction include classic binaries, such as the
mind-body problem and the freedom-determinism debate, theoretical concepts
that are interestingly illustrated by the experience and behavior of addicts, such
as authenticity and akrasia, and topics in applied philosophy, such as concept
of disease and a number of ethical issues.
There has been a marked increase in philosophical articles published on
the topic of addiction in the last dozen years or so. Herbert Fingarette
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published Heavy Drinking in 1 989 , in which he criticized the popular
understanding of alcoholism as a disease. In the 1990s there was increased
attention to the way in which addiction illustrated issues in freedom and
determinism. Work by Alfred Mele and others focused on addiction as a
contemporary instance of akrasia, which is the phenomenon of knowing right
but lacking the power to do right. In the past year, the American Journal of
Bioethics published an issue in which there were a number of articles that

addressed ethical issues in addiction research. These were responses to
questions raised by Louis Charland in "Cynthia's Dilemma: Consenting to
Heroin Prescription ," 84 in which he asks whether heroin addicts are competent
to consent to be research subjects in protocols that involve their using heroin.
Because of the many implications for related issues in medical ethics, including
patient autonomy, competence to consent to treatment, compliance and
noncompliance, intersections between law and medicine, and so on, bioethicists
and other philosophers will surely have much to contribute to the addiction
dialogue in the future.
Most of the philosophical literature that relates to addiction concerns the
topic of freedom vs. determinism. In its most extreme form, this debate is
between libertarians, who believe that human behavior is the product of
completely free, unconstrained choice, and the hard determinists, who hold
that human behavior, like the behavior of objects, is the result of a set of
caused factors, and that human "choice" is an illusion. A middle position is

84
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held by compatibilists, who argue that determinism does not preclude human
freedom.
Rather than approaching the topic of addiction from within that
framework, however, it behooves us to think specifically about features that a
theory of freedom would need in order for it to provide a good foundation for
thinking about addiction. One is that it would need to consider freedom to be
an ability instead of a property. Libertarians and hard determinists consider
people to "be" free or to "be" compelled, rather than considering people to have
the potential ability of acting freely. This ability can be acquired, strengthened,
or lost, just like other abilities. Furthermore, a useful account of freedom
would need to take into account that freedom is a continuum concept; that is,
there are degrees of freedom. Within this framework, it is possible that some
people are more free (that is, have more of the ability to act freely) than others.
On the same note, we may regard each person as being more free at some times
than at other times.
Finally, as John Dewey discusses in Philosophy and Civilization, 85
freedom involves not only free choice, but also power - the power to bring
about that which I have chosen. On Dewey's account, freedom is a complex set
of abilities, including intelligence, power, flexibility, and self-control. In this
view, the diminishing of freedom is not the loss of some mysterious and
inarticulable quality. It is rather a decline in one or more of the various
features of freedom just mentioned. As I shall discuss in chapter four, this

s s J ohn Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom," Philosophy and Civilization, (New York:
Minton, Balch and Company, 193 1) p. 293.
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ability can be described in terms of personal competence - Diana Meyers' term
for autonomous persons' ability to act authentically.
The connection between authenticity and addiction has not been much
explored in the philosophical literature, but I find it more helpful than
discussions of freedom and determinism for understanding addiction. Addicts
behave in ways that challenge our notions of authenticity - they do things that
they lmow will harm themselves and others, they sometimes report feeling very
free and unconstrained ("I can stop whenever I want") and sometimes report
feeling compelled by their addiction ("I didn't even want to; I didn't even enjoy
it" ) . Whether addicts

qua addicts behave authentically also falls fairly neatly

along moral model/ disease model lines: the moral model is consistent with the
belief that addicts authentically choose bad things (or at least things that are
bad for them) while the disease model is consistent with the belief that addicts
do not choose freely or authentically to behave as they do.
Authenticity is an important issue in addiction, in part because it is the
key to solving the problems that result from defining addiction in terms of how
much of a substance is consumed (or how much time or money one spends on
something, etc.) . Defining addiction in terms of how much one consumes poses
clear problems; certainly some problem drinkers drink less than some other
people who have no problem with alcohol, for example . In contrast, whether or
not the individual genuinely wants to engage in the habit in question (i.e. the
potential addiction) is one of the essential features of addiction. If one
individual says, for example , "I enjoy smoking; I don't want to quit - it is one of
the pleasures of my life ," we have less reason to suspect addiction than in the
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case of the person who says, "I wish I could quit smoking. I wish I'd never
started."
Determining what an individual's authentic desires are is not always
easy. Bravado, caprice, an exaggerated sense of personal power and just plain
lying are often features of addicts' personalities. How then, are we to determine
which are the addictive desires and which are authentic? More vexingly, when
people who drink heavily and destructively avow that they endorse their lifestyle
and accept all of the features of it, are we to agree that such a person is
drinking heavily and destructively and also authentically and non-addictively?
Clearly, this presents a practical problem that cannot be solved by casual
acquaintance with or observance of the individual in question. However, it is
my contention that over time and with sufficient contact, especially if the
contact occurs in diverse settings, individuals' authentic values and desires do
become apparent to others. Sufficient empathetic listening, moreover, can
make individuals' authentic values and desires more readily apparent to
themselves as well.
Addiction interferes with authenticity in that the desires it produces are
so powerful, and become even more powerful by force of habit, that they become
monumentally difficult to resist. When these powerful desires that are
reinforced by habit conflict with an individual's more authentic desires, the
authentic desires often lose. However, an addiction is different from a habit
that has consequences that one dislikes. Most people have habits that have
some undesirable consequences, but overall they still endorse the practice. In
contrast, addictions conflict with the individual's authentic desires, rather than
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simply having undesirable consequences. One fundamental feature of this
conflict is the compulsive nature of addictions. An individual might endorse the
addictive habit except for the compulsive experience of it. In such cases, it is
the experience of feeling compelled that the individual does not endorse, rather
than the practice or habit in which that sense of compulsion is embodied.
In another vein, addiction provides a fascinating example of problems
with the concept of disease. As noted earlier and discussed at length in later
chapters, addiction is widely held to be a disease, but what makes it a disease
is more vexing an issue. Since terms like "disease" and "illness" are applied to
both physical and nonphysical problems, and since addiction is clearly a
problem that touches many facets of human life, it poses problems as to just
what the nature of this disease is, if it is a disease at all. While some addictions
have obvious physiological features, others do not. Further, the physiological
features of addictions do not seem to be the essential (i.e. defining) features.
Perhaps, rather than holding addiction up to a set of diseasemaking criteria
and checking for fit, it would be most fruitful to ask if "disease" is the best way
to describe it.
As H. Tristram Engelhardt and others have noted, there are values
implicit in naming a phenomenon a disease. The notion that medicine - or
any science - is a completely objective matter has been challenged. "Values
influence the purpose and direction of investigations and treatment. " 86 Thus,
the belief that addiction is or is not a disease reflects certain value

86 H Tristram Engelhardt, "The Disease of Masturbation," Meaning and Medicine, Hilde
Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson, eds. (New York: Routledge. 1999) p.
1 1.
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assumptions. What is there to be gained in using the moral model or the
disease model to explain addiction? Whose values (and other interests) are
supported by each explanation? As noted in the history of addiction, each
version of each model reflected the values of the era in which it was most
popular. We would do well to examine the values that influence our present
concept of disease, and the instances in which we apply it. Current motives to
describe addiction as a disease include a fascination with science and the
technology of medicine, a desire to respond humanely and effectively to the
plight of addicts, and faith that science can ameliorate what seems to be a
problem that is spiraling out of control. However, as I argue in chapters two
and three, the implications for adopting the disease model are less effective, less
humane and less coherent than they might seem on encounter.
A related question is, If addiction is a disease, is it also a disability? In
1 999, a Chicago-area teenager who was dropped from his high school
basketball team for drinking sued for reinstatement and damages. 87 He argued
that his alcoholism, which had been diagnosed by his physician, meant that he
could not control his use of alcohol and should be protected by the 1 990
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case, while newsworthy, was not expected
to go very far legally. According to Curt Decker, director of the National
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, the 1990 law covers recovering
addicts (i.e. drug addicts and alcoholics) but not current users.88 However, if
addiction is a disease, and is in fact the kind of disease that ought to be a

s7 Andrew Buchanan, "Teen Says Alcoholism is a Protected Disability," The San Diego
Union-Tribune Sept. 10, 1999: A l6.
88 Ibid.
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protected disability, it seems counterintuitive to argue that those whose disease
is in remission deserve to have their disease acknowledged while those whose
disease is florid do not. While it is easy to see problems with including current
users of drugs and alcohol under the ADA, and also easy to see why recovering
addicts might be vulnerable to unjust discrimination, calling addiction a
disability or disease in order to gain such protection seems to cause more
problems (both at the level of theory and legal practice) than it solves.
Finally, ethical issues abound when addiction is involved. Many ethical
questions arise because it is not always clear whether (and to what degree)
addicts are responsible for their actions. For example, a classic issue involving
addiction in medical ethics concerns allocations of liver transplants for
alcoholics. A 199 1 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association
contained two articles on either side of this debate. In one, physicians Mark
Siegler and Alvin Moss argued that patients who have end-stage liver disease
due to alcoholic cirrhosis should, categorically, be given lower priority for
transplants than patients whose liver disease results from other causes. 89 In
contrast, philosophers Carl Cohen and Martin Benjamin, et al, argue that

other patients.

90

alcoholics should be considered for transplants on a case-by case basis just like
They argue that, while it is morally sound to consider whether

the patient is likely to ruin the transplanted liver by drinking, patients with a
history of alcoholism differ as to whether they become good stewards of a
transplanted organ and therefore ought to be considered as individuals rather
89 Mark Siegler and Alvin Moss. "Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver
Transplantation?" JAMA 265 no. 1 0 ( 199 1) pp. 1 295-8.
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than merely as alcoholics. Moreover, individuals who are in medical need
"because of alleged self-abuse ought not be grouped for discriminatory
treatment - unless we are prepared to develop a detailed calculus of just
deserts for health care based on good conduct."91
A related ethical problem concerns treatment for addictions. Some
addicts who break the law are offered the option of treatment for their addiction
in place of criminal sentencing. This "offer" strikes some as utterly sane and
humanistic, others see it as coercive and Orwellian. The argument for
treatment in place of incarceration is fairly clear: addicts whose crimes are
related to their addictions break the law partly due to a factor beyond their
control. Curing the addiction will better ensure that they will not break the law
again, which is better for society, and is more just than punishing them for
doing something that they were not (or not wholly) at fault for. The argument
against mandatory (or coercive) treatment rests partly on objections to the
disease model of addiction that the previous argument assumes, and partly on
the limited effectiveness of the treatment modalities that are available. As noted
in more detail in chapter two, psychologist Stanton Peele has argued that
coercive treatment for addicts is morally wrong because it imposes a "diseased
identity" on a healthy person. Moreover, it encourages addicts and their
communities to absolve themselves of responsibility for the criminal activity and
hide behind what he regards as a mythical disease. 92

Carl Cohen, et al. "Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation," JAMA 265, no. 1 0 ( 199 1)
pp. 1299- 130 1.
9 1 Ibid.
92 Stanton Peele, Diseasing of America (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1995) p. 22 1.
9o

47

There is, then, a broad foundation on which today's philosophers can
build to clarify and explore many issues regarding addiction. Philosophy, when
artfully done, can lend an illuminating hand to very nearly any project, and
addiction is no exception. The following chapters explore some of these
directions, especially authenticity, bioethics, and the concept of disease. Other
promising philosophical directions for addiction studies are philosophy of law,
philosophy of science, and research ethics (continuing Charland's recent work) .
The growing field of applied philosophy can contribute much to our
understanding of addiction.
Finally, while it is tempting to frame the problem of addiction with the
freedom-determinism debate, I argue that we have reached a stalemate at this
point; that no progress can be made in addiction studies with this binary at this
time . A more probable direction to turn for now is toward the notion of habit.
On this topic, such diverse philosophers as Aristotle and John Dewey have
contributions that can profitably be paired with the work of social psychologists
and others to develop conceptions of addiction that avoid the entanglements
that the freedom-determinism debate inevitably entails.

Overview of the Dissertation

In addition to critiquing the standard models of addiction, there are three
major themes on which I focus in the following chapters. These include: 1) The
phenomenology (i.e. the lived experience) of being addicted. The most
important feature of this experience is the feeling of compulsion. 2) The notion
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of habit, which, I argue, should replace freedom vs. determinism in the
addiction debate. 3) Authenticity, which is, I argue, an important criterion in
defining addiction; it is also a more promising goal than abstinence. Existential
anxiety, which I suggest is the source of addiction, is related to authenticity.
In chapter two, I describe and critique the position that addiction is not a
disease, as represented by two critics of the disease model, Stanton Peele and
Herbert Fingarette. The work of both of these scholars dates back to the late
1980s and early 1990s and is characteristic of critiques of the version of the
disease model that was popular at that time. While certainly there were others
who contributed important work on the subject, Peele and Fingarette are strong
representatives of this position. Their work, and the work of others such as Jim
Orford, Charles Winnick, and Patrick Biernacki, raised serious objections to the
"classic" disease model.
The classic disease model has been revised to accommodate the
objections raised by its critics. The new disease model, as represented by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and one of its former directors, Alan
Leshner, is the focus of chapter three. This model is an improvement over the
earlier one that Peele and Fingarette critique, but it is still vulnerable to several
serious criticisms.
The new disease model differs from its "classic" predecessor in several
respects. The most striking of these is the sophisticated level of neurological
research that has contributed to its development. While the old disease model
made use of the problematic "tolerance and withdrawal" criteria, or made
reference to the notion that addiction was based on an "allergy" or
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hypersensitivity to a substance, the new disease model makes specific claims
about the neurological foundations of addiction. Another difference is that the
new disease model is sensitive to the individual differences between addicts,
and calls for matching treatment modalities to the individual. A final difference
is the importance the new disease model places on the role of personal
responsibility in addiction, where the classic disease model tends to emphasize
absolving the addict from blame. All in all, the newer perspective offers a more
credible picture of the development of addictions than does its predecessor .
However, even though the new disease model is much clearer, more
useful and more coherent than the classic model, I shall argue that there are
still important flaws in it. The arguments given for addiction's being a disease
do not include a set of criteria for diseases and show that addiction fits them;
rather, they offer a more intuitive argument based on the presence of the
neurological changes that are a component of drug addictions. In point of fact,
it may be that addiction fits certain criteria for diseases. Even if that is the
case, it is not the best way to categorize addiction.
Chapter four begins with a discussion about the relationship between
existential anxiety and addiction. I suggest that addictions of all kinds are
attempts to avoid or mask existential anxiety. That is, compulsive habits are
ways in which we keep from having to face ourselves, our inadequacies, our
mortality. Some of these are obvious addictions - the housewife who drinks to
escape the boredom of her day, the drug addict who stays stoned to avoid the
desperation of poverty and violence - but others are not so obvious. The
"workaholic" who is overcommitted to career, thereby avoiding intimacy, is a
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more contentious addiction; some thinkers have even suggested that technology
in general is also an addiction for many (or most) of us in the United States
today. 93
I argue that addiction should be considered a compulsive habit that the
individual does not endorse rather than a disease. This definition has several

advantages over both disease models and moral models, not the least of which
is that it avoids two troubling binaries that have derailed progress on the topic;
namely the binary of disease vs. moral models and the binary of freedom vs.
determinism. My definition of addiction emphasizes three themes: the
phenomenology of addiction, a focus on habit instead of freedom or
determinism, and the goal of authenticity.
The use of the term "phenomenology" here refers to the experience of
being addicted, which I take to be a feeling of compulsion toward the addictive
object. This experience of compulsion has been a theme in discussions of
addiction throughout the history of the topic. E.M. Jellinek was the first to
elevate the status of this feeling of compulsion to a position of prominence; for
Jellinek, compulsion to drink was the symptom that characterized the disease
variety of alcoholism. My contention is that Jellinek was right to focus on the
experience of alcoholics, but that his conclusion that such experience makes
alcoholism a disease is inaccurate. Lastly, I expand on this last component in a
discussion of the manner in which addiction limits authenticity. Addiction
limits authenticity, in part, by creating powerful, conflicting desires. In addition
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to their being characterized by a sense of compulsion, the addictive desires are
those that interfere with the addict's life project.

52

Chapter Two: Two Anti-Disease Model Theorists: Flngarette and Peele

One commonly held conception of addiction is that addiction is a disease.
The disease model of addiction has fallen in and out of favor since it was first
introduced by the physician Benjamin Rush in the eighteenth century. While
different versions of this model exist, the basic idea is that addiction is an
illness to which certain people are vulnerable. These people engage in their
addictions without the consent of their will; they can't help doing what they do,
nor can they control how much they do it. Once they start, they become
increasingly involved in their addiction, neglecting other important features of
their lives, until they reach a crisis. From this crisis point they either get help
and abstain from their addictive object, or they begin another cycle.
While the disease model is widely held by the general public, including
many who work in the addiction treatment industry, many of the people doing
research in the field have rejected it. Philosopher Herbert Fingarette goes so
far as to say " . . . no leading research authorities accept the classic disease
concept. "94 Fingarette, along with psychologist Stanton Peele, argues that the
disease model is not supported by data, that it is inconsistent, and that it is
ineffective at best, dangerous at worst. The disease model, they argue,
oversimplifies a complex problem. People engage in addictions for many
different reasons and respond to different interventions. They do not have the
same disease, and cannot benefit from a single "cure." Fingarette confines his
topic to drinking, while Peele addresses other addictions as well. Both call for
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replacing the disease model with an understanding of addictive behavior that
accounts for the diversity of experiences and behavior that accompany it.
Fingarette advocates a perspective on heavy drinking (he eschews the
term "alcoholism") in which heavy drinking is a central activity in the drinker's
life. A central activity is a habit around which an individual defines herself.
Common central activities include career, religious affiliation, and hobbies. It is
the result of a series of the individual's preferences and choices, although it
bears noting that some choices can have unanticipated or unintended results.
Once a central activity becomes established, it becomes difficult to change
because so much of the individual's life depends on it. Fingarette rejects the
disease model of alcoholism in favor of a rich picture of heavy drinking as a
destructive habit. Similarly, Peele advocates a perspective in which addiction is
a maladaptive way of coping with problems in a person's life. This way of
coping affects everything in a person's life, from the smoker who is able to stay
in a high-stress job that is ruining her health because the cigarettes help her
manage in the short term, to the compulsive shopper who indulges in "retail
therapy" to deal with depression, to the multi-drug street addict who uses
because that's the only thing that makes her existence bearable.
Both thinkers reject "easy, simplistic" solutions to addiction and
alcoholism, and regard moralistic models and well as disease models as
wrongheaded. Addictions are remarkably hard to break. Puritanical
reproaches of the "Just Say No" variety fail to appreciate the complexity of
addiction. However, with appropriate motivation and support, people can and
94
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do quit. Addiction, they both maintain, is not some mysterious force to be
exorcised; rather, it is a comprehensible (if destructive) aspect of human
behavior.
Fingarette's book was published in 1 988; Peele's books were published in
the 1 980's and early 1 990's. Why focus on authors whose work is so old? Why
not concentrate on more recent attacks on the classic disease model? There are
two reasons. The first is that these two are the first and most noteworthy
critics of the classic disease model. Their work forms the foundation of the
debate that continues in recent literature . The second is that, while the disease
concept has continued to evolve in the literature , the disease concept in the
mind of the general public has not. In order to get the richest perspective , the
evolution of the disease concept must be considered. I will argue later that the
"new" disease model does not answer the objections raised by these early
critics.

Stanton Peele

Stanton Peele is a psychologist who has written extensively on addiction.
His :first book on the topic, Love and Addiction, co-authored with Archie
Brodsky, was published in 1 975. Since then he has written several other books
and many articles on the subject, including The Meaning ofAddiction, ( 1 985) ,

Diseasing ofAmerica, ( 1 989 , 1 995, 1 999) and The Truth about Addiction and
Recovery (with Archie Brodsky and Mary Arnold) ( 1 99 1 ) .

3. emphasis in original.
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Peele maintains a vociferous criticism of the disease model of addiction.
He argues that the disease model, which he defines as the belief that addiction
is a biological disorder marked by an inability to control one's behavior due to
the pharmacological effects of a substance on the individual, is a
misconception based upon bad data about opiate use. 95 According to Peele, the
disease model of addiction has been thoroughly disproved. Controlled use of
narcotics by even regular and heavy users of these drugs96 , the presence of
addictive behavior in users of nonnarcotic substances (including substances
that do not produce physiological withdrawal) , 97 and variations in self
administered substance use in animals98 support his contention that addiction
is not simply a result of the pharmacological action of a substance on an
individual's brain. In fact, addictive behavior appears in individuals who are
not substance users at all. For this reason, Peele subscribes to a version of
unitary theory, the notion that many behaviors can be understood as
addictions; i.e. that many compulsive nondrug involvements such as
compulsive gambling, exercise, and the like are properly called addictions. 99
While certain kinds of experiences are more likely to be addictive than others , in
theory anything could become an addiction. However, no addictions - neither
heroin nor gambling nor compulsive orange juice consumption - are diseases.
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Peele's objection to the disease model is not just that it happens to be
false. He argues that the disease model is morally and intellectually sloppy;
that it undercuts moral and legal standards of personal responsibility,
pathologizes and medicalizes normal emotions and problems, and encourages
a fatalistic, self-preoccupied perspective on life.
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Further, not only does it fail

to ameliorate the problem of addiction, it actually increases the incidence of
addictive behavior, since it convinces people that their behavior is not under
their own control and makes it less likely that people will mature out of their
addiction (because of their mistaken belief that they have a disease) , as many
normally do . 1 0 1 His objection to the disease model, then, might be called
pragmatic and moral as well as scientific. The fact that the disease model
emerged from sloppy science cannot be excused by saying that it nonetheless is
useful or has good consequences, as some disease model advocates suggest.
The worst thing about the disease model, Peele argues, is the damage it causes
to individuals, to communities, and ultimately to the culture as a whole.
Evidence Against the Disease Model
Peele argues that the notion that addiction is a physiological
phenomenon marked by irresistible craving and a loss of control over one's
behavior toward an addictive substance has been debunked by a great deal of
evidence. Even so, most people - researchers as well as the general public continue to believe the classic disease model of addiction. He suggests that one
factor that has influenced the pervasiveness of this model is that it is derived
largely from research on heroin addiction. The prevailing beliefs about heroin
100
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use are based on studies in which the subjects came from treatment centers
for drug abuse . This clinical data is biased because all of the heroin users in
such centers are there precisely because they cannot control their drug use. In
contrast, naturalistic studies of heroin use show greater variation, as well as
less destructiveness, in the behavior of those who use such drugs . 102
Peele notes that there are numerous studies that document controlled, or
nonaddicted narcotics use. A 1 984 study by N .E Zinberg, for example ,
identified both controlled and addictive patterns of narcotics use . Zinberg
concluded that nonaddicted narcotics users control their desire for the drug
according to other values; for example, in order not to interfere with work or
nondrug-related recreation. Contrary to popular belief, some individuals use
narcotics regularly but are able to abstain when they need or want to . 103
Perhaps even more significant is the finding by L. N. Robins, et al in 1 975 that
even a previous history of addiction does not preclude non-addictive narcotics
use. Robins and her colleagues studied Vietnam veterans who had been
addicted to narcotics while in the service. Of their subjects, half used heroin
after returning to the United States, but only fourteen percent became
readdicted to the drug. Despite such findings, and despite the fact that
narcotics and other now-illicit drugs were widely used with low rates of
addiction in the nineteenth century, 104 there has been considerable reluctance
to accept the existence of controlled narcotics users. Narcotic drugs are the
clearest case of addictive objects; if some can use them in a controlled manner
101
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then it cannot be the case that they produce an irresistible loss of control, and
the disease model loses some of its force.
Similarly, alcohol is a substance with clear addictive potential. During
the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century in the United
States, alcohol was widely believed to be inherently addictive; this belief led to
Prohibition in 1 920. 105 (Ironically, this was the same time that the use of
opiates was commonplace!) Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century
the notion that alcohol is only addictive for a specific group of people - i.e. ,
those who are born alcoholics - gained popularity. Despite this belief, Peele
cites a number of studies that document controlled drinking by individuals who
had been determined to be alcoholics. 106

107

According to Peele , the fact that

alcoholics can and do sometimes control their drinking does not mean that
there is no such thing as alcoholism or people who abuse alcohol; it simply
means that alcohol abuse is not the result of some disease process that is
beyond individuals' control.
There is also the matter of addictive features that do not involve
narcotics or alcohol. Many nonnarcotic drugs are popularly considered
addictive. However, since marijuana, cocaine, and amphetamines (among
others) do not produce chemical dependency , 108 and yet many people certainly
seem to be addicted to them, there needs to be some explanation for addictive
behavior in users of nonaddictive substances.
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One attempt to do this while maintaining the traditional view of addiction
is the World Health Organization's distinction between physical and psychic
dependence. 109 According 1 964 WHO guidelines, physical dependence is an
unavoidable result of the biochemical action of certain drugs. Psychic
dependence, in contrast, is determined by the extent to which the use of a drug
is a central activity for an individual, and to which it edges out other coping
mechanisms for that individual. 1 10 As Peele notes, all recreational drugs can
be classified as producing psychic dependence, whether or not they produce
physical dependence. However, " . . . [t]he concept of psychic dependence cannot
distinguish compulsive drug involvements .. . from compulsive overeating,
gambling, and television viewing. " 1 1 1 It makes more sense, Peele argues, to
simply use the term "addiction" for all compulsive, destructive activities. The
most important features of addiction are behavioral rather than physiological;
if not, there would be no need to create terms such as "psychic dependence."
Furthermore, drug studies involving animals support the argument that
addiction is not the irresistible force of a substance on an individual. While
there are many studies that document caged laboratory animals self
administering high, regular doses of drugs, studies that take the animals'
environment into account show significant variation in how much of a drug the
animals self-administer. A 1979 study by Patricia Hadaway, et al, made a
morphine-sucrose solution available to rats under two conditions. One group of
rats was in isolated cages, while the other group was placed in a more
109
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naturalistic environment that was larger, contained more diversions, and
contained sixteen to twenty rats of both sexes. The rats in this latter
environment, dubbed "Rat Park" consumed significantly less morphine-sucrose
solution than did their caged counterparts. Further studies and analysis have
led to the conclusion that space and social interaction have a combination
effect (that is, these factors together have a greater effect than either factor
taken alone) on drug use in rats. 1 1 2
These animal findings are, of course, subject to all of the limitations that
any animal-to-human generalizations are. However, they do support findings in
human research that there are several important nonbiological factors in
addiction. An individual's culture, social situation, environment, stage of
development, personality, and beliefs and expectations about drugs have
powerful effects on his or her behavior. These factors can affect an individual's
desire for drugs or alcohol, her behavior while using drugs or alcohol, as well as
her experience of withdrawal of drugs or alcohol. 1 1 3 The fact that, for example ,
subjects in studies by Marlatt and Rohsenow ( 1 980) and Wilson ( 1 98 1) became
aggressive and sexually aroused when they mistakenly believed they were
drinking alcohol, but did not when they drank disguised alcoholic beverages 1 1 4
supports Peele's claim that the effect a substance has on an individual is not
simply a matter of biochemistry.
According to Peele, people become addicted to

experiences.

"First and

foremost, addictive experiences are potent modifiers of mood and sensation, in
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part because of their direct pharmacological action or physical impact and in
part because of their learned symbolic significance." 1 15 Addictive experiences
tend to be those that provide a feeling of power and control (gambling,
drinking), security or calm (barbiturates, cigarettes) , exhilaration (cocaine,
amphetamines, gambling), or comfort and being cared for (shopping, eating.)
This helps to explain why certain addictions are correlated with different groups
of people. For example, lower socioeconomic class is associated with problem
drinking and obesity 1 1 6 , while compulsive running and dieting is associated
with middle and upper socioeconomic class. 1 1 7 Of course, one has to wonder
what definition is being used for "problem drinking, " as it may be that lower
socioeconomic class is correlated more with being unable to avoid problems
associated with drinking than with compulsive drinking itself. Even so, many
studies show that rate of addiction and choice of addictive object are related to
life phase and socioeconomic class, vary along cultural and ethnic lines, and
are influenced by an individual's peers and parents. 1 1 8

1 19

"What is more, as Vaillant ( 1 983) noted for alcoholics and Wishnie ( 1 977)
for heroin addicts, reformed substance abusers often form strong compulsions
toward eating, prayer, and other nondrug involvements ." 1 20 Anyone who has
ever been to an AA meeting knows that these recovering alcoholics smoke an
astonishing number of cigarettes and drink impressive amounts of bad coffee. I
have even heard AA members who attend one or more meetings a day to remark
1 ,s
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wryly that they have traded addiction to alcohol for addiction to meetings!
Addictive behavior has been documented with such non-drug involvements as
running, 1 2 1 gambling, 122 and love. 1 23 This supports Peele's argument that
addiction has more to do with an individual's behavioral response to his or her
environment and less to do with his or her physiological response to a
substance.
Dangers to Individuals
As noted above, some disease model theorists acknowledge the scientific
problems with this model, but argue that it is nonetheless a useful model
because it is more humane than moralistic models of addiction. They maintain
that disease models offer addicts a face-saving way to seek treatment for their
problem, rather than driving them away from help with judgmental attitudes
and condemnation. Peele offers a steady criticism of this notion of disease
models as "useful fiction," arguing that such thinking does far more harm than
good.
Perhaps the simplest reason disease models are dangerous to individuals
according to Peele, is that they don't work very well. Untreated people fare at
least as well as, and sometimes better than, treated patients. One outstanding
illustration of this is Dr. George Vaillant's classic The Natural History of
Alcoholism, which Peele cites extensively in several of his own works. Vaillant, a

Harvard psychiatrist, compared alcoholic patients in his program (which
included inpatient detoxification, mandatory AA meetings, and counseling) with
121 Stanton Peele. How Much is Too Much· Healthy Habits or Destructive Addictions. (New
Jersey: Prentice- H all, 1 98 1 .) p. 3 7.
1 22 How Much is Too Much, p. 1 1 .
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alcoholics who received no treatment. He found that " . . . [a]fter initial discharge ,
only five patients in the Clinic sample [of one hundred] never returned to
alcoholic drinking, and there is compelling evidence that the results of our
treatment were no better than the natural history of the disease ." 1 24
Furthermore, Peele cites the American Cancer Society and other sources
indicating that ninety-five percent of Americans who quit smoking did so on
their own, 1 2 5 and a study by the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers
for Disease Control that found that individuals who tried to quit smoking on
their own were significantly more likely to be successful than individuals who
used smoking cessation programs . 126 Since many people consider smoking to
be the hardest addiction to give up, these findings are notable. Finally, Peele
cites a study by Columbia psychologist Stanley Schachter which found that
obese people who had never entered a weight loss program showed better long
term weight loss than those who did, 1 27 and Patrick Biemacki's 1 986 book,
Pathways from Heroin Addiction: Recovery Without Treatment, that describes

the many ways in which untreated heroin addicts quit their drug habits. These
and other studies strongly suggest that treatment is not the only way (or even
the most effective or reliable way) to kick the habit.
These findings could easily be misconstrued to say that addiction is not
really a problem, because even doing nothing works as well - or sometimes
1 23 The Meaning ofAddiction, p. 54.
124 George Vaillant. The Natural Histo ry o/ Alcoholism (Cambrid ge: Harvard University
Press , 1 983 . ) p. 283-84 .
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better - as therapy. That is not Peele's assertion , as both treated and
untreated individuals persist with their unhealthy habits for a long time and
cause a lot of damage before they quit. And there are tragic cases in both
conditions in which individuals never do quit. Rather than therapeutic
interventions, Peele favors approaches to addiction that focu s on the
individual's personal values, achieving a sense of balance, and reliance on
community support.
The fact that disease-based approaches to addiction simply don't work is
dangerous because, while such approaches are being tried, other, more likely
to-be-effective approaches are not being tried. Further, time , effort and money
spent on an ineffective approach leave less of these resources for other
approaches.

Failure at the goals generated by these approaches , moreover,

can diminish the sense of hope and self-efficacy that one needs to quit an
addiction.
It is morally and economically necessary for us to evaluate the
effectiveness of alcoholism and other addiction treatments. For we
are wasting limited health-care resources to place people in
expensive treatments - treatments that have not been shown
they do more than inexpensive, straightforward skills counseling
or than people accomplish on their own - often more reliably! 1 2s
A related problem is that the disease model makes it less likely that
individuals will " grow out of it". That addicts often do "mature out" of heroin
addiction was documented by sociologist Charles Winnick, 129 and has been
supported by other studies of heroin addicts and alcoholics. 1 3° As noted
elsewhere in this chapter, individuals' beliefs about addiction affect their
128
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perceptions and their behavior. Winnick found that the minority of heroin
addicts who do not mature out of addiction believe that there is no point in
trying to beat their habit; these are persons "who decide that they are 'hooked,'
make no effort to abandon addiction, and give in to what they regard as
inevitable." 1 3 1 Of course, it could be argued that this minority of addicts hold
the belief that addiction can't be overcome precisely because they truly do have
a disease that continues to rage in their later years . Perhaps those who mature
out never had the disease form of addiction, and those who remain addicted are
the ones are diseased. However, this is circular reasoning: Certain addicts
have the disease form of addiction . How do you know? Because they never
recover. Why don't they ever recover? Because they have a disease that keeps
them from recovering.
Disease model theorists, who favor abstinence as the only appropriate
treatment goal, argue that relapse is such an overwhelming possibility for
alcoholics that suggesting to them that they might be able to drink moderately
is morally wrong. However, belief in the disease model - and privileging
abstinence - may pose its own dangers. Peele cites several studies that
suggest that those trying to achieve strict abstinence are more likely to binge
following a single drink than those who are not attempting to maintain strict
abstinence. 1 32 He argues that the disease model teaches that alcoholics are
unable to control themselves after they drink any alcohol (in AA lingo, "One
drink, one drunk") , and that this belief facilitates out-of-control behavior. This
130 The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 23 .
131 Charles Winnick. Maturing Out of Narcotic Addiction." Bulletin o n Narcotics 1 4 : 1 -7 .
1962. p. 6 . cited in Meaning of Addiction, p . 122.
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is not to say that Peele rejects abstinence as a reasonable goal for some people;
rather, he rejects the notion that abstinence is the only acceptable goal for
addicted persons. What is important about the goal is that it fits with the
values, lifestyle, resources , and deficits of the individual.
A final danger of disease models is that treatment is and has been forced
on people "for their own good" on the grounds that addicts are "in denial" about
their disease and hence unable to make judgements about their lives. Coerced
treatment is indefensible on moral and legal grounds, Peele argues. Disease
model-based treatments require participants to accept the identity of a diseased
person as the beginning point of therapy. To force a person to assume an
identity that she does not feel is her own, especially when that identity involves
being incurably diseased, is morally wrong. Likewise, remanding people to AA
is unconstitutional because of its emphasis on spirituality. (Despite the fact
that AA' s "Higher Power," "Power greater than ourselves" and "God as we
understood Him" can be interpreted as loosely as one wishes, some people do

object to AA on the grounds of "spiritual coercion" - bullying people into a
spiritual milieu that is not their own.) Coerced treatment is particularly odious,
however, because treatment for addiction is so notoriously ineffective . 1 33
Therefore, it cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds (because it doesn't
work) or on the grounds of preventing harm to others (because it is an attempt
to "cure" the individual, not an attempt to prevent her from harming others. ) It
is neither humane nor effective , claims Peele, to force people to get better,
especially when they were not sick to begin with .
132
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Coercive treatment can tak e many fo rms. The most straightforward
cases ar e those in which you ng people are commi tted by thei r parents to
treatment centers. Peele argu es that thi s i s becoming more common becau se of
the mark eting of addicti on treatment fo r adolescents to frig htened parents. 134
A lcoholi sm, dru g addiction, eati ng disorders and the like are real problems that
g enuinely do affect adolescents, bu t they are not di seases and cannot be
am eliorated if treated as su ch. Ou t of fe ar, a lack of u nderstandi ng , an a
desperate desi re to do somethi ng , par ents bu y i nto the treatment indu stry' s
char acterizati on of these problems, al ong with the i ndu stry' s simple, dram ati c,
and ex pensi ve soluti on. Other examples of coerci ve treatment inclu de cou rt
ordered treatment as an al tern ati ve to jail or other pu ni shments and employee
assistance program s that require employees to g o to rehab in order to retai n a
j ob. Su ch measu res do not hold people responsi ble fo r thei r behavior, bu t
rath er coerce people to accept a new, damagi ng self- concept: th at of an ad di ct.
Rather than fo rce people to u nderg o costly, in effecti ve treatment th at teaches
them that they are u nable to control thei r li ves, Peele ar g u es that we shou ld
simply hold them accou ntabl e fo r the actions that make addi cti on obj ectionable
i n the first place. Addi cti on i s not some mysteri ou s g host i n the machi ne; i t is a
comprehensib le (thoug h harmfu l) way of approachi ng the world. I f we don' t
approve, we need to say so; if we fi nd some of the behavi or associ ated wi th
addi cti on u nacceptable ( e. g. , lying , DUI) we need to stop ex cu sing it.
Perhaps the most fu ndam ental claim Peele makes is that i ndi vidu als are
acti ve parti ci pan ts i n th eir addi cti ons, not passi ve vi ctims of them. Whi le
The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 364.
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addictions are indeed difficult to break, addicted persons are still responsible
(in both the moral and the causal sense) for their own involvement in them.
Addiction - which he defines as "an ingrained habit that undermines your
health, your work, your relationships, your self-respect, but that you feel you
cannot change" 1 35 - is situated within the rest of individuals' lives. It
expresses their values, their skills, and their deficiencies. Moreover, rather
than being an inevitable expression of individuals' neurochemistry, addiction is
an expression of individuals' value options. "The environments and value
options people face do have tremendous implications for drug use and drug
addiction, as well as for teen pregnancy and other social disabilities and
problems. " 136

In an important sense, then, the most important danger that

the disease model poses to individuals is the dangers it poses to communities.
Dangers to Communities
According to Peele, research has shown that people are more vulnerable
to addiction if they face certain kinds of problems. The common idea that
"addiction can strike anyone" is misleading. While no one is immune to
addiction, it does affect people whose lives are dangerous, hopeless or
meaningless to a far greater degree. 1 37 Therefore, the poor, those with few
social supports, people who are under undue stress are more vulnerable to
developing addictions than others. 138 To suggest that alcoholism is not related
to poverty because there are rich alcoholics, for example , is like saying that
gender is not related to power because Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of
4
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England. Addiction seems to affect middle- and upper-classes to a greater
degree than it really does because they are the "squeaky wheels" in many ways .
While recognition of the social factors that contribute to addiction does not
obviate individual responsibility for personal choices, it does indicate that these
social factors must be addressed.
In Diseasing of America, Peele situates his call for community-level
responses to addiction in a discussion of the historical progression of the use of
the word "disease" . 1 3 9 Diseases that are lmown by their effects on the body 
those that are defined by measurable physical effects - are labeled "first
generation diseases ." These are uncontroversially diseases. I will add that
while these diseases clearly have non-physical dimensions (a broken leg can
cause feelings of frustration, depression) they are still primarily related to the
function of the body. The "second generation diseases" are somewhat more
controversial. These are mental illnesses and emotional disorders, known to us
by our observations of the individual's behavior, and by what she reports about
how she feels, what she thinks, and so on. And while these clearly have
physical dimensions (many mental illnesses respond to psychotropic
medication) they are still primarily related to disordered beliefs and feelings.
The third generation of conditions to be called "diseases" are addictions. These
are known to us by the behaviors they describe: compulsive over-consumption
of something or compulsive and excessive engagement in some activity.
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Some, notably psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, dispute labeling mental and
emotional problems "diseases," arguing that these are importantly different
from "real" (physical) diseases. Likewise, Peele rejects the notion that addiction
is a disease. However, he does think that an environmental approach to
disease control, which has been adopted for many first generation diseases,
should be adopted for addictions as well It is fairly well-recognized that mental
states affect physical wellness and illness, that a positive frame of mind,
balanced perspective on life, and solid social supports can promote healing and
perhaps even help prevent illness in the first place. (Perhaps the best-known
example of this phenomenon is the greater risk of heart disease and "type A
personalities".) It is no great leap to recognize that nurturing communities that
offer hope and a sense that people can control their destinies can contribute to
a positive mental outlook. From here it is no great leap to say that
communities in which people are isolated from one another, communities that
have few resources and offer little hope, are likely going to produce members
with high rates of diseases of all kinds. An environmental approach to
controlling some "first generation diseases" - especially infectious diseases has been effective.
Yet we have not generalized this environmental approach very well
in the later stages of disease control. For example, we don't fight
mental illness by trying to create better communities, even though
we know community support is a tremendous force for mental
health. Our environmental approaches to drugs are of the most
superficial kind - cutting off drug supplies. We fail entirely to
ask which communities inspire the most drug abuse. Instead, we
argue (contrary to all common sense and epidemiological evidence)
that community approaches don't make sense because drug
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addiction and alcoholism are diseases to which those in all
communities are equally vulnerable . 140
Addiction and community interface in several ways. First, disconnected
communities contribute to addiction. Few social supports, few opportunities for
rewards and meaningful activity, and the presence of social problems (such as
violence and poverty) create a stressful and hopeless milieu. Peele suggests
that addiction arises in individuals who are undergoing stresses that they
cannot realistically expect to modify, a claim that is supported by a number of
studies. 1 4 1 The corollary to this is that solid communities are an effective
defense against addiction. Secondly, addiction harms communities in obvious
ways; addicted people are not available to be contributing members of their
communities as well as nonaddicted members are. Some addicts are real
threats to their communities, others are merely self-absorbed and not able to
participate in the groups they belong to as fully as they would if not for their
addiction.
Thirdly, the disease model of addiction harms communities. One reason
for this is that it misses the point: it makes us fear things that are not real and
that we can't fix, while allowing us to remain blissfully unaware of the problems
that are real and that we can fix. For Peele, the disease model of addiction is
part of a trend in America to overdramatize remote-but-scary things (e.g., the
fear, perpetuated by movies, news media and government agencies, of strangers
kidnapping children and drugging Halloween candy) while ignoring immediate
problems that hard work can change (e.g., our crumbling communities,
140
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steadily-rising obesity rates and sedentary lifestyles) . The disease model
perpetuates both fear and hopelessness with its mantra that we are out of
control of our selves and our world, and fear and hopelessness are two of the
very factors that exacerbate addiction. "We fear so many things that already too
much of our society's ameliorative energy goes toward warning people against
and protecting them from the many addictive dangers we have discovered." 14 2
We Americans do not know or trust our neighbors and tend to see family as an
arcane and ludicrous chore, and yet we join self-help groups in which we
willingly disclose our personal traumas to others.
A related danger of disease models of addiction to communities is that
they encourage a self-centered perspective that precludes the very community
involvement that inoculates people against addiction. Peele argues that both
the support of a solid community and the individuals' caring about their
community protect people from developing addictions. These are important
factors in quitting addictions, as well. 1 43 Disease models focus intensely on the
individual and her feelings; they have no room for other-directed action or
attention. Some versions of the disease model are notably self-indulgent and
explicitly eschew the needs of others (much of the literature CoDependents
Anonymous illustrates this point.) 1 44 Peele does not advocate completely
selfless, other-directed values, but emphasizes the importance of "getting out of
your own head" in quitting addiction. Addictions themselves are self
preoccupied endeavors; disease models of addiction and recovery are as well.
The Meaning of Addiction, p. 1 1 2.
Diseasing of America, p. 238.
1 43 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery,
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Further, disease models reduce behavior to biology, which undercuts
moral and legal standards. Since behavior that was once criminal or just plain
stupid is now "diseased," nobody can be said to be responsible for anything
they do. "Diseases" from drug addiction (as in the case of Joel Steinberg, who
beat his daughter, Lisa, to death) 145 to overindulgence in junk food and
excessive TV (as in the case of Dan White, who killed San Francisco mayor
George Moscone) 146 have been used to explain and excuse all manner of
wrongdoing, including murder. This leads to some incoherent legal and social
policy. For example, " . . . employees found to be unable to perform their jobs
because of drunkenness cannot be fired by Minnesota state law (or by that of a
majority of states) but must be treated at the employer's or insurer's
expense," 1 47 but meanwhile many states are cracking down on drunk drivers.
Evidently alcoholism on the job is a disease, but alcoholism in your vehicle is a
crime.
Finally, disease models pathologize normal human experiences. By
contrast, the view that addiction is an ingrained habit with negative
consequences allows for degrees of addiction and allows for negative human
experiences that are not "sick" . For example, on a disease model, someone who
overeats for emotional comfort is a "compulsive overeater" who has a
permanent, diseased relationship to food. On Peele's model, this same person
has an unhealthy, hard-to-break habit that is helping her to cope with
problems in her life . On the disease model, the compulsive overeater should
144
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accept that she has a disease, attend Overeaters Anonymous or some similar
support group, and completely abstain from her "trigger foods" (usually all
sweets, snacks and rich foods .) On Peele's model, she should identify what
eating does for her, find other ways to get those needs met, and select goals
regarding eating that fit with her goals for her life. 148 Rather than a nation of
imperfect individuals with some bad habits to work on (or with some good
habits to cultivate) with disease models we are becoming increasingly sick, sad,
and self-absorbed - hardly the legacy we want to pass along to the next
generation. "If we cannot persuade our children that they have the capacity to
manage their lives and that the world is worth living in -- and then work to
create a world in which this is true -- medical treatments will expand endlessly
but will be unable to help us. " 1 49
Better Approaches
According to Peele, treatment for addiction generally does not work,
because most treatment programs are based on faulty assumptions about the
nature of addiction. The only way to help addicted persons - and those
affected by the behavior of addicted persons - is to bring about social change.
Such change must include creating a moral climate in which people are
expected to behave themselves. 1 50 In must also include strengthening our
communities so that people can flourish.
The rise in disease treatments for behaviors and emotions is
primarily a compensation for our deteriorated community. It is
not an answer to this deterioration. Instead, we need to take
Diseasing of America, p. 127.
The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, parts II and III.
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responsibility for our communities and make them more
efficacious. While this is certainly a difficult undertaking, there is
no substitute for it. t s 1
The goal for addicted persons should be a life of self-esteem, personal
competence, and contribution to others. It should include opportunities for
accomplishment and recognition. Disease model approaches to addiction, in
contrast, foster an identity of powerlessness and endless therapy. Some groups
based on disease models of addiction (e.g. AA) are supportive communities
themselves, but they require their members to be "sick" in order to get the
support they need. There is something dreadfully wrong, Peele argues , about
the disease-model notion that addicts can perpetually be "in recovery" but never
"recovered." Unlike some "first generation" diseases that are manageable but
not curable (e.g. diabetes) addiction supposedly persists even when all the
definitive symptoms (the addictive behaviors) have been gone for years. With
supportive communities that foster wellness and self-efficacy, addiction is not
only amerliorable, but preventable.
The most promising approach to addiction, then, starts with
communities. We need to start by recognizing that our resources are finite , and
that cost-effectiveness is an important criterion in selecting an approach to a
problem. Medical model programs are not only ineffective, they are
expensive. 1 52 Therapeutic Communities, in which residents learn life skills and
have as their goal the ex-addict's return to the community, are comparatively
effective . However, they are expensive and artificial. In contrast, the
Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) is both effective and relatively
151
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inexpensive; in fact, " ... it is the most cost-effective treatment on record for
alcoholism." 1 53 Participants in a CRA identify people in their community who
can help them develop and maintain healthy habits in each aspect of their lives.
Such people might include family members, friends, co-workers, as well as
others. Participants who do not already have such supports are assigned a
partner for the areas in which they need one. CRA coordinators help addicts to
restore community supports, but do not do anything for addicts that they can
do for themselves. The coordinators also help partners develop specific ways in
which they can help the addicted person stop the addictive behavior. In tum,
the people who partner with addicts provide motivation and accountability for
them to live up to their goals. This approach preserves the dignity of addicted
persons because it neither berates them with heavy-handed moralizing, nor
infantilizes them with excuses for their inappropriate behavior.
An important component of this approach is developing the outlook that
individuals and communities can bring about desired goals, called efficacy.
Community efficacy is important for each individual's sense of efficacy. 1 54 Self
efficacy requires a sense of personal competence, a belief that the world is
comprehensible, and that some minimum of social and material resources are
available. Disease models work against self-efficacy by convincing people that
they are incompetent to their very core because of their disease. They explicitly
state that, try as they will, addicts simply cannot control their own behavior or
make their own decisions regarding their addictive habits. They will go off the
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deep end unless they abstain altogether. Disease models also work against self
efficacy because they posit a mysterious disease state that is responsible for the
addict's baffling behavior, rather than the simpler, more accurate and more
accessible explanation that addiction is a disruptive pattern brought about by a
series of individual choices.
Interestingly, Peele calls for the legalization of drugs. He argues that
drug use in and of itself should not be considered a crime, especially
considering the variety of experiences (i.e. addictive and non-addictive) that
people have with drugs. However, criminal activity and bad behavior should
never be legally or socially excused, even when related to addiction. 1 55 Further,
drug screening in the workplace and in schools should be replaced by high
performance standards and the expectation that inappropriate behavior
(addiction-related or not) will not be tolerated. 1 56 Treatment for addiction
should be fully voluntary, and should fit with the individual's values, goals, and
personality. Court-ordered treatment is unsound ethically and legally,
especially when it requires an individual to assume the identity of a sick,
incompetent, powerless somebody.
For Stanton Peele, disease models of addiction are an example of what is
worst about contemporary American society. They are short-sighted, self
indulgent and heavily dependent on medicine-as-magic. Effective approaches
require nothing more - and nothing less - than a cultural change that
emphasizes personal and community responsibility. "The only way we can
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really do something about addiction is to create a world worth living in. " 1 57
Peele seems to believe that such a world is still within our reach.

Herbert Fingarette

In contrast to clinical psychologist Stanton Peele, Herbert Fingarette is a
philosopher. His book-length critique of the disease concept of alcoholism was
one of the first attempts by a philosopher to consider the topic. While he has
not written as extensively on alcoholism as Peele has on addiction, he considers
similar evidence, rejects the disease model for similar reasons, and draws
similar conclusions as to where the solutions lie as Peele does.
In Heavy Drinking ( 1988) , Herbert Fingarette argues that the disease
concept of alcoholism is inaccurate and unuseful. Despite a consensus among
researchers in the interdisciplinary field of alcoholism studies that the disease
concept is outdated, the general public (including most of the staff at
alcoholism treatment centers) continues to believe in it. The myth of the
disease of alcoholism, firmly rooted in the culture, should be replaced by an
established fact: people who drink heavily do so for a variety of reasons. Heavy
drinking has no single cause and no single cure.
There is no "one size fits all" explanation or solution to the problem of
heavy drinking, as disease theory proponents would have us believe. "Disease
concept of alcoholism" here refers to the AA version of the disease concept and
the variations that have developed from it. It is essentially the same as the
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disease model of addiction that Peele describes. Unlike Benjamin Rush, the
18th century physician and pioneer of the disease concept of alcoholism, who
held that beer and wine were safe for everybody, and hard liquor a problem for
everybody, AA holds that only certain people are alcoholics. 1 58 If these people
do drink, they inevitably experience loss of control over their drinking and
proceed in a stepwise fashion through the stages of disease. Eventually they hit
bottom, at which point they either die of alcohol-related problems or are saved
by some power greater than themselves. Complete abstinence from alcohol is
required, at which point the alcoholic is "in recovery" but never "recovered".
The vast majority of Americans believe the disease model, even if they can't
quote it chapter and verse and even if they also hold some beliefs that are
inconsistent with it. 1 59
Some proponents of the disease concept argue that it is invaluable for
getting alcoholics the help they need, whether or not it scientifically valid. The
disease model offers a non-judgmental explanation for excessive drinking,
which allows alcoholics to seek help without sacrificing their dignity. Families
and treatment staff will be moved to respond compassionately and productively
to the heavy drinker, rather than responding accusingly and alienating her
further. However, these hoped-for effects of the disease concept often do not
materialize. In fact, many heavy drinkers react negatively to being called
"diseased" or "sick," and reject treatment that demands complete abstinence
but offers no cure.
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Like Peele , for Fingarette the most damning criticism of the disease
concept of alcoholism is this: it actually works against helping people who drink
excessively. Most of the people who drink heavily and get into trouble as a
result of their drinking do not consider themselves alcoholics; further, these
people would not be diagnosed as alcoholic by traditional diagnostic criteria.
Some twenty percent of Americans drink enough to be statistically at
substantial risk for alcohol-related disorders. The greater number of these,
states Fingarette, don't fit any of the traditional diagnoses for alcoholics. So the
very people who need help are not alcoholics by their own standards - or by
society's - and do not seek help for their problem. "In this way, the prevalence
of the disease concept narrows the scope of inquiry, concern, and help. " 160 The
most promising thinking about excessive alcohol consumption tends to focus on
difference: differences in cultural, economic, social, and political factors in
heavy drinking, as well as individual differences in motivations and patterns in
heavy drinking. This is in contrast to AA's disease model, which emphasizes
that, as a disease, alcoholism does not respect differences between individuals.
A closer look at heavy drinking reveals different patterns , motivations, and
experiences . 16 1
Finally, Fingarette nods at the notion of a "unitary theory," the
proposition that addictions and compulsions in general are related and should
coalesce into a theory about excessive appetites . While there are important
behavioral and chemical differences between the addictions, he considers the
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possibility of a unitary theory a promising area of future research. He suggests
that many of the ideas in Heavy Drinking may apply to other addictions, but
leaves it at that. 162
The Classic Disease Concept of Alcoholism
In his chapter on the history of thinking about alcoholism, Fingarette
documents the evolution of the disease model from Benjamin Rush, through the
Temperance movement, on to E.M. Jellinek and AA. Perhaps the most
significant feature of this history is Jellinek's 1 960 book, The Disease Concept of
Alcoholism. This text is the authoritative text for the disease model. The data

for this work was obtained from a questionnaire that Jellinek developed from
AA literature and administered to AA members. After eliminating certain
subjects (including all women, because their responses differed so significantly
from the men's) he had data from 98 male members of AA. His _results were
striking: they closely corroborated the disease notion of alcoholism that AA
espouses. Jellinek himself cautioned against making much of this theory, since
there were such significant limitations to the data. Nevertheless, the disease
concept of alcoholism caught on, and has remained remarkably persistent even
in the wake of countless studies that challenge it.
Fingarette suggests several reasons for this persistence. 1 63 He
perceptively discusses the current political climate that surrounds alcoholism
treatment, noting that different groups are invested in the disease model
because of what they stand to lose if it is debunked. For one, alcoholism
treatment is big business. Treatment centers and all who are connected with
162
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them stand to lose a great deal of money (in 1989, he puts the figure at $ 1
billion per year in tax revenues and health insurance coverage) if it turns out
that alcoholism is not a treatable disease after all. Further, many of the direct
service staff in alcoholism treatment are paraprofessionals who describe
themselves as recovering alcoholics. "Since their own treatment was effected at
a time when the classic disease concept of alcoholism was dominant, they tend
to have faith in the old dogma and tend to perceive any challenge to the disease
concept as a challenge to the validity of their own emotional ordeal and
conversion to sobriety." 164 The economic and psychological risks in challenging
the status quo are enormous for researchers, administrators, professional and
paraprofessional program staff, as well as individual alcoholics. The liquor
industry itself benefits from the disease concept, which, after all, holds that
only a small number of persons are diseased, and that everybody else can enjoy
their product without fear. Finally, the simplicity of the disease model is
appealing to the general public.
Fingarette notes that some people, while recognizing the inaccuracy of
the disease model, nevertheless believe that it's a useful social fiction. The
belief that alcoholism is a treatable disease rather than a moral failing
encourages a humane attitude toward alcoholics and encourages them to seek
treatment. However, he cautions that these benefits may be fiction, as well.
The notion that alcohol-related problems have a single cause (a disease) with a
single, simple solution (abstinence for all alcoholics) is reassuring. However,
despite all these benefits, the disease concept of alcoholism is false. Heavy
1 63
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drinking is caused by different factors in different people, and thereby requires
different solutions for different people. Some heavy drinkers fail to achieve total
sobriety but succeed in drinking moderately; a laudable goal of its own. 1 65 The
truth about heavy drinking is more useful than the "useful fiction" of the
disease of alcoholism.
For Fingarette, the central premise of the disease notion of alcoholism is
that alcoholics cannot control their drinking. Even when they recognize that
they will suffer if they continue to drink, their disease prevents them from
stopping. This claim, argues Fingarette, has been discredited by the scientific
community, yet it remains popular. Several studies support his argument. In
one by Mello and Mendelson ( 1 972}, diagnosed alcoholics in an inpatient
treatment center were allowed to "earn" an ounce of bourbon at a time by
pushing a button according to instructions. When and how much alcohol was
served to them was up to them. According to the disease theory, they should
have been drunk all the time. The results, however, showed that they did not
drink continuously, that they did not consume the alcohol as soon as it became
available, and that some of the subjects even tapered off their drinking in the
days just before the experiment ended, to avoid withdrawal. 166
In another by Marlatt, Deming and Reid ( 1973), diagnosed alcoholics
were divided into four groups and asked to sample different brands of a
beverage. One group was truthfully told that they were drinking plain tonic
water, the second group was truthfully told that they were drinking a mixture of
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tonic and vodka, the third group was given plain tonic water and told it was a
vodka-tonic mix, and the last group was given the vodka-tonic mix and told that
it was straight tonic. According to the disease theory, the alcoholics who were
actually drinking vodka should have consumed enough to get drunk, regardless
of their belief about what they were drinking. However, the amount consumed
depended on what the alcoholic subjects believed they were drinking; those who
thought they were drinking vodka drank significantly more than those who
thought they had straight tonic water, regardless of what they actually drank.
Further, the amount consumed remained moderate in all four groups. These and

other studies support the claim that there are no physiological factors that
compel alcoholics to consume alcohol. 167 The evidence strongly suggests that
people who drink heavily - even those who are diagnosed as having the disease
of alcoholism - are able to moderate their drinking when the reasons to do so
are salient to them.
Some disease model theorists respond to this data by arguing that the
studies did not use "real" alcoholics; since they did not demonstrate a loss of
control when confronted with alcohol, they must not have been true alcoholics.
However, this approach suggests that the portrait of alcoholism the disease
model offers is unfalsifiable, and thereby unscientific. Others, notably Yale
researcher Mark Keller, propose that the disease of alcoholism, characterized by
a loss of control over one's drinking, is multifactorial and that it can go into
remission for indefinite periods of time. However,
This new approach to loss of control so emasculates �he concept
that it becomes useless in explaining or predicting drinking
161
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behavior. There is indeed a phenomenon involving the strong
inclination to drink to excess, and it does need to be made
intelligible if possible . But the attempt to account for this by
reference to an on-again, off-again loss of control that follows no
discernible pattern will not help anyone understand why heavy
drinkers sometimes drink moderately and sometimes go on
binges. 1 6s
Fingarette might say that by applying Occam's razor to the most scientifically
comprehensive version of the disease theory, we find that the disease theory is
unnecessary to explain heavy drinking.
There are several scientific theories as to what causes problem drinking.
Among these are genetic, metabolic, psychological and socio-cultural
hypotheses. 1 69 While each of these identifies risk factors that problem drinkers
would be well advised to pay attention to, none of these adequately explains
why some people drink heavily, nor do they adequately predict when such
people will drink heavily and when they will abstain or drink moderately . 11 0
The consensus is that there is no single cause for excessive drinking.

While

surely there are factors that increase the likelihood that a person will drink
excessively, each person is a unique combination of these.
It follows from the claim that alcoholism has no single cause that there is
no single cure that will work for all problem drinkers. Indeed, Fingarette argues
for tailoring the treatment to each problem drinker' s situation. He argues
forcefully, however, against modes of treatment for alcoholism that rely on the
disease model . Two of his premises are scientific in nature; one is
philosophical. In the name of science , he cites studies that have shown that
168 Heavy Drinking p. 44.
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heavy drinkers who receive intensive treatment fare no better than those who
receive a single counseling session in which each patient was told that he (all
subjects were male) and he alone had to deal with his situation.

111

So, to begin

with, there are good reasons to question the efficacy of disease model inspired
modes of treatment. Secondly, he notes that data regarding the efficacy of
Alcoholics Anonymous (which holds that alcoholism is a disease) is suspicious.
The number of drinkers who successfully stop drinking with M varies widely
from source to source, and is in any case a self-selected group. Since
participation in M is voluntary, it may well be that those who succeed are
those that stay, rather than the other way around. 1 72
In the name of philosophy, Fingarette argues that treatment goals based
on the disease model are incoherent. The goal of treatment for such programs
- since alcoholics are held to have a disease, not unlike an allergy to alcohol is abstention from drinking for the alcoholic. "Treatment" in this context does
not mean "cure," since alcoholism is thought to be an incurable disease.
Instead, "treatment" refers to a regimen that purports to ease or eliminate the
symptoms of the disease, rather like achieving remission from or entering a
latency phase of an illness .
The paradox is this: the alcoholic is believed to have a disease that
makes it impossible for her not to drink. The essential feature of this disease is
that its victims cannot stop drinking; that they suffer from a loss of control with
regard to alcohol. How, then, are they expected to achieve the treatment goal
1 70
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set out by the treatment industry, namely abstinence? Some reply that the
loss of control happens after the first drink; again, much like an allergic
reaction happens after initial contact with the allergen. (The M slogan "one
drink, one drunk" speaks to this.) This is the very reason that alcoholics are
encouraged to abstain from drinking altogether. However, notes Fingarette, the
allergy analogy breaks down before it can be of any use in explaining excessive
drinking. People who have serious allergies don't need treatment programs or
support groups to encourage them to stay away from allergens; especially if
they have ever experienced an adverse reaction, they simply avoid the offending
substance. Once sober, then, why would an alcoholic ever take another "first"
drink?l 73
Fingarette's final blow to disease model modes of treatment is that they
hijack medical language and metaphors without (often) using medicine for
treatment. Most notably, while M uses terms like disease, symptom, and
allergy,

the "treatment" M offers is explicitly nonmedical. 1 74 I would add that it

isn't even psychological in any clinical/counseling sense; it is utterly pragmatic.
Fingarette alludes to the possibility that the powerful - and useful - aspects
of M are not dependent on the disease model. In fact, it may be that more
people would be moved to try "the AA way" if it weren't for the problems that the
disease model imports.

Specifically, he cites Jim Orford and Griffith Edwards. Alcoholism - A comparison of
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New Approaches to Heavy Drinking
If alcoholism is not a disease , then what are we to make of people who
drink excessively and get into trouble because of their drinking? Rather than a
homogenous group with a single problem or set of problems, Fingarette
suggests that problem drinkers are a diverse group that " . . . have little in
common except that ( 1) they drink a lot, (2) they tend to have many more
problems in life than nondrinkers or moderate drinkers, and (3) they show a
puzzlingly inconsistent ability to manage their drinking." 175 Problem drinkers
are people for whom excessive drinking is a "central activity. " A central activity
is a theme in one's way of life, around which other aspects of life are centered.
In addition to central activities, we each have our set of valued pleasures and
less-important habits that make up our lives. Valued pleasures are less
thematic; they are features of life that the individual enjoys but are not as
deeply embedded in the individual's routine or identity as central activities are .
Less-important habits are those habits that develop incidentally, that are not
related to other features of a person's life. Obviously, drinking is a central
activity for some people , merely a valued pleasure for others, and a fairly
unimportant feature (or absent entirely) for still others. Some central activities,
heavy drinking among them, are self-destructive. 176
People for whom drinking is a central activity arrange their lives - their
social lives, their work lives, etc. - around drinking. The details of how they
do this varies from person to person, but for each heavy drinker, drinking is a
prominent feature that determines other features of life. All manner of details,
m Heavy Drinking p. 99.
89

from one's choice of friends to the way in which one furnishes her home reflect
one's central activities. We do not choose our lives complete and ready-made,
but our choices build upon each other in ways that we cannot always predict.
Thus, in an important sense, though each of us initially makes
choices that eventually determine our central activities, once an
activity becomes central it influences, inspires, or even seems to
demand certain other choices that further define who we are, how
we act, where we go, and what we value. 177
Heavy drinking, then, is the result of a series of choices that have come together
as a central activity. Like any other series of choices, once the pattern is in
place it carries a certain force. It is reinforced by a complex web of habits that
are also the result of decisions the individual has made. Whether or not they
are aware of it, heavy drinking is a meaningful part of the way in which some
people are coping with their lives. For Fingarette, heavy drinking as a central
activity is destructive; he does not discuss the possibility (even to dismiss it)
that heavy drinking might be an appropriate coping mechanism - the "right
choice" for some people.
Helping the heavy drinker out of this pattern requires an understanding
of the momentum of central activities without giving in to the fiction of loss of
control. Because central activities develop over time, and because of the way
that they come to influence every aspect of our lives, we often do not recognize
the force they have. Any change that challenges a long-standing, deeply
ingrained habit is difficult, but that does not mean that the difficulty is the
result of the grip of some alien power. A single, isolated decision to stop
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drinking will likely fail; it does not address the myriad ways in which drinking is
a part of a heavy drinker's life. Sheer force of will is not enough to achieve a
desired change of a central activity, but such a change is impossible without a
serious commitment to make that change. Helping the heavy drinker, then,
cannot involve such circuitous rationalizations as the disease model offers. "If
our righteous condemnation is not in order, neither is our cooperation in
excusing heavy drinkers or helping them evade responsibility for change." 11s
Fingarette's suggestions for helping heavy drinkers follow from his
argument that heavy drinking is a destructive central activity that results from
a complex series of decisions that each heavy drinker makes, as opposed to a
biologically-driven malady that causes people to lose the ability to make
choices. Specifically, he calls for matching the treatment (including the
therapist and the setting) with the drinker's personal characteristics, drinking
history and patterns, and so on. 179 Additionally, he calls for flexible measures
of success, which include both abstinence and controlled drinking. t so
Controlled drinking presents both conceptual and practical difficulties. Once
the abstinent/not abstinent dichotomy is rejected, operationally defining what
counts as "success" becomes complicated. However, normal drinking is at least
as desirable a goal as abstinence - perhaps more desirable, as the drinker sees
it as more attainable and less stigmatizing. Like the notion of "heavy drinking"
as opposed to "alcoholism" , controlled drinking as a treatment goal is more
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complicated and individualized than abstinence . This goal should not be
rejected simply because it is not as simple as we might like it to be.
Finally, Fingarette suggests that social policies that govern excessive
drinking reflect this new understanding of heavy drinking as a central activity
rather than a disease. His suggestions are largely commonsense ideas; that is,
commonsense if one rej ects the disease model. Some of his proposals (notably
to reduce the availability of alcohol through liquor truces and licenses) are at
odds with Stanton Peele; others (notably to increase public education and
advertisement campaigns in attempt to influence social norms, to further limit
liquor advertising, and to increase legal responsibilities associated with
drinking) , 1 8 1 are consonant with Peele's suggestions . In either case, they are at
odds with the widely-accepted disease model of alcoholism. Those who
subscribe to the disease model will reject these as ineffective , inhumane, or
both. There is evidence, however, that these approaches will work. For
example, limiting the availability of alcohol during Prohibition did not eradicate
alcohol consumption or alcohol-related problems , but the incidence of both
substantially declined during that time. 182 Fingarette is not advocating another
Prohibition, but offers this as support for his claim that simply making alcohol
harder to get will reduce the incidence of heavy drinking. While no social policy
will help everyone , certain policies can make it less convenient or appealing to
drink to excess. Abandoning the disease model is the first step in developing
such policies .
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Once we leave behind the disease concept, which emphasizes
medicine and individual treatment for a supposedly involuntary
symptom, we can adopt a broader view: that what takes place in
the drinker's environment may be more important than what
takes place in the drinker's body . 1s3

Remarks

Stanton Peele and Herbert Fingarette offer a convincingly damning
criticism of the widespread acceptance that the disease model has enjoyed . In
the following chapter, we will see if the most recent genetic and neurological
research can answer their charge that addictions are results of the choices
people make, not the product of compelling biochemical determinants of
behavior. First, though, I will offer a critique of their work. I will address a few
problems with each of them, but primarily I want to sketch out some
philosophical implications of their rejection of the disease model of addiction.
Phenomenology and Addiction
Both Fingarette's description of drinking as a central activity and Peele's
description of addiction as an ingrained habit that one feels she cannot change
understate the experience of addiction. It's true that Fingarette does caution
the reader to have a healthy respect for the momentum that central activities
have in influencing each individual's behavior, and Peele frequently notes that
addictions are hard to break. However , this does not capture how different
drinking is from other central activities for some drinkers, or how powerfully
some people feel that they cannot rid themselves of their addiction.
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Central activities as Fingarette describes them· are features of everyone's
life. Our central activities not only contribute powerfully to our choices, but
also give shape and color our perceptions and values . He gives the example of
three people approaching a downtown building: a real estate investor who sees
the building as a business opportunity, an architecture buff who sees the
influence of Louis Sullivan in the skyline, and an anxious patient who is aware
only of the clock near the elevators as his appointment approaches. Similarly,
he says, a heavy drinker will approach a party and notice how much alcohol is
available, while others (presumably those with the relevant central activities)
might notice the decor or the food. 184 The heavy drinker's central activity,
drinking, determines what she notices and what will make the evening a good
one or a bad one for her.
His description is accurate for as far as it goes, but it is incomplete.
While surely some heavy drinkers will observe how well-equipped a bar is at a
party with the same level of enthusiasm as an interior decorator might notice
the new drapes, for some heavy drinkers the experience is - feels - obsessive.
These drinkers do not merely "wince if it is poorly equipped" as Fingarette
describes, but panic and plot, calculating how they will get enough alcohol
without being detected. Caroline Knapp, journalist and author of Drinking: A

Love Story, describes it this way:
Are you driven by a feeling of hunger and need? When someone
sets a bottle of wine on the dinner table, do you find yourself
glancing at it subversively, possessively, the way you might look at
a lover you long for but don't quite trust? When someone pours
you a glass from that bottle, do you take careful note of the level of
liquid in the glass, and measure it secretly against the level of
184
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liquid in other glasses , and hold your breath for just a second
until you 're assured you have enough? Do you establish an edgy
feeling of relationship with that glass, that wine bottle; do you
worry over it, care about it, covet it, want all of it yourself? 1 ss
For these drinkers, Fingarette's notion of drinking as a central activity is only
part of the picture. For these drinkers, drinking is an obsession. Not all
central activities (not even all maladaptive central activities) are obsessions.
They carry with them the momentum of having arranged one's life around
them, but do not feel compulsive.
To use Fingarette's own example, reading is a central activity for some
people. For these folks, reading affects the way they arrange their homes (lots
of bookshelves and reading lamps) how they spend their time and money, whom
they associate with, and so on. If deprived of books or other reading materials
for a while, they may feel uneasy or at loose ends, but probably not panicky.
We cannot ordinarily imagine people stealing cars or prostituting themselves for
because of their intense, uncontrollable craving for more and more . . . books.
("First it was novels and plays, no big deal. But then I got in to literary criticism
and pretty soon I was doing hard stuff like Foucault and Derrida. Now I'll read
anything I can get my hands on. You gotta help me, doc!") And lest we become
tempted to say that it is the nature of certain substances that makes people do
that, let's remember that gambling and other nondrug addictions have the same
phenomenology.
Similarly, Peele does not adequately acknowledge the power of the
experience of addiction. Like Fingarette, he does not explicitly downplay or

185

Caroline Knapp. Drinking: A Love Story. (New York: The Dial Press, 1 996.) pp. 52-53.
95

deny the power of the addictive experience, but his descriptions of addictions
and his discussion of the way people often "mature out" of addiction, his zeal in
trashing medical model-therapies as having fantastically low efficacy rates, and
his hope for such homespun interventions as having a buddy to encourage you
not to drink, leave the reader with the sense that addictions aren't as hard to
quit as those bad treatment-industry moguls would have us believe. This is not
to say that he is wrong about what works and what doesn't work, but rather
that he tends to understate how trapped and hopeless addicts feel by their
addiction.
It may be that, for both Fingarette and Peele, the sense of helplessness
and being overwhelmed that addicts feel has been so well-documented in
disease model literature that they do not feel the need to emphasize it
themselves. Further, they may think that focusing on how very hard it is to
quit addictions detracts from their position that addiction is not a disease.
However, social and psychological factors can be extremely powerful - clearly
in some cases social and psychological factors are more powerful than biological
ones. (For example, a devout Muslim will not eat pork even if she is very
hungry.) Their argument - that addiction is not a disease, that it is a
comprehensible pattern of behavior brought about by other choices in an
individual's life, and that it can be overcome without appeals to medicine or
religion - does not preclude the fact that addiction seems incomprehensible,
feels like being possessed by aliens, feels impossible to break. While neither

Peele nor Fingarette deny this, they do not give it the emphasis needed.
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Authenticity. Value Options. and Central Activities
Peele argues, contrary to conventional wisdom, that addiction is an
expression of an individual's values. According to Peele, a crack addict's
resorting to violence, theft, prostitution and the like to support her drug habit
(for example) cannot be said to be due to the drug's making her act in ways that
are contrary to her own values, as is commonly claimed; rather, her addiction is
a result of choices based on what means the most to her . 186 He offers the
example of an adolescent girl who stays at a crack house, having sex for money
to buy more crack. 187 She does not, he notes, go to work or school . Peele says
that addicts like her choose "to pursue drugs at the cost of other opportunities
that do not mean as much to them - in this girl's case, learning, leading an
orderly life, and self-respect. " 188 He makes the related claims that "Those with
Better Things to Do Are Protected from Addiction," 1 89 and "If you have better
things to do and value other things more than escape into intoxication, then
you won't make intoxication the center of your life." 190
In one sense Peele is clearly wrong on this one. One of the very reasons
that addiction attracts such morbid fascination is that people who do have
better things to do - and who have a lot to lose - become addicted to some
substance or behavior and lose everything that is dear to them because of it.
People lose their children, their homes, their jobs, their health, and more to
addiction. More importantly, they do not lose them because they value them
1 86
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less than their addiction; it seems quite wrong to say that, for example, that the
crack addict described _above would rather get high again than live a life of
order and self-respect. Perhaps a straw man version of his argument is that
addicts value nasty things like violence and indiscriminate sex and disvalue
virtuous things like cleanliness and good, old-fashioned hard work. Surely he
doesn't mean that. But he is clear that he believes that an addiction is not
separate from the rest of a person's life; addiction and the other behaviors
required to support it are part of a coherent life story.
A promising interpretation of his claim makes much of his use of the
expression "value options" in this discussion. Expanding on Peele's use of the
term, each person has a set of value options: possible objects of value for us.
What is possible for an individual to value varies, not only from person to
person but also over time for each individual. Value options change for many
reasons, some of which are directly or indirectly a result of choices a person
makes, others of which are beyond the control of the individual. Each choice a
person makes opens up another set of choices. Of these, some are more salient
than others, some are new, and some options that were live options are no
longer live. This is why addicts sometimes find themselves doing things we
never thought they'd do, as in narratives from women interviewed in Fast Lives:
Women Who Use Crack Cocaine:

I can't tell you about it. I'm at a place I thought I'd never be. For
years, I fought against becoming a bad person, and here I am . .. I

1a9 Diseasing of America, p. 1 60.
190 The Truth About Addiction and Recovery, p. 43 .
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can't even look at myself anymore. I never sit down and think
about my life and where I should be going. It's too painful. 19 1
It' s not like I want to be a whore . I never thought about it, but I
got into it. I guess it happened once I started smoking crack. . . . I
wasn't doing no drugs before crack. I never stole anything from
the store or did any sin. Any woman can give sex. That' s what I
ended up doing . . . . I'd like to do something better than hooking
but I am always high . 192
The concept of value options is related to Fingarette's discussion of
central activities . An individual's central activities determine, in part, what
value options are available to her. If it is the case that certain values or central
activities "protect" against addiction, it seems that the "protection" will be value
relative. Consider, for example, a passion for buying and wearing haute
couture . This kind of central activity might offer some protection from eating
compulsively, but not necessarily from addictions such as using amphetamines
or shopping. If a person with this central activity becomes addicted to
something, it will be to something that allows her to keep her fashion habit,
though she might wreck her life in other ways . The degree to which her values
and identity are wrapped up in her ability to wear high fashion is related to the
likelihood that she will stay slim. Likewise , to say that a someone who overeats
co.mpulsively does so in accordance with her values is not to say that she values
obesity, excess, junk food, etc., but rather that she values comfort, a sense of
being taken care of, etc, and that furthermore her values don't preclude excess
weight as, say, a fashion model's might.

19 1Claire Sterk. Fast Lives: Women Who Use Crack Cocaine. (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1999.) p. 76.
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With addiction, a person's involvement with a central activity gets away
from her; she slides down a slippery slope. The values of "learning, living an
orderly life, and self-respect" are not live value options for the crack addict in
the example; the central activity of drug use (motivated, perhaps by the value of
comfort or escape) has gained momentum and become the central activity of
drug addiction. A person will "select" her drug of choice based on which
(initially small) indulgences she can accommodate. 1 93 In sufficiently degraded
lives, drug use is not so stupid a value option. It is not objectively the best
choice, but it is a choice that makes sense to some people given their situation.
"For the person challenged by personal problems, heavy drinking is one of the
culturally available responses, however imprudent and self-destructive." 1 94 For
this reason, we should neither excuse her behavior nor pathologize it. Peele
would argue for contributing to some value options worthy of the effort it takes
to attain them (by providing safe schools and neighborhoods, decent
employment opportunities, for example) and letting her make her own choices,
without excusing socially or legally unacceptable behavior.
Peele's claim that addiction is an expression of an individual's values can
be reconciled with my claim that addiction mars authenticity by noting that
sometimes values can be at odds with one another, especially the most extreme
expression of some values (e.g. valuing fun in moderation doesn't interfere with
valuing family, but valuing either to an extreme can interfere with the other) .
Likewise, Fingarette notes that most individuals have more than one central
For discussion of culture and choice of addictive object see Peele's The Meaning of
Addiction, p. 1 09- 1 1 0; for individual values and choice of addictive object see The Truth
About Addiction and Recovery p. 202-203.
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activity, but he does not develop a discussion of coherence and central
activities. Some central activities fit easily together and so produce coherent
value options. Others do not fit together as obviously and produce odd value
options, and some don't fit together at all and produce dichotomous value
options. Valuing health together with valuing beauty might lead to coherent
value options - good diet, exercise, and adequate rest, etc. , or might lead to
incoherent value options - good diet, exercise, and plastic surgery, etc.
Likewise, addictions can conflict with values, as with women who use drugs but
also want to be good mothers. 1 9 5 Addiction compromises authenticity precisely
because it produces powerful conflicting desires, and the seductiveness of
addictive desires gives us reason to be suspicious about their authenticity. To
say that addictions express an individual's values, then, is not false, but it is
misleading and incomplete.
This discussion of central activities and value options is related to lack of
meaning in that addiction is possible when life has no value option that
precludes

some kind of

addiction. Valuing even things like health and

relationships can allow addiction to sneak in the back door, as these can lead
to running addiction, anorexia, and "love addiction". To truly be "protected"
from addiction, you need value options that are transcendent. A discussion of
this theme follows in Chapter 4.
Addiction, Habit, and John Dewey
Fingarette's idea of central activities and Peele's call for social changes in
order to ameliorate addiction echo John Dewey's remarks on the topic of habit.
194
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While Fingarette does not discuss habit specifically (the word does not even
appear in the index) and neither he nor Peele makes any mention of Dewey,
their work can be meaningfully analyzed using the work of this philosopher.
Though neither of them make this point explicitly, both Fingarette's and Peele's
treatment of alcoholism and addiction implicitly reject the free will/ determinism
binary that has gridlocked our ability to assign responsibility - especially in
situations like those involving alcoholism. Similarly, Dewey's work on the role
of habit in behavior offers a middle ground between views that individuals have
no control or total control over their behavior.
Like Fingarette, Dewey argues that human behavior is not mysterious or
remote from our understanding and control. He calls for individual
responsibility, which can be supported by careful changes in an individual' s
environment. Further, rather than targeting the will as the sole source of
motivation in human behavior or rejecting the notion of willpower outright,
Dewey advocates disciplining the will to attend to the activity that is "next" in
the chain of events that lead to a desired goal . These features of Dewey's
thought may be usefully applied to concerns about heavy drinking.
Habit for Dewey is a social function; all of our habits develop within a
social context. The patterns of our behavior take shape as each action meets
'\\'ith the approval or disapproval, support or abandonment, of others . This kind
of claim might have led to claims about the force of society on individual
behavior, and then to the conclusion that individuals are not responsible for
themselves, but rather society deserves the blame for the bad behavior of its
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citizens . However, Dewey argues instead that the best response to wrongdoing
is to demand personal responsibility from individuals, and to do so in a way
that focuses on changing the factors that contribute to wrong acts.
Courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as
if his evil will were the sole cause of wrong-doing and those which
condone offense on account of the share of social conditions in
producing bad dispositions, are equally ways of making an unreal
separation of man from his surroundings, mind from the world. 1 96
Dewey's words recall Fingarette's caution to avoid both righteous condemnation
and allowing heavy drinkers to evade responsibility for their actions. Both
philosophers argue for approaching problem behavior with a balanced, firm,
compassionate sense of judgement.
Such an approach requires not only the right attitudes and beliefs about
individual responsibility, but also requires a commitment to changing the
environment in a way that supports the desired behavior. Just as Fingarette
calls for social policies that will encourage moderate, non-excessive drinking,
and Peele calls for mutual support between individuals and communities to
prevent addiction, so too Dewey calls for attending to and modifying the
environment in order to influence the formation of good habits. Simply
exhorting people to change is not effective (which explains the success of the
Reagans' "Just Say No" campaigns in the 1 980s) .
We must work on the environment and not merely the hearts of
men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised
in a desert of motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen
and without a miracle. But only first by changing the jungle and
desert. 197
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Just common sense, to be sure, but focusing on the environment runs contrary
to the classic disease model of addiction. (Interestingly, as Peele notes, this
method is used to combat "first generation" diseases such as malaria and
dysentery.)
Finally, Dewey's discussion of habits and how they affect behavior
includes the suggestion that, in order to change a habit, the individual ought to
focus her energies and attention on "the next step" rather than on the final
goal. This suggestion is actually in line with some classic AA advice to stay
away from alcohol "Just for Today." In fact, a frequent saying at AA meetings is
that the person who woke up earliest that day is the person who has been sober
the longest. As Fingarette observes, AA's theory and practice are not altogether
coherent; much of the advice that circulates among AA members flies in the
face of the classic disease concept of alcoholism. On this point, AA, Fingarette
and Dewey are in agreement; in particular, Dewey's suggestions on changing
habits are echoed in Fingarette's suggestions on changing one's central
activities:
The hard drinker who keeps thinking of not drinking is doing what
he can to initiate the acts which lead to drinking. He is starting with
the stimulus to his habit. To succeed he must find some positive
interest or line of action which will inhibit the drinking series and
which by instituting another course of action will bring him to his
desired end. 1 98
Thus for a heavy drinker to make a major change in his drinking
patterns requires a reconstruction of his way of life. The drinker
must learn over time to see the world in different terms, to cultivate
new values and interests, to find or create new physical and social
settings, to develop new relationships, to devise new ways of
behaving in those new relationships and settings. 1 99
198
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Again, the advice here is commonsensical, but it challenges both the disease
model of alcoholism and the equally simplistic moral model with which it often
competes.
A final thought on AA: Peele and Fingarette are unswerving in their
attacks on all disease-theory based treatment, calling it expensive and useless,
promoted by closed-minded zealots who equate questioning their way of
treating addiction with heresy. AA, which explicitly accepts the disease model
while actually utilizing many techniques that contradict it, is among those
programs that they criticize. However, AA is undeserving of some of this
criticism. It is free, membership is supposed to be voluntary (one of the Twelve
Traditions is that it acquires members by "attraction rather than promotion") , it
helps a lot of people, and certain aspects of it are pretty self-effacing and
modest. One slogan is "Take what you need, and leave the rest," and members
are encouraged to interpret AA literature in whatever way helps them to stay
sober. 20° For all of its shortcomings, AA should not be dismissed lightly.

Conclusion

These two thinkers have raised an important challenge to the dominant
thinking about addiction. They argue that the disease model is neither
coherent, supported by data, nor particularly useful or humane. They offer
suggestions for alternative ways of thinking about and responding to addiction.
200
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Much of the current research on addiction , however, focuses on the
neurological effects of addiction and characterize it as a disease. Whether these
recent contributions can answer the challenges raised by Peele and Fingarette
is the subject of the following chapter .
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Chapter Three : The New Disease Model and Beyond

The classic disease model - which characterizes addiction as a chronic,
progressive illness to which certain people are susceptible - is not as widely
accepted as it once was. Its decline in popularity is partly due to the work of
critics like Stanton Peele and Herbert Fingarette, partly due to the changing
political climate, and partly due to advances in neuroscience. On this older
version of the disease model, the disease of addiction does not discriminate
according to individual characteristics, such as background, social supports,
economics, gender, etc . The only solution to this incurable disease is said to be
complete abstinence from the addictive substance. This model is conveniently
vague as to the etiology or physical manifestations of the disease, though M
has made some gestures toward asserting that alcoholism is an allergy to
alcohol. In contrast, the updated disease model takes seriously some of the
theoretical and practical criticisms advanced by detractors of the classic disease
model, and the result is more specific, more coherent, and more useful than its
predecessor. The dip in the classic model's popularity has been absorbed by
two basic perspectives: the view that addiction is not a disease at all, and a new
version of the disease model.
The newer disease model improves on the old model in several respects.
For one, it makes specific claims about the nature of the disease of addiction,
situating it in the neurological changes that result from drug use. The old
disease model's claims about what, specifically, was the disease-making feature
of addiction were generally vague and unsubstantiated. Another difference is
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that the new model makes much use of the psychosocial dimensions of
addiction, and calls for including such supports in addiction treatment
regimens. A related difference is that, while the classic disease model tended to
focus on the similarities between addicts, and the homologizing effects of
addiction, the contemporary version acknowledges the myriad individual
differences between addicts and calls for appropriately individualized treatment
approaches. Finally, the updated disease model addresses the choices that
addicted individuals make and the effects these choices have on addiction to a
greater and more coherent degree than the classic disease model did.
Despite these many improvements, there are reasons to reject even this
much-improved version of the disease model. While it is certainly true that the
neurological features of addiction are striking and merit further research, I
contend that the most important defining features of addiction are behavioral
and phenomenological, not neurological. There are theoretical and practical
dangers in using the moniker "disease" to describe addiction. Even if there are
sufficient physiological features of addiction to warrant calling it a disease, it is
still not the best or most accurate way to describe this complex phenomenon.
That is, even if we come to believe that it technically meets the criteria for a
disease, that characterization both misleads one to think things that are not
true, and it diverts one from appreciating things that are important about
addiction. Thus, even the new and improved disease model has serious flaws in
it, and is not the best way for us to think about addiction.
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Alan Leshner, NIDA, and the Science of Addiction

The National Institute on Drug Abuse, or NIDA, was established in 1974
to explore issues of drug abuse . It became part of the NIH in 1992 . NIDA's
goals have expanded from issues in drug abuse alone to include combating
drug-related problems, such as the spread of diseases like hepatitis and AIDS .
I t i s an organization that i s aggressively promoting th e notion that addiction i s a
brain disease. A visit to its website reveals its position on the matter: a
silhouette of the human head in shades of blue and purple sets off NIDA's
mission statement: Bringing the Power of Science to Bear on Drug Abuse and

Addiction, together with the slogan Keep Your Brain Healthy. The resources
that NIDA makes available include educational materials on drugs for teachers,
information for students , and updates on its latest research for the general
public and for other researchers.
NIDA has taken the issue of addiction to new levels of sophistication. Not
only has it sponsored the most advanced, cutting-edge neuroscience , but
additionally it has augmented its affinity for medical science with data from the
social sciences. Indeed, Strategy 1 from NIDA's five-year strategic plan is Give
Communities Science-Based Tools To Prevent Drug Abuse and Addiction. It
reads, in part:
Understanding what determines vulnerability to substance abuse
is crucial to the development of effective prevention programming.
At this point, there is no evidence that a single , unique factor
determines which individuals will abuse drugs; rather, drug abuse
appears to develop as the result of a variety of genetic, biological,
emotional, cognitive, and social risk factors that interact with
features of the social context. Thus, both individual-level factors
and social context-level factors appear to make an individual more
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or less at risk for drug abuse and influence the progression from
drug use to drug abuse to drug addiction . 2 0 1
This organization is to be commended for including community and social
factors in the discussion that focuses on the latest advances of the medical
science of addiction.

However, NIDA is vulnerable to the criticism that it calls

addiction a brain disease when, by its own description , nonmedical factors
(such as the plethora of "social context-level factors") determine risk for drug
abuse and addiction.
Further, despite its recognition of the importance of the nonmedical
features of addiction , NIDA continues to funnel its efforts into high-tech
treatments and interventions. Such treatments and interventions seem quite
warranted if one adopts NIDA's position that addiction is a brain disease, but
misguided if one accepts NIDA's description of the salience of the nonmedical
features of addiction. The following appears in NIDA's Strategy 2: Develop and
Distribute Tools To Improve the Quality of Drug Abuse Treatment Nationwide:
Scientific advances, particularly over the past decade , have
catapulted both our understanding of addiction and approaches to
treating it. Research has, in fact, come to define addiction as a
chronic disease, for many people a recurring disease ,
characterized by compulsive drug-seeking and drug use that results
from the prolonged effects of drugs on the brain. Both animal and
human studies have demonstrated that chronic drug use changes
the brain in fundamental ways that persist long after the drug use
has stopped. By using advanced brain imaging technologies, we
can see what we believe to be the biological core of addiction . 202
This passage makes mention of compulsive drug-seeking, as well as discussing
the effects of drugs on the human brain. However, "compulsive drug-seeking"
is a behavior, not a medical symptom, and there are, clearly, social, volitional,
20 1
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and other factors that contribute to whether this "symptom" manifests itself. It
is, therefore, unlike certain behaviors that are medical symptoms of various
conditions (e.g. slurred speech, shuffling gait, etc.) in which the volitional and
social factors are minimal.
Neuroscientist Alan Leshner is a prominent advocate for the
contemporary disease model of addiction. Leader of NIDA from 1 994 to 200 1,
he has worked to popularize the idea that addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain
disease. 203 At first glance, he and theorists like Stanton Peele and Herbert
Fingarette seem to occupy opposite positions on the subject of addiction. In
fact, while they do differ dramatically in the sides they take, they agree on some
substantive issues in addiction, most notably that addicts must take
responsibility for their problem and play an active role in solving it. Even so,
Leshner's characterization of addiction as a brain disease is less accurate and
less useful than the position that it is something other than a disease.
Leshner argues that addiction is the result of changes in brain function
that are produced by the use of addictive drugs. 204 Drug taking begins as a
voluntary activity, then, as brain function changes due to the neurochemical
action of the drug(s), compulsive craving occurs that makes it nearly impossible
for addicted persons to stop using on their own . Even when they are not
experiencing the direct effects of the drug, these neurological changes are slow
to reverse themselves. These physical differences in the brains of addicts as
compared to the brains of non-addicts is the basis for calling addiction a
202
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disease ; it isn't just a psychosocial phenomenon. However, he also says that
the "nature of addiction" concerns the experience of compulsion:
What does matter tremendously is whether or not a drug causes
what we now know to be the essence of addiction: compulsive drug

seeking and use, even in the face of negative health and social
consequences.2os

This contemporary disease model of addiction differs from the
"traditional" or "classic" model - espoused by E . M . Jellinek and the
Anonymous programs and criticized by Peele and Fingarette - in that the
newer account describes a disease that is the effect of a harmful substance on a
healthy brain, whereas the traditional account describes addiction as a disease
to which certain people are inherently vulnerable. (As noted, AA sometimes
describes alcoholism as caused by an allergy to alcohol .) 206 This updated
disease model also takes into account behavior and social contributors to
addiction in ways that earlier accounts did not.

For these reasons, it is a more

comprehensive model than the classic disease model.
Despite the opposite camps that they occupy, both Leshner and disease
model critics such as Peele and Fingarette agree that addicts should not be
excused from responsibility for their behavior and that addiction is a problem
that requires many kinds of intervention. "Addiction is a brain disease . . . but
not just a brain disease," 207 according to Leshner. Successful treatment for
addiction must be tailored to the needs of the individual, and each individual
204 Alan Leshner. "Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment" Journal of
the American Medical Association Oct. 1 3 , 1999 . p. 1 3 1 5.
205 Alan Leshner. "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters. " Science. October 3,
1997. vol. 278 . p. 46. my emphasis.
206 Alcoholics Anonymous (New York: Alcoholics Anonymous World Services. Inc.,
1955.) p. xxvi.
2o1 Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters ." p. 46.
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will have multiple needs. "[B]ehavioral and social cue components must also be
addressed, just as they are with many other brain diseases, including stroke,
schizophrenia, and Alzheimer's disease. " 208 Further, since addiction is a
chronic, relapsing disease rather than an acute disease, treatment options
should reflect the need for continued maintenance - a difference from Peele
and Fingarette, who disagree with keeping people dependent on treatment.
(This may not be a serious difference, however, depending on what counts as
"treatment" and what is meant by "chronic.") On Leshner's account, the best
treatment for addiction can combine medications, cognitive, behavioral, and
psychological therapy, social service assistance, and the like, as directed by the
needs of the individual.
Leshner's version of the disease model is a big improvement on the
classic disease model. With its emphasis on tailoring treatment to the needs of
the individual instead of ltone-size-fits-all" therapy, and on addressing many
dimensions of addiction instead of focusing on just one or two, the model of
addiction that Leshner articulates has much to recommend it. Even so, there
are some important problems with it. The major criticisms of Leshner's model
are persistent problems with the notion of volition and disease, and the
inappropriate medicalization of a condition that has but a small medical
component. Additionally, characterizing addiction as a disease has some
undesirable implications for our thinking about morality and addiction, and
neglects nonsubstance addictions. Stated in general terms, the most important
criticism of Leshner's account of addiction is not so much that it is wrong, but
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that it seriously overstates "the biological core of addiction" and under
emphasizes other, more important features.

Volition, Behavior, and Disease

The first problem with the new disease model of addiction is that to
characterize addiction as a disease diminishes the volitional component of
addiction. Since the term "disease," when used to describe addiction, has
historically been used to connote a defect in an individual's body or mind,
continued use of the term is misleading, even with the appropriate nods to
other causal factors. It suggests that there was something wrong with addicts
to begin with rather than the addicts' having done something that has
damaged themselves. Even though Leshner himself clearly says that addicts
must take responsibility for the choices they make, retention of medical
vocabulary carries the connotation that addictions just happen to people, rather
than being the result of individuals' choices. The account of addiction as a
brain disease is similar to that of diseases like asbestos poisoning: these are
conditions that occur in a healthy body due to prolonged exposure to a
substance. However, in the case of asbestos poisoning, the volitional, social
and economic features of the medical problem are much more clear than in the
case of addiction, which seems miasmatic by comparison.
Furthermore, calling addiction a brain disease does not adequately
account for why some drug users become addicted and others do not, or why
some former addicts begin using after many years of having been "clean" . It is
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true that advances in neuroscience have revealed certain substances cause
changes in the brain that persist far longer than had previously been thought.
However, it remains the case that some individuals whose brains have been
altered by substance abuse do not return to using that substance, while others
do. Presumably, nonbiological factors such as poverty are at work here;
alcoholism, for example, is correlated with low socioeconomic status, and
relapses are associated with certain memory triggers and with stressful life
events. If such nonbiological factors are important enough to determine who
becomes addicted (i.e. "develops the disease of addiction") and who does not, as
well as who returns to using and who "remains in remission," it seems far more
accurate to say that addiction is a condition that has important neurological,
phenomenological, and psychosocial features than to say that it is a brain
disease ("but not just a brain disease") .
Leshner rightly disagrees with the notion that diseases have no volitional
component. "What about people with high cholesterol who keep eating French
fries? Do we say a disease is not biological because it's influenced by
behavior?" 209 This is an important point. Many (arguably alij human problems
have many dimensions; likewise, many (arguably all) biological diseases have
nonbiological components. In Leshner's example, heart disease (a "real" disease
if ever there was one) is exacerbated by high cholesterol, which in tum is
exacerbated by the behavior of eating french fries. But notice: the disease in
this example is in the body: the heart does not function as it should. The
behavior that exacerbates the problem - french fry eating - is not itself the
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problem. By contrast, the "disease" of addiction is in the behavior itself:
compulsive drug taking. In the case of heart disease, a behavior causes a set of
physical problems, which are the disease. In the case of addiction, a behavior
is the disease, which causes a set of physical problems. The point here is that
the physical features of addiction are not essential features.
Take the example of two people, call them Minnie and Mickey. Minnie
has heart disease, and Mickey is addicted to diet pills. If Minnie stops eating
french fries (and starts eating soy and taking daily walks, etc.), but somehow
her heart still remains gunked up and her cholesterol remains high, we would
conclude that Minnie still has heart disease even though her behavior has
changed in the relevant ways. Now let's say Mickey stops taking diet pills and
never experiences craving or withdrawal, but somehow his brain remains
unchanged (i.e. does not begin to return to its pre-drug state) even over a long
period of time. If he is no longer taking the drugs, would we say that he is still
addicted to diet pills? In both cases, the behavioral features have stopped and
the physical features have remained the same. The difference is that the
physical features of heart disease are essential features, while the physical
features of addiction are not. Likewise, the behavioral features of addiction are
essential, but the behavioral features of heart disease are not.
One might be tempted to say that whether Mickey has the disease of
addiction depends on whether or not his brain was changed by the diet pills in
the first place. In the example above it is simply stated that Minnie had heart
disease and that Mickey is addicted to diet pills; but what criteria are being
employed for addiction? According to Leshner, the most important criterion is
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the compulsion to use drugs. Tolerance (usually defined as an adaptation to a
substance so that the effect is diminished) and physical dependence (usually
defined as certain characteristic withdrawal symptoms when drug taking stops)
are, he rightly argues, not the most important criteria. Since the most
important features of addiction are behavioral and phenomenological rather
than physiological, these are also the most important criteria for describing
addiction. Neurological data, if and when it becomes available, will serve to
corroborate clinical findings, or to adjudicate difficult cases. Neurological
features alone are not, and cannot be, the most important criteria for addiction.
To illustrate, consider another person, call him Donald. Donald acts just
as Mickey did when he was addicted to diet pills (i.e. he had a compulsion to
take the pills), and even has feelings of craving and withdrawal when he tries to
stop taking them. But when we look at Donald's brain, it does not show the
same drug-induced neurological changes that Mickey's did. Would we say that
he is not - and never was -.addicted? It seems that Donald is addicted,
despite the lack of neurological features that often accompany addiction, and
that Mickey (the new Mickey, after quitting the drugs) is not, despite the
persistence of these neurological features. The most important features of
addiction are the behavioral and phenomenological features; while the
neurological features are important because they point us to useful tools in
helping addicted persons overcome their habit, they are not defining
characteristics of addiction.

The point here is that, for all of the many problems and difficulties that
people face, some are best described in terms of their physical manifestations.
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Diabetes and broken legs fall in to this category, for while there are
nonbiological contributors to these problems, their most salient features are
physical. Other problems, while they may have striking physical dimensions,
are best described in other terms. This may be because their etiology, most
important phenomenological features, and/ or their best solutions are not
physical in nature. I will address these three dimensions of addiction later in
this chapter and in the following chapter in greater depth; I will argue that
neither the etiology nor the best solutions to addiction are physical in nature.
The way a problem is framed shapes our thinking about it, and can have
important implications for treatment, research, moral attitudes, and so on.
There is a better frame for the problem of addiction than to frame it as a
disease.

Medicalization and its Dangers

The second problem with the new disease model is that naming addiction
a disease threatens to medicalize it inappropriately. Leshner says, for example,
that addiction should be treated by addressing the medical, behavioral, and
social needs of the addict, just as we treat individuals who have other brain
diseases, like schizophrenia. He's right, except that we don't treat
schizophrenia that way, though we should; we give schizophrenic people
psychotropic medications and send them on their way. Calling addiction a
"brain disease like schizophrenia" threatens addicts with the same fate as
schizophrenics. He is certainly right that the most effective way to treat a
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problem is to address each dimension of the problem; I would argue that this
applies to all human problems. For example, we are now beginning to address
the psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions of conditions that used to be
considered strictly from a medical perspective, such as cancer and heart
disease. Likewise, we are beginning to address the physical dimensions of
conditions that had once been considered from nonmedical perspectives, such
as grief. However, since this is the case, there is nothing to be gained from
calling addiction a brain disease, especially when the social and psychological
aspects of it are so powerful.
Furthermore, although the best treatments for all kinds of problems
address them in many dimensions (i.e. physical, emotional, social, etc.) many
people do not have access to the best care and treatment. While ideally
conditions like schizophrenia should be addressed on an individual basis, using
intensive social support, counseling, medications, etc. as appropriate for each
individual, more often treatment consists of medications and a sham outpatient
"counseling" session that primarily consists of inquiries as to how the
medications are working. The sad fact is that many people will not get adequate
care; given that, it is imperative that the care they

do

get be of the kind that is

going to be most effective. The characterization of addiction as a disease will
mean that the treatment priority will focus on the neurochemical aspects of it,
which are the least important and the least effective in arresting addiction.
A case in point is that a common treatment for overeating and the
obesity that results from it is appetite suppressant drugs. The theory is that if
individuals' appetites are suppressed, they will eat less and will lose weight.
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However, common sense suggests that treating obesity with appetite
suppressants is counter-productive. People do not overeat because their
appetites (i.e. the physical sensation of hunger, which is the sense of "appetite"
that "appetite suppressants" address) are too big, rather they overeat because
eating satisfies some other, nonphysical, need .

Some animal data support this

point. For example, one study compared the rate of consumption of starved
rats versus well-fed rats for both normal maintenance chow and ground meat.
As one might expect, well-fed rats will eat much less rat chow than starved rats
will when both groups have access to unlimited amounts of food; well-fed rats
are not as hungry as their deprived brethren. However, well-fed rats will eat as
much raw ground meat (which is thought to be much tastier than rat chow) as
starved rats will. 2 10 Such findings suggest that overeating is not a result of
physical hunger. If that is true, then medications to ameliorate hunger will not
stop overeating. Likewise, if medications are the only treatment - or
essentially so - available for addicted persons , addicts' attempts to change will
be inadequately supported and they are likely to fail.
A related danger of medicalizing addiction is that it puts the emphasis on
curing addiction rather than preventing it. In doing so, it puts the
responsibility for addiction primarily on the medical community, secondly on
the addicted individual, and hardly at all on social, political and economic
groups. A more appropriate and effective allocation of responsibility would put
the medical community last, with the contextualized individual (that is, the
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individual understood as being situated in certain kinds of social, political and
economic factors) first. Since on Leshner's model addiction is a disease that
occurs because of excessive drug use, it follows that the most effective way to
approach addiction is to intervene before it happens. While theoretically this
model isn't stopping anyone from doing just that, the focus on a cure often
works against working on prevention.
We who are interested in arresting addiction can take a cue from the
example of Garfield Park. This area, in one of the poorest parts of Chicago, was
the subject of a 1 974 task force on community health. Northwestern
University's Center for Urban Affairs, together with a group called the Christian
Action Ministry, searched medical records of nearby hospitals for the major
causes of health problems in the area. They found that residents of the
neighborhood were frequently admitted to hospitals for treatment of dog bites.
They could have responded to this health problem by providing inservices for
ER physicians on suturing techniques for dog bites, by making rabies vaccines
more widely available, and perhaps by providing pamphlets for community
members on how to avoid dog bites. But they didn't. Instead, they hounded
(you should excuse the expression) their local government until the animal
control department removed the stray dogs. 2 1 1 These researchers did much to
prevent the health risk the patients were facing, and thus made a far greater
contribution to the patients' health than they ever could have if they had stayed
in the clinic. Likewise, focusing research and treatment efforts on curing

2 1 1 "Hospitalization Causes: New Look at Ghetto." in Medical News, Journal of the
American Medical Association Oct. 3 1 , 1 977. vol. 238, no. 1 8 . p. 1 908.
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addiction, while necessary, diverts time, effort, money, and inspiration from
preventing it. Perhaps most tragically, it diverts us from even thinking about
preventing it.
Calling addiction a disease and focusing on the neurological features of it
is like calling malnutrition a disease and putting research, therapeutic, and
education dollars into understanding and using knowledge of precisely what
happens to the human body when it is deprived of adequate food. Such
knowledge is unquestionably useful, but to emphasize it is to miss the point.
Hunger is a political issue as well as a biopsychosocial one. While it helps to
know that starving children need vitamin E, it is better to change the systems
that allow starvation to happen than to hand out vitamin E capsules to starving
children. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that a danger in putting energy
into calibrating and distributing the proper dosage of vitamin E to starving
children is that we will lose sight of why they are starving in the first place, and
we will have no resources left to address that. Since the danger of focusing on
cure to the detriment of working on prevention applies to "real" diseases, too,
we should exercise caution about extending the reach of medicine.
The fact that focus on a cure often works against working on prevention
is related to my first objection, that labeling addiction a disease has the
connotation that addicts have a defect in their brains that causes them to
abuse drugs, rather than defects in their brains that result from their drug use.
It is important to retain an awareness of addicts' agency, and to say that
addiction is a disease tends to reduce this. It is useful, for example, to compare
drug addiction with asbestos poisoning, since both phenomena occur when a
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healthy person becomes unhealthy due to exposure to a toxic substance.
Labeling asbestos poisoning a disease makes sense because the features of the
condition are primarily physical and because exposure to asbestos is often
involuntary - or, in any case, less voluntary than exposure to relevantly
similar levels of drugs. Further, while some people's bodies are more sensitive
to toxins than others, and so will be more prone to react to asbestos than
others, nearly any body that is exposed to certain levels of asbestos will get
sick. This no matter of agency or willful action. However, this is not the case
with drugs and drug talcing . . Amount of exposure to a drug does not determine
addiction - though it might determine chemical dependency - in the same
way that exposure to asbestos can determine toxicity. Many people who take
drugs that are addictive (for pain management, for recreation, etc.) never
become addicted (that is , never manifest the compulsive, excessive drug-taking
behavior that marks addiction) and stop taking the drug when they wish to.
Others who take the same drugs do become addicted. While certainly there are
many factors that contribute to the difference between the two groups, one
factor concerns the choices that individuals make with regard to their drug
talcing. This factor is inappropriately de-emphasized by calling addiction a
disease.
Leshner is aware of this objection, and agrees that the volitional
component in addiction is crucial. He notes that recovery from any disease
requires the participation of the individual; addiction is no different. He also
notes that the danger in calling addiction a brain disease is that it makes
addicts sound like victims, and he is interested in avoiding that danger. "It can
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be a brain disease and you can have given it to yourself and you personally
have to do something about treating it,"2 1 2 he argues. Maybe it can be. But he
still has not explained the advantage of calling addiction a brain disease "with
embedded behavioral and social aspects" instead of calling it a habit with
important neurological and social aspects. The latter description accounts for
the same features as the former, but it places the emphasis where it belongs
and can do the most good. At best, the former description is merely
inconsistent, at worst, it can misdirect energy from where it is needed.
An example of such inconsistency appears in an article describing a
program in which addicts talked about their experiences for a group of medical
students. The program was intended to correct future physicians'
misconceptions about drug addicts, and to sensitize them to addicts' lived
experience. The program itself sounds like an innovative approach to educating
health care professionals about addiction, except for this rationale, offered by
the program's medical director: "A medical student who becomes a physician in
the community who hasn't learned that addiction is a brain disease is not going
to be effective. 112 1 3 The contradiction is evident, as the addicts in the program
weren't talking about their diseased brains; they were talking about their
experiences and actions. One medical student who found the experience
enlightening said, "What I heard were people who were using drugs to make the
suffering go away, to get lost in the world of drugs." The push to label addiction
a brain disease doesn't seem to have done any damage in this case, but the
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inconsistency is troubling. Which perspective will inform this future doctor's
thinking about addiction as she continues in her career - her mentors' or her
patients'?
Since addiction is clearly a condition that has only a small medical
component, what is to be gained by further medicalizing it? Instances of
inappropriate medicalization of legal, political, and social problems has been
well-documented. Reasons for inappropriate medicalization vary, from sleazy
attempts to silence or disempower people (e.g. "drapetomania," the desire that
causes slaves to run away214) to reflections of the morals and norms of the day
(e.g. nineteenth-century beliefs about masturbation. 215) While surely the
interest in medicalizing addiction reflects contemporary values, specifically our
fascination with science and technology, another possible motive to medicalize
non-medical phenomena - and likely one that is at work with regard to
addiction - is to capture the sympathy of the general public. As Mariana
Valverde notes, " . . . the scientific temperance activists of the early twentieth
century, and, after the 1930s, Alcoholics Anonymous, used the term " disease"
not to hand over control of alcohol questions to medicine , but simply to de
stigmatize the population which they sought to reach and reform. " 216
Furthermore, in contemporary American culture, we believe that medical
problems are eminently comprehensible and fixable . We are confident that
those we cannot solve today are simply those that we will solve tomorrow.
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Physical problems are comfortingly, undeniably real, while spiritual, emotional,
or cultural things are maddeningly contestable.
The related advantage to the new disease model for addiction over other
models is that treatments for diseases are fundable in ways that assistance for
bad habits or weak willpower is not. If we believe that addiction is a disease, we
are likely to feel more generous about funding for research and treatment, and
w� are more likely to feel generous about funding for jails and probation officers
if we believe that addiction is a bad habit or a manifestation of moral weakness.
Indeed, it may be that advocating for the new disease model is more a political
move than a scientific one. 217 Psychobiological research is, after all, an
expensive enterprise, and if touting a disease model of addiction allows
addiction researchers to acquire adequate funds to continue to learn about the
neurological features of addiction - well, why not? The brain-related aspects of
addiction and the biological tools to combat them that are being developed are
important, but costly. Given that, some might argue that the disease model is
necessary (a "useful fiction," perhaps) to get the relevant research done.
A suppressed premise to this argument is that, while we might call
addiction a brain disease in order to get funding, we can continue to treat it any
way that works. This kind of argument is used on a micro scale when patients
are given a billable diagnosis, even though what is actually wrong with them
bears little resemblance to that diagnosis. The problem with this practice is
that in order to keep getting funded (whether for research or for individual
treatment) those who do the funding (for grants or for insurance) have to see
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some consistency. There is room for professional autonomy, to be sure, but
glaring inconsistencies (like, "addiction is a brain disease, we need funding for
community development") are going to catch up with one sooner or later.
Medicalizing addiction doubtless produces great short-term gains in funding,
but at what price for our long-term understanding of addiction? Ultimately, the
brain disease model boxes our thinking into a corner, and the answers aren't in
any single corner.
A related, hopeful development in this area is that some psychiatrists are
advocating that "relational disorders" - emotional and behavioral distress that
emerges from disturbances in relationships between people - be included in
the DSM. 2 1 8 This move represents a divergence from medical model psychiatry,
in which all emotional and behavioral disorders are thought to be tied to
neurological defects. Those advocating the inclusion of relational disorders
acknowledge the obvious link between emotions, behavior and brains, and
argue that problems that are primarily emotional and behavioral are just as real
and worthy of treatment as problems that are primarily neurological. If such
thinking catches on, perhaps the motivation to characterize addiction as a
brain disease will diminish.
The implicit assumption made in medicalizing addiction is that diseases
are completely beyond the control of the individual (not true) and that habits
and moral weaknesses are wholly under the individual's control (also not true).
The overly simplistic dyad of freedom vs. determinism contributes to our faulty
thinking about individual and social responsibility - i.e. either addiction is a
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moral weakness, addicts are free and responsible for their actions and deserve
to be punished for their behavior OR addiction is a disease, addicts are not
responsible for their actions and deserve treatment for their illness. This,
again, is not Leshner's own view. It is, however, the view that is most apt to
"filter down" from the theoretical heights to the valleys of our everyday living.
As such, it deserves critical attention.

Morals and Addiction

Thus, the very volitional component that both Leshner and the anti
disease theorists maintain is important is jeopardized by the sentiment that
people deserve help only if their situation isn't their fault. In order to get
funding for research and treatment, we have to begin with an assumption that
prejudices and weakens our thinking about research and treatment: the
assumption that addiction is primarily (or best understood as) a brain disease.
It is as though we believe that if addicts got themselves into this mess, they can
just get themselves out of it, but if they are victims of something beyond their
control we are only too willing to help. Indeed, as Leshner notes " . .. there are
many people who believe that addicted individuals do not even deserve
treatment. This stigma, and the underlying moralistic tone, is a significant
overlay on all decisions that relate to drug use and drug users." 2 1 9 The moral
model of addiction (that is, moral models of addiction) hold some variation of

2 18

Paul R. McHugh. Treating the Mind as Well as the Brain. " The Chronicle of Higher
Nov. 22, 2002, p. B- 14.
219 Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters." p. 45.
Education

128

11

the belief that addicts are simply bad, weak-willed people who simply need to
shape up. This assumption is unattractive for at least two reasons: for one, it is
mean-spirited and judgmental, and secondly, it points us to treatment options
that are tantamount to abandoning addicts to their own devices ("Just Say NO
to drugs!")
Surely it is true that the stigma attached to addiction and the judgmental
attitudes that go with it can be unwarranted and detrimental. And surely it is
true that public perceptions of addiction are woefully inadequate and simplistic.
However, disease models of addiction only feed into these judgmental attitudes;
people lmow that there is a strong volitional component to addiction, and many
react to the disease model by rejecting it so thoroughly that they swing back
into the moralistic models that disease model theorists (rightly) want to replace.
The disease model, even the improved version, seems to suggest that the fact
that the cravings have the "legitimating" feature of neurological changes makes
them beyond moral criticism. An article in the New York Times Magazine in
which Leshner was quoted describes this feature thus: "At some point (when,
precisely, is unclear) the neurochemistry and receptor sites of a user's brain
change , radically, causing drug-seeking to become as biologically driven as
hunger, sex, or breathing. " 220 And yet we still maintain certain standards of
behavior for at least two out of the three of the biologically-driven behaviors
cited. The cravings and compulsions that addicts experience are not beyond
moral critique because they have persistent neurological features. Many
biological drives can and should be controlled by the individual . Furthermore,
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both the disease models and moral models minimize the role of social and
economic factors in addiction. Because they present polarized views of addicted
persons, as either villains or victims, they leave little room for discussions of the
loosened social supports that contribute to choices - and lack of choices -
that are available to individuals. It is unreasonable to expect people to flourish
without adequate social support. Social support includes moral support and
expectations of high standards of behavior.
The best antidote to this tug-of-war between the disease models and the
moral models is to introduce a third, different category that is not disease
based nor moral-based, nor even a hybrid category, but a description that sits
apart from the dichotomy. Allegiance to the disease model - any disease mqdel
- condemns the discussion of addiction to ping-ponging between it and the
moral model. In order for any progress to be made , we need to escape the
disease/moral dichotomy and consider models of a different sort. In doing so, if
we do it well, we can avoid counterproductive appeals to morality and can also
continue to disvalue - that is, continue to retain an appropriate moral attitude
toward - addiction. That is, it is true that the self-congratulatory moralism
that many people hold toward addicts is unwarranted and detrimental. It is
unwarranted because it does not acknowledge how difficult addictions are to
quit, or indeed what drives many people to addiction in the first place. It rests
on faulty, self-serving assumptions about addicts and addiction. Furthermore,
it is detrimental because addicted persons are less likely to seek help if they feel
that they are being unfairly judged and misunderstood.
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However, it would be a mistake to say that we should strive for a morally
neutral attitude toward addiction and toward addicts' behavior, as disease
models seem to imply. A certain level of moral approbation - tempered with
compassion- is useful, appropriate, and consistent . First of all , it is useful
because honest, fair-minded moral disapproval can be a powerful motivator for
individuals to change and grow . When people believe that others disapprove of
their behavior, but still esteem them as individuals and believe that they can
change their behavior, it can give them the self-esteem they need to overcome
their problems. This is especially true when they themselves disapprove of their
own behavior. Indeed, "enabling" in AA lingo refers to allowing addictions to
flourish by keeping confrontations with addicts from becoming too
uncomfortable for them. Such discomfort is necessary for change.
Secondly , moral disapproval (again, tempered by understanding) for
addiction and for addicts' behavior is appropriate. Addicts hurt themselves and
others. The anger, pain, and frustration that those who are involved with
addicts feel is natural and healthy. To distill away these feelings and regard
addiction as a morally neutral "condition" is dishonest, and produces a kind of
emotional dissonance in those who attempt to do so. These emotional
gymnastics do nothing to help the addict, and do harm those who are around
them. (Obviously, those who are involved with addicts should take pains to
express their feelings constructively.)

Thirdly, moral disapproval of addiction is

consistent with moral approval of ending addiction. Breaking an addiction is
hard work and requires a great deal of personal effort. People who do break
addictions (and people who are attempting to break addictions) deserve high
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praise for doing so. To say that we cannot blame addicts for their addictions
but can praise them for breaking their addictions is only consistent if we believe
that they had no causal role in the development of the addictions - a move
that few would be willing to make. While the contemporary disease model that
Leshner espouses does not preclude moral approbation for addiction or for
addicts, the implication that such approbation is inappropriate remains.
That is to say, the moral model of addiction is wrong, incomplete, sub
optimal - but there are moral dimensions of addiction that ought to be
preserved. We ought not, for example, regard addiction, as Thomas Szasz does,
as "the right of self-medication. " 2 2 1 The experience of compulsion that addicts
experience takes addiction out of the realm of things that competent adults
ought to be left alone to choose at their own peril. Classic examples of
possibilities that even competent adults may not choose for themselves include
duelling and selling oneself into slavery, on the grounds that autonomy is so
precious that one may not voluntarily choose those possibilities that effectively
destroy it. 222 Addiction is bad, and it is bad because it limits individuals' ability
to choose for themselves; let's not pretend it's just a different choice than one
we'd make for ourselves.
Likewise, the disease model of addiction is wrong, incomplete, sub
optimal - but there are neurological and other physiological dimensions of
addiction which are vital in understanding and responding to it. However,
neither of these models gets at the whole picture. A new perspective on
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addiction, one that incorporates the appropriate features from other
perspectives and places the appropriate level of consideration on each, is what
is needed at this time. Such a perspective will be more complete, more
coherent, and more useful. I shall argue in the following chapter that
describing addiction in terms of habit and authenticity avoids many of the
pitfalls of both the moral model and the disease model. Embracing such an
alternative allows us to reject not only the moral model and the disease model,
but, more importantly, the dead-end duality that either of them entails.

Nonsubstance addictions

A final point is that neither Leshner nor NIDA address nonsubstance
addictions. Since NIDA is, after all, an agency that is concerned specifically
with drug abuse, and since much of Leshner's work was published while he was
the director of NIDA, perhaps we should not expect him or NIDA to say much
about compulsive gambling, sex addiction and so on. However, these
nonchemical addictions pose serious problems as well, both for the addicted
individuals and for their families and friends, and it can be argued that the new
disease-model perspective on drug addiction does not prima facie preclude
classifying non substance-related compulsions as addictions. Leshner argues
that the essence of addiction is " .. . compulsive drug seeking and use, even in
the face of negative health and social consequences" 223 and that " .. . what
matters most in addiction is often an uncontrollable compulsion to seek and use
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drugs. "224 This implies that the phenomenology and behavior of addiction is
more important than any neurological feature. For this reason, it seems that
there is no reason to exclude nonsubstance addictions when they, too, are
destructive and share the same phenomenological features.
Jon Elster, sociologist at Columbia University, argues that chemical
addictions form natural kinds, but that nonchemical "addictions" are, more
than likely, only analogous to chemical addictions. Since they are likely not
homologous to chemical addictions, i.e. they probably do not have the same
etiology, and since homology is a stronger basis for comparison than analogy,
he argues that nonchemical "addictions" share some important features with
chemical addictions, but that they are probably not the same thing. The
definitive answer, he argues, will appear when more is known about
neuroscience. In his Strong Feelings, Elster considers a phenomenological
analysis of addiction, including nonsubstance addictions. He identifies
fourteen properties common to many addictions, and notes that no single
property or group of properties, other than craving, that are universal
properties of addiction. However, craving alone would cast too wide a net to be
the sole criterion for addiction. Thus, phenomenological properties cannot be
used to define addiction at the theoretical level.
In contrast, he argues that while all chemical addictions are not identical
in their neurological causal mechanisms they are remarkably similar to one
another. All chemical addictions arise because of the way addictive substances
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increase the amount of dopamine in the brain, which produces the
characteristic craving that marks drug addiction. "For purposes of diagnosis
and treatment, one could use a pragmatic approach and define something as
addictive if it possesses (say) eight of the thirteen properties. For more
theoretical purposes, this procedure is obviously pointless. " 225 It is pointless, I
take it, because theories should be more precise and elegant than this approach
allows. This assertion, however, is troubling for three reasons.
The first problem with the suggestion that defining addiction as
possessing a certain number of phenomenological features is acceptable at the
level of diagnosis and treatment, but not for theoretical purposes, is that doing
so has us using phenomenology for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, and
neurology for theoretical purposes. This conceptual gap is dangerous: it
threatens to produce more of the inconsistencies that already plague
discussions about addiction. As noted elsewhere, addiction is considered a
brain disease in some contexts, a vice in others, and so on, owing (in part) to
such conceptual shifts. These competing conceptions of addiction make
sensible, sane, fair social policy and treatment planning even more difficult
than they need to be. We need more coherence between the practical and the
theoretical levels, not less.
The second reason that this move is troublesome is that it excludes
nonchemical addictions from being considered "real" addictions. Elster clearly
indicates this consequence; he suggests that nonchemical addictions are
phenomenologically similar to chemical addictions but are likely neurologically
225
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dissimilar, and therefore not likely to be true addictions. This will make for
more elegant theory, to be sure. But the resulting elegant theory that leaves
out important-but-troublesome features of the phenomenon it describes is
worth less than theories in progress that do try to account for all of the
variables. This is not unlike the many studies that discarded data from female
subjects because they muddled the results: the all-male samples produced
elegant results that were useful for describing men's experiences, but not useful
for describing the experiences of women. 226 Similarly, excluding nonsubstance
addictions from consideration makes defining addiction simpler but incomplete.
If the theory cannot account for important features that are relevant in
diagnosis and treatment (i.e. if the theory appears to make the concept clearer
but is misleading,) then it is worse than useless.
I shall argue that the third, and most important, problem is that there

is

a common phenomenological feature of addictions, sometimes called
compulsion. This refers to being drawn to the addictive object even against
one's will.
Its hallmark is an out of control, often aimless compulsion to fill the
lost sense of belonging, integrity, and communion with substances
like alcohol or food, or experiences like falling in love and
gambling. The addicted person is trying desperately to satisfy real
needs - but since either the external situation or the internal
climate does not allow for satisfaction, she turns to secondary
sources. 227
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By compulsion I do not mean metaphysical compulsion: I do not mean to say
that addicts are, in point of fact, compelled to engage in their addictive objects.
Rather, this is compulsion in the phenomenological sense: the feeling or
experience of being compelled. This feature is, I argue, important in
distinguishing "mere" chemical dependencies from drug addictions, and
"merely" bad habits from nonsubstance addictions. The notion of compulsion,
also called loss of control, is easily misused but deserves a second look. I
address the advantages and disadvantages of making compulsion an essential
feature of addiction in chapter four, and conclude that the notion of compulsion
is vital for framing the problem of addiction.

From neurochemistry to existential anxiety

Elster, citing George Loewenstein, notes that there are many "visceral"
(i.e. , physical) factors of behavior: hunger, pain, urge to urinate, etc. These
factors, when they are powerful enough, can interfere with the capacity to make
rational choices. There are also factors of behavior that are more emotional and
less physical: fear, anger, etc. Addictions, he says, have a physical component
which can be quite potent. When addicts are under the effects of a drug, their
capacity for rational choice is indeed compromised. However, just as extreme
hunger interferes with rational choice to a far greater degree than just having
the munchies does, addicts experience the physical features of addiction to
varying degrees at different times. It is not the case that every time addicts
choose to engage in their addictive object, they do so because they are
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physically compelled (in the same way that extreme hunger or other like factors
compel behavior.)
Furthermore, there is no question but that addiction is not just a matter
of neurological effects. In fact, most of the research seems to indicate that the
physical component of addiction is small compared to the other factors. For
example , people who have long since quit their addiction get cravings and
relapse when under stress or when exposed to a particular stimulus that
reminds them of their addictive object. Perhaps these cravings can be mapped
neurologically, but what caused them? The causes are not primarily
neurological; they are primarily psychological, and they vary from person to
person, from situation to situation. Some who argue for a brain-disease model
of addiction say that relapse is based on changes in brain function, but
acknowledge that these neurological changes interact with environmental
factors. 228 This move turns the causal picture on its head. Why? Because the
environmental and social stress factors alone can prompt a relapse, while
changes in brain function alone don't. The fact that relapse is a common
feature of nonchemical addictions, and occurs in similar patterns as with
substance-related addictions, supports this point.
Finally, it is important to note that, compelling as physical factors are ,
they are not deterministic; they do not reduce the behavior humans into the
behavior of objects. Physical factors do have an equalizing effect - we all
become less fastidious as we become more desperate - but, as Viktor Frankl,
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psychiatrist and Nazi camp survivor observed, it is sometimes in situations
characterized by physical extremes that one's character emerges:
Sigmund Freud once asserted, "Let one attempt to expose a
number of the most diverse people uniformly to hunger. With the
increase of the imperative urge of hunger all individual differences
will blur, and in their stead will appear the uniform expression of
the one unstilled urge." Thank heaven, Sigmund Freud was
spared lmowing the concentration camps from the inside. His
subjects lay on a couch designed in the plush style Victorian
culture, not in the filth of Auschwitz. There, the "individual
differences" did not "blur" , but, on the contrary, people became
more different; people unmasked themselves, both the swine and
the saints. 229
My use of this passage is not intended as a moralistic attempt to cast blame on
drug addicts, or to require everyone to be one of the saints that Frankl
describes. What deserves emphasis here is not that "good" people can resist
physical temptations, but rather that nonphysical factors affect behavior even
in the most profoundly physical situations. Freud hypothesized that hunger
would render individuals indistinguishable from one another and from their
fundamental urge; Frankl's experience suggests that even in such extreme need
humans are more than their physical urges.
Physiological features of addiction, then, should be addressed by
biochemical means, but addiction is not entirely, or even mostly, physiological.
Diseases are mostly physical and addiction is mostly nonphysical: we can tell
that it is mostly nonphysical because (for example) if addiction was primarily
neurological, we would expect to see people get addicted to painkillers and other
drugs without regard to nonbiological factors. Their brains would be hijacked
whether or not they liked, and pursued, the effects of the drugs. However,
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many people take potentially addictive prescription painkillers without
becoming addicted because they don't like the way they make them feel.
Indeed, as sociologist Howard Becker notes, the "taste" for the effects of drugs is
acquired, much like a taste for oysters.
The user feels dizzy, thirsty; his scalp tingles; he misjudges time
and distances. Are these things pleasurable? He isn't sure. If he
is to continue marihuana use, he must decide they are.
Otherwise, getting high, while a real enough experience, will be an
unpleasant one he would rather avoid. 230
People who initially were not addicted to anything but become addicted to
painkillers do so, I argue, because they find that the effects of the drug satisfy a
nonbiological craving - "help them get through the day" - which is existential
rather than neurological. By this I mean that it involves addressing the lack of
meaning in one's life. Situations in which individuals medicate themselves
against periodic unpleasant experiences (e.g. taking a tranquilizer before an
MRI, drinking a lot at a boring social gathering) may not be filling existential
needs. But when individuals medicate themselves to cope with life in general,
which they find boring or anxiety-producing or depressing, that is filling an
existential need.
Citing Peele's criteria for addiction, Elster asserts, "On the widest
definition of addictions, according to which one can become addicted to 'any
potent experience,' they may not have much in common . " 23 1 I argue in
response that chemical and nonchemical addictions are not merely analogous,
but that they are homologous as well. To say that two things are homologous is
229
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to say that they share a common causal history. The common casual feature of
both chemical and nonchemical addictions is, I argue, existential rather than
neurological, in the form of avoidance of existential anxiety.

Elster's own

narrative on the "secondary rewards" of smoking is an illustration of this:
Smoking became a ritual that served to highlight salient aspects of
experience and to impose structure on what would otherwise have
been a confusing morass of events. Smoking provided the
commas, semicolons, questions marks, exclamation marks, and
full stops of experience . It helped me to achieve a feeling of
mastery, a feeling that I was in charge of events rather than
submitting to them. This craving for cigarettes amounts to a
desire for order and control, not for nicotine . 2 32
In this example, the cigarettes serve the function of structuring and making
sense out of the individual's life. The neurological features, which doubtless
were present, are not relevant to why he smoked in the first place. They might
be relevant in terms of his quitting, but not as relevant as the other features.
Nicotine patches, gum and the like are helpful only to a point in the project of
quitting smoking. Consumers are cautioned against smoking more than a
certain amount while using these products; the fact that this warning is
necessary (and that many people ignore it!) speaks to the primacy of social and
emotional factors in cigarette addiction.
As mentioned earlier, addiction used to be defined in terms of mere
chemical dependency on a drug of abuse. Persons were considered addicted if
they exhibited tolerance to a drug and withdrawal symptoms when the drug use
stopped. 2 33 This definition has since been rejected, in part because some
H oward Becker, "Becoming a Marihuana User," in Outsiders: Studies in the
Sociology of Social Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1963.) p. 53. my emphasis.
23 1
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substances that are clearly "drugs of abuse" (perhaps most notably cocaine) do
not produce these effects.

Moreover, patients with severe and/ or chronic pain

can become chemically dependent on painkillers insofar as they experience
unpleasant physical withdrawal effects when they stop tal<lng their medicines,
without being "addicted" in any other meaningful sense of the term. There is,
therefore , an important distinction to be made between chemical dependency
and addiction . Chemical dependency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for addiction; that is, an individual may be chemically dependent on a
substance but not addicted to it (some neonates, for example, are born
chemically dependent on drugs that their mothers ingested) , or may be addicted
to something that is not a substance (gambling, shopping, sex, the Internet) .
The distinction is an important one for theory, therapy and policy: an individual
who is chemically dependent but not (on my account) addicted needs to be
addressed differently than an individual who is addicted, whether or not the
addiction involves chemical dependency on a substance . Keeping one's brain
healthy, as the NIDA website advocates, is a relatively small component of a
comprehensive approach to ameliorating addiction .
Thus, certain apparent counterexamples to my thesis that addictions
have in common existential features are actually examples of chemical
dependency - which presents its own set of problems - but not examples of
addiction. When we refer to crack babies, for example, we can hardly describe
their "addictive" experience in existential terms. Their experience is purely
visceral; it does not involve any sense of compulsion, moral tension, or
existential anxiety. Whether or not a baby is born chemically dependent
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depends on physiological factors. In adults, however, addiction rates vary
depending on social context. (This is true even for adult nonhuman animals.
The Rat Park experiments mentioned in chapter two , in which bored rats
become addicted more readily than rats in a pleasantly stimulating
environment, are a good example. Addiction in adult animals can more closely
resemble addiction in adult humans than in human infants .) The fact that pain
patients, crack babies and others who are "only" chemically dependent are said
to be addicted is not necessarily problematic; many terms are used colloquially
in ways that are not perfectly accurate . However, individuals who are
chemically dependent but not addicted are importantly different from
individuals who are both chemically dependent and addicted; their problems
have different etiologies and respond to different interventions. Individuals who
are both chemically dependent and addicted have more in common with those
who are addicted and not chemically dependent (e .g. compulsive gamblers) than
with those who are chemically dependent and not addicted (e.g. crack babies) .
Explaining addiction in neuroscientific terms need not be at odds with
explaining it in existential terms. Neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp discusses
the relationship between neuroscience and emotion in his book Affective
Neurosdence. Panksepp explores the relationship between oxytocin (the

hormone responsible for milk "letdown" in lactating mothers) and bonding and
the fundamental need for the feelings of security produced by relationships,
bringing a neuroscientific perspective on what has historically been an
existential issue. There are some interesting animal studies that examine the
conditions under which animals find oxytocin rewarding. For example, animals
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who are given oxytocin under ordinary conditions do not manifest behavioral
changes, but puppies who are isolated from their litter mates cease crying
within 1 5 minutes of receiving an oxytocin injection . 234 Perhaps, Panksepp
suggests, drug-seeking is an attempt to create a chemical counterfeit for the
sense of well-being that we experience in our very first relationship, when we
receive oxytocin in our mother's milk235 • The effects of the drugs themselves are
not inherently rewarding; they are rewarding in response to this fundamental
need, which is satisfied by milk and cuddling in infants , and by (among other
things) meaningful interpersonal relationships in adults.
This explanation accounts for why some people take "addictive" drugs
but do not become addicted. These people take drugs for pain relief or
recreation, and do not find that they fill a void in their lives . The drugs remain
simply a minor source of recreation or (physical) pain relief. Others who start
out taking drugs for pain relief or recreation find, perhaps accidentally, that the
experience the drug provides for them answers a basic longing - perhaps one
that they did not realize was there .

The drugs then become much more than

they originally had been. This explanation makes sense of both Leshner's
description of drugs "hijacking the brain ," and Peele's assertion that the most
effective responses to addiction are found in communities.
Panksepp dismisses Leshner' s argument that addiction is a disease
because drugs cause persistent changes in the brain . "Life causes persistent
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changes in the brain," he counters. 236 Since chemicals are not the only sources
of neurological changes (i.e. , since patterns of behavior - habits - also change
the brain) , it follows that treatment for addiction need not be reduced to
pharmacology - not simply because there are other dimensions of addiction but
because the neurological dimension can be addressed by nonchemical means.

For example, much of Panksepp's research has focused on ADD /ADHD . The
most severe cases of ADD / ADHD are manifested by neurological differences
from the norm (a shortened frontal lobe , for example) . Pharmacological
treatments for ADD/ADHD are well-lmown. Panksepp, however, found that a
regimen of vigorous play, for an hour twice a day, was at least as effective in
reducing the symptoms of ADD /ADHD as phannacotherapies. 237 Similarly,
even though drugs cause neurological changes, the most effective treatments
may be (and thus far have been shown to be) not the kind you swallow with a
glass of water.
A related point is that it is not clear that these neurological changes that
occur as a result of drug-taking are unrelated to other mental features of the
individual. That is, it is possible that the changes that occur depend not only
on the substance, the amount of the substance, the duration to which the
individual is exposed to the substance, etc. , but also to cultural, social, and
emotional factors. It may be, for example , that relevantly similar dosages of
tobacco cause different neurological effects on a nurse who smokes at work and
a shaman who smokes at work. If the nurse smokes because it is a habit that
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she develope� that reduces stress at work, and the shaman smokes - even the
same amount, over the same period of time, etc. - because it is a part of a
spiritual ritual of healing, it may be the case that the brain may respond
differently in these two individuals. It is known, for example, that drugs affect
the body differently depending on the setting in which they' are consumed: the
explanation is that the behavior that "leads up to" consuming the drug when it
is taken on the street gives the body an opportunity to prepare itself. When the
same amount is administered in a clinical setting, the absence of warning cues
means that the body is hit unawares with a dose of drugs. These studies relate
to the question at hand because they show that an individual's frame of mind
can have an effect on the body.
This kind of issue is an application of the perennial philosophical
question as to how the mind and body affect one another. The mind-body
problem is one of several classic problems that is illustrated by the
phenomenon of addiction. However, like another classic dyad, freedom vs.
determinism, it may be that the most interesting and useful answer to the
debate is outside the pair. That is, in contrast to descriptions of addiction as
"of the body" in the form of a brain disease, or "of the mind" as a moral problem,
it may be that the most accurate and complete description would make use of
experience and habit, which involve both dimensions of the person.
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Conclusion

What, then, is in a name? The disagreement over whether addiction is a
brain disease with important psychosocial features or a psychosocial problem
with important neurological features is no mere semantic turf war . Like many
other problems, the name frames the issue: names are both denotative and
connotative. The attitudes of researchers, clinicians, addicted persons and
their families and the public in general change depending on the framing of the
issue. One of Leshner's 1997 articles is titled "Addiction is a Brain Disease,
and

It Matters." It matters because our definition of addiction indicates our

beliefs about the etiology, moral dimensions, and effective responses to it.
However , as I have argued, defining or describing addiction as a disease points
us in the wrong direction on all of these questions.
Neurological features of addiction have our attention because they were
hidden from us for so long, because they are comfortingly, materially real, and
because they corroborate the (comparatively) slippery behavioral and
phenomenological data that has been amassing over the years. Additionally,
neurological data are retrieved using fascinating high technology: they require
instruments and procedures that most of us are not smart enough to
understand, much less devise or use.

It makes sense to expect that anyone

who can do work of this kind must be right about the significance of it.
However, it is easy to get seduced into thinking that the technical features of an
issue are the most important ones. While these features may be important
clues in understanding addiction, and while they may be among the most

147

interesting and impressive features, they are not the most important features
and are easily overstated.
We are now recognizing the extent to which the many facets of human
existence are integrated, and thankfully, we are beginning to embrace a more
holistic approach to all manner of problems. Even so, most of these problems
have features that are more prominent than others, and these features are the
ones that should - for theoretical as well as practical reasons - get top billing.
Addiction is characterized primarily by a set of behaviors and experiences
rather than medical symptoms. While the medical features of addiction, when
saliently present, should be addressed, they should not be mistaken for the
essential features of addiction. More importantly, they should not be addressed
to the exclusion of the more important features of addiction. Rather than a
brain disease, addiction is best considered in terms of the experience and
behavior of addicted people: in other words, it is more existential than medical,
and the answers are more social than neurological.
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Chapter Four: The Existential Model of Addiction

She gets lonely, why not admit it? She gets hugely, cavernously
lonely, and then she eats. Eats and drinks and smokes, filling up
her inner spaces. As best she can. 23 s
As discussed in chapter one, thinking about addiction has, in large part,
vacillated between moral models and disease models . Each of these models
seems to have settled into different arenas; the disease model dominates the
treatment world, while the moral model influences law. The reason for this
dichotomization is understandable: the legal system has the task of assigning
praise and blame and meting out punishments when appropriate. Moral
models facilitate this task, while disease models complicate it. Similarly,
disease models facilitate treatment by positing a problem that can be fixed by
the interventions of trained professionals and the participation of the patients.
In contrast, moral models, especially the more simplistic "moralizing" moral
models, make treatment more difficult because they make addicted people feel
judged. However, even though the different models lend themselves to different
arenas, the fact remains that the same addict exists in both arenas and is
asked to internalize the norms and assumptions of both. Using different
models of addiction in legal and therapeutic settings is incoherent and works
against ameliorating the problem of addiction. It would be far preferable to use
a single, accurate, workable model in every arena.
Thus, it is my contention that the best model for addiction is neither a
version of the moral model, nor a version of the disease model. As I have
argued, even rich, elaborate versions of each of these models will ultimately fail.
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They will fail for four reasons: For one, even if the content of either model is
basically right, it will still frame the problem of addiction in a distorted way.
That is, even the contemporary disease model, with its provisions for the
nonbiological features of addiction, carries all of the connotations of the word
"disease", and even moral models that acknowledge the social and neurological
features of addiction have the undesirable connotation of judgment. Secondly,
because of the history of bouncing back and forth between two models that
frequently were in direct opposition, proponents of each perspective will
naturally resist the other one. Thus, the solution will have to reside outside of
the dyad. Thirdly, in order to be consistent, both the moral model and the
disease model rely on an answer to the freedom-determinism debate, which
isn't forthcoming. As discussed in earlier chapters, for both the moral models
and the disease models, an important question concerns whether or not addicts
can control their behavior. The answer to this question is likely to be fairly
complicated (i.e. it is likely that the answer will vary from addict to addict, and
further from situation to situation) and for this reason may not be as helpful as
it first appears. Finally, neither model can adequately account for the complex
experience of addiction. Both major models can account for some features of
the experience, but not others. A more phenomenologically complete model is
needed.
What would an adequate account of addiction look like? We need an
account of addiction that avoids the problems of the disease models and the
moral models. That is, it must be able to accurately describe the lived human
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experience of addiction, account for all the major features of addiction, and
accord them appropriate weight. Furthermore, it should point us toward
treatment options that will work, social policies that make sense , and laws that
are fair. Additionally, it should avoid the pitfalls that are engendered by the
freedom- determinism dichotomy. That is to say, it should not rely on a
definitive answer to the question, Do people in general ultimately have control
of their own behavior? Finally, the new model should reflect the complex
nature of responsibility, and should avoid overly simplistic attributions of
blame .
This chapter presents an alternative definition of addiction, one that is
fundamentally different from both disease models and moral models . Rather
than describing addiction as a moral, psychological, or physiological defect of
the addict, this proposed model - call it the existential model - describes
addiction as a compulsive, inauthentic habit: a compulsive habit that the
individual does not endorse. Since compulsion and habit are already
frequently-cited features in descriptions of addiction, I shall focus here on
authenticity. Addiction, I argue , limits authenticity because the power of
addictive desires (i.e. the desire to engage in the addiction) makes authentic
choice difficult, if not impossible. Addiction constrains authentic choice in the
same way that factors such as pain and fear can interfere with autonomous
choice. Just as some conditions can obscure autonomous thinking, addiction
interferes with the process of living authentically. The powerful, compulsive
nature of addictive desires obscures individuals' endorsed desires and thus
interferes with their living authentic lives .
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The Existential Model of Addiction

The existential model of addiction begins with the assumption that angst,
or existential anxiety, is a universal feature of the human condition. 239 That is,
nearly every human experiences existential anxiety at various points in life, and
has to find a way to deal with it. What triggers existential anxiety varies from
person to person, but everyone (or nearly so) has to deal with it at some time or
another. Rollo May notes that individuals develop the "positive aspects of
selfhood" by confronting and overcoming anxiety; that is, angst is a universal
component of human development. 240
The term "angst" is used in many different ways. For Heidegger, angst is
the feeling of dread one experiences when one apprehends nothingness - which
is to say, when one confronts death. Authenticity for Heidegger is being
towards-death, or living in such a way that one is conscious of death as an
ever-present possibility. In contrast, inauthenticity is living in denial of
death.24 1 In my account, angst is used to mean something slightly different.
Angst is the state characterized by the fear that one is getting life wrong; that
one has chosen the wrong values, the wrong projects, the wrong way of living
one's life. Here, as for Heidegger, angst is not an emotion, but rather a state
that has emotional and cognitive components. 242 The emotional components
have been described as fear, anxiety, dread, and the like. The cognitive
If not truly universal, then very nearly so. Individuals with Down's Syndrome might
be an example of people whose lives are unmarked by angst.
240 Rollo May. The Meaning of Anxiety. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950.) p.
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components might include beliefs about mortality, one's own facticity, and one's
own possibilities. Additionally, it includes an understanding that there is such
a thing as "getting my life wrong" or "living my life wrongly".
I begin with the assumption that people need to believe that their lives
matter, they need their existence to be tangible, they need to express
themselves, to say I AM. We all are afraid that our lives might not matter, that
we will be forgotten, that we are insignificant. Furthermore, we all are afraid
that the choices we make will tum out to be the wrong ones . This is not simply
the fear that our choices will have bad consequences for us; that is not angst.
Rather, this is a deeper fear that the choices we make are fundamentally wrong
for us. Both major life choices (e.g. whether to have children) and minor
choices that we believe reflect something important about ourselves (e.g. how to
dress) can be sources of angst. Major life choices can lead to our wasting our
lives, while the minor choices, we suppose, indicate that we are wasting our
lives. The notion of angst as the belief that one's life has been spent wrongly, or
that it does not matter, is related to Heidegger's definition of angst, in that our
deaths represent the end of opportunities to get our lives right and to make our
lives matter. Thus, Heidegger's idea that angst concerns being-towards-death is
closely related to my notion that angst concerns "not getting one's life right" .
Angst is both necessary and uncomfortable. It serves as a powerful
motivator to live life authentically, which, given our finitude and propensity to
get distracted, is a good thing. However, too much angst can be crippling.
Precisely how much angst one needs would be impossible to determine, and in
242
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any case will vary from person to person. It may also vary across the lifespan ;
angst may be more important at certain phases of development (adolescence
and midlife seem to be likely candidates here .) Heidegger notes that angst is
the means by which individuals are able to confront themselves; that is , to
"own" their actions, possibilities, and limitations. 243 He calls this the "call of
conscience" . 244 Angst makes authenticity possible, because authentic choices
are made in response to angst. Thus, a certain amount of angst is actually
good, as it strengthens character in unique and important ways. Aldous Huxley
makes a similar point in Brave New World; as terrible as anxiety, disease and
death are, human life without some suffering is frivolous and superficial.
For some people , angst results from believing that their labor is all for
naught. This group includes, but is not limited to , what I call the poor-and
hopeless . Poverty alone does not always produce angst, even when it produces
other kinds of emotional and physical suffering. Poverty coupled with the belief
that one's labors make a difference (whatever that means for the individual in
question) is not angst-producing. For example , in my clinical work in Oswego ,
N.Y. I used to see Mexican migrant workers who were admitted to our inpatient
mental health unit for depression, suicidal behavior, and alcoholism. In
addition to other concerns (e .g. about relationships) they frequently expressed
hopelessness and helplessness about their working conditions. However, some
migrant workers found their labor meaningful because it meant that they could
send money back to their families in Mexico. It was supporting their families
that made them feel that they mattered; it was the cash and the food it would
243
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buy for their families, not the manner in which it was earned. More money
made a real difference to those families.
In contrast, the group I call the rich-and-aimless experience angst
because they have not found anything they can do that matters, that makes a
difference. They are too comfortable, afraid of failing, of suffering even small
privations; they never risk, reach, do anything that changes their world. So
they come to fear, and then believe, that their lives do not matter - that they
haven't gotten life right. Self-centeredness produces angst because there is
never anything bigger than oneself toward which one can make a difference.
Mattering, or making a difference, requires people to get outside themselves and
do something that matters to someone else - or even to something else.
When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do
not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them,
the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves. To those
who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of
life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the
time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by
death: while those who leave after them objects of personal
affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow
feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an
interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and
health. 245
Believing that one's life matters requires community; if not community
with people, or animals, then a meaningful connection with something. The
someone or something might even be imaginary or in the future -- one might
hope that one's labors will be appreciated by future generations, even when no
one presently seems to care. Even in such cases, such individuals experience a
Ibid. p. 271.
J ohn Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1979.
Originally published in 1861.) p. 13.
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connection with something outside of themselves. The individual cannot be the
sole object of mattering (that is, it isn't enough that my life matters to me - it
has to matter to me and someone or something else) because the individual is
finite. If I matter only to me then my life ceases to have meaning when I die. It
will be as though I never was, and all my struggles are for nothing.
Common sources of existential anxiety include a sense of
meaninglessness in one's life, feeling a lack of control, awareness of mortality,
alienation, feelings of personal inadequacy (also feeling like an "impostor") , and
a sense of rootlessness or lack of foundations. Each of these, in tum, can have
a multiplicity of triggers. For example, seeing a commercial on television can
make someone feel inadequate because she doesn't look like the model in the
Slim-Fast ad. The inadequacy she experiences (e.g. "I'm not slender enough")
can cause angst, a state in which she believes that she could and should be as
slender as the model in the Slim-Fast ad; that in failing to be that slim she is
"failing life" . (In the words of Saturday Night Live' s Stuart Smalley, "I'm going to
die homeless and penniless and twenty pounds overweight, and no one will ever
love me.")
My personal favorite of these triggers is Western culture (broadly
construed) which I think causes all manner of existential problems, especially
as regards meaninglessness and alienation.
I think of those youngsters who, on a worldwide scale, refer to
themselves as the "no future" generation. To be sure, it is not just
a cigarette to which they resort; it is drugs. In fact, the drug scene
is one aspect of a more general mass phenomenon, namely the
feeling of meaninglessness resulting from a frustration of our

1 56

existential needs which in tum has become a universal
phenomenon in our industrial societies . 2 46
Western culture encourages us to take our superficial desires too
seriously, so we never transcend these desires, and therefore do not connect
with anything that we can regard as larger or more important. As a result, we
fail to make the kinds of connections that could cause us to believe that our
lives really matter. Western culture contributes to angst by emphasizing self
importance to the point that it becomes self-centeredness. However, a certain
amount of self-centeredness is important for believing that one's life matters .
Ive discussed this elsewhere in terms of contextualization of the self. 247
Spiritually balanced people, I have argued, neither take themselves too
seriously nor not seriously enough; they balance their desires against the needs
of others. I've suggested that for those of us who live in upper-middle class
America, striving to live in an ecologically sustainable manner helps to
contextualize the self, to help us to accord ourselves an appropriate amount of
importance.
Personally, I keep coming back to cooking and gardening because I think
that alienation from the sources of life contributes to angst for people like me rich, white, educated, overly-comfortable people. But for others . . . many of the
migrant farmers in Oswego did not find connection to the soil meaningful; it did
not make them feel as if their lives mattered. If anything, it served as a
reminder that they were only migrant workers , and that all of their labor would
never amount to much. The point here is that, while angst is universal, what
246
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causes it is particular. Sometimes something that triggers angst in one person
will ameliorate it for another person.
The existential model of addiction begins by acknowledging that angst is
a feature of the human condition. Sometimes when angst surfaces, we
experience it directly and confront it straightforwardly. We might call this
dealing with angst authentically. In the language of pop psychology, this is
called "facing pain" or "feeling your feelings, both of which refer to
ti

acknowledging angst, which is the first step of dealing with it authentically.
After acknowledging angst, the next step is to acknowledge one's limitations
and possibilities and to make choices based on these. "Inauthenticity as well as
authenticity begins with a recognition of the challenge to take hold of oneself,
but the former flees it while the latter accepts it. " 248
A cornerstone of 12-step programs is the Serenity Prayer, and authentic
responses to angst require the same combination of acceptance, courage and
wisdom to which that prayer appeals. That is, facing angst authentically
requires individuals to both confront their limitations (what they cannot
change, what they are powerless over) and also to recognize their power (the
things they can change, their possibilities) . Both recognition of powerlessness
and recognition of possibilities can be extremely uncomfortable. Powerlessness
can degenerate into helplessness, but at the same time, sometimes even the
best possibilities within our scope of power are pretty unattractive. It is easier
not to face angst authentically. In any case, the final step in facing angst
247 Women and Power conference, MTSU, Murfreesboro, TN. February 27, 2003.
Robert C. Solomon Continental Philosophy since 1 750: The Rise and Fall of the Self.
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authentically involves acting on the choices one has made based on one's
limitations and possibilities.
In contrast, sometimes when angst surfaces, we deal with it
inauthentically. There are many ways this can happen. We might not
acknowledge it or allow ourselves to experience it. 249 We might use one of the
"standard" coping mechanisms, as taught in psych 1 0 1 - denial, sublimation,
projection, etc. Sometimes when we use these coping mechanisms we use a
vehicle for them; we overeat and "stuff' down our feelings. We put in too many
hours at work or work out excessively: misplaced penances for unnamed sins.
We drink to forget, to loosen inhibitions. We shop to make ourselves feel better
(novelist Ann Lamott calls this "retail therapy.") We become emotionally welded
to another person (i.e. "codependent") to avoid dealing with our own problems.
We have emotionally-disconnected sex in order to feel attractive and desirable,
or to gain a sense of power.
It is noteworthy that both disease model theorists250 and anti-disease
model theorists2 5 1 have described addicts as comprising two groups: thrill
seekers and depression-avoiders. Both of these groups can be seen as avoiding
angst, either by distraction (in the case of thrill seekers) or anesthesia (in the
case of depression-avoiders.) Sometimes these coping activities (drinking,
gambling, eating, etc.) become compulsive, then later become habits.
Sometimes they become habits, which tum compulsive. An example of the
former is someone who occasionally drinks excessively, out of control, more
249
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than he meant to. When these binges become habitual, part of a pattern, then
he has developed an addiction. An example of the latter is someone who is in
the habit of eating for comfort and entertainment. (Most people do this from
time to time, but some people are in the habit of doing so.) Perhaps in response
to some stressful event, the habit becomes compulsive; it takes on more
urgency. This person is also an addict. Addictions are compulsive, inauthentic
habits.
The inclusion of both "compulsive" and "inauthentic" in the proposed
definition of addiction may seem redundant, because in some sense the
compulsion to do something precludes one's authentic endorsement of it.
However, there are other reasons that individuals might not endorse their
compulsive habits besides the mere fact that they are compulsive. Compulsion
can limit authenticity in several different ways. For one, it might limit
authenticity by how much an individual does something. For example, someone
who eats sweets compulsively might endorse eating sweets, but not in the
amounts she does. A second way is that it might limit the manner in which an
individual does something. To keep the same example, someone who eats
sweets compulsively might endorse eating sweets and even feel that how much
she consumes is acceptable, but is disturbed by the urgency with which she
consumes them when she does. Similarly, she might be bothered by the fact
that she feels compelled to eat sweets in certain situations {e.g. "when I'm
stressed I just have to have my chocolate - I wish I could find a better way to
cope") . Thirdly, compulsion might limit authenticity by limiting what the
25 1
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individual does (or is able to refrain from doing). In the same example, someone
who eats sweets compulsively might not endorse eating sweets at all regardless of the circum�tances.
Perhaps most importantly, however, compulsion limits authenticity by
"overriding" other, endorsed desires. That is, the three examples above are
ways or modes in which compulsion can limit authenticity, but the mechanism
by which compulsion limits authenticity is that it out-competes other desires
(for example, the desire to be fit, to spend one's money on something other than
sweets, to model good food choices for one's kids, etc.) The call of compulsion
drowns out the "call of conscience", deafening addicts to their endorsed desires.
While inauthenticity and compulsion are essential features, addiction is
not simply a compulsion that the individual does not endorse, but rather a
compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse. The difference may be
illustrated thus: there is a basket of cookies on the counter in the Philosophy
Department. Two people, Ernie and Bert, are standing at the counter. Ernie
absentmindedly eats a cookie, and then another and another. He finds himself
eating more cookies than he really (i.e. authentically) wants to, but he also
wants more cookies. Finally he pushes the basket away and exclaims, "Get
these cookies away from me! They're addictive!" He leaves the office and the
thought of cookies does not trouble him further. His description of the
experience as "addictive" is fine as a colloquialism, but it's inaccurate. His
experience was compulsive and involved a conflict of desires, but was not
addictive. In contrast, there's Bert, who is still standing in front of the counter
with the cookies. Bert also is eating more cookies than he really (authentically)
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wants to, but this is a pattern with Bert, not just something that happens
sometimes. Ernie can usually eat a few cookies and let it go at that, but not
Bert. He habitually overeats - more than he wants to, more than is good for
him. He always does this. When he does leave the office, the thought of
cookies goes with him, and he continues to be tempted by them for as long as
there are any left. After all the cookies are gone his thoughts turn to other
cookies, sweets, snacks, etc. that might be around. Bert eats addictively ("is a
compulsive overeater" in 12-step lingo) while Ernie simply has occasional brief
episodes of cookie compulsion.

Compulsion, Habit, and Authenticity

To say that addiction is a compulsive, inauthentic habit is to paint
addiction differently than other models have done. It is to say, first, that an
essential feature of addiction is the attitude of the addict toward the addictive
behavior. Thus, for instance, given two individuals who are equally dependent
on a substance, one of them might be addicted and the other one not, if one of
them authentically chooses to be dependent. Similarly, individuals who
endorse their habits - people who seem like they might be addicts but who
wholeheartedly and authentically defend their choices - are not addicts. They
may make weird choices, they may have serious problems, but they're not
addicts. (I will discuss this further in the section on authenticity.) Likewise,
how much or how often a person engages in an addiction does not define
addiction. Excessive consumption might be a red flag; a signal to examine the
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habit as a possible addiction, but addiction can't be defined strictly in terms of
number of drinks per day, number of hours spent watching television, etc.
Thus, in spite of the power of the contemporary brain-disease model of
addiction, addiction is best described as a compulsive habit that the individual
does not endorse rather than a brain disease. I include that the individual does
not endorse, even though that may seem redundant to compulsive, in order to

nudge the connotation toward authenticity and away from the (admittedly
related) concepts of freedom and determinism.
These habits, which can develop with more or less of the individual' s
awareness and assent, become increasingly entrenched socially, behaviorally
and neurologically. When these habits are not endorsed by the individual and
are compulsive in nature, they qualify as addictions. I will devote comparatively
little energy developing the criteria of compulsion and habit, since these are
well-known to the addiction literature. Discussing addiction in terms of
authenticity, however, is a relatively new and undeveloped idea, and merits
more attention here.
Compulsion
Describing addiction in terms of compulsion is an obvious move. Self
help literature and narrative accounts of addiction paint addiction in terms of
feeling out of control, compelled, possessed by the objects of one's addiction.
Further, both disease model theorists like Alan Leshner252 and anti-disease
model theorists like Stanton Peele253 emphasize the fact that addicts seek their
addictive objects compulsively, seemingly uncontrollably. "Compelled"
252
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describes what it feels like to be addicted; the most important
phenomenological (i.e. experiential) component of addiction is compulsion.
It is interesting to note that compulsion is a feature of addiction that
appears, albeit in different guises, in the classic disease model, in addiction
definitions put forth by critics of the classic disease model, in the new disease
model, and again here. This feature of addiction was explored in some depth by
E.M. Jellinek, popularizer of the classic disease model of alcoholism. Jellinek
argued that the disease-making feature of alcoholism was a loss of control, and
that other heavy drinkers (European wine drinkers, for example) are not
diseased. Herbert Fingarette discusses the same idea in terms of the
compelling force that entrenched habits, or central activities, can have. Alan
Leshner and other promoters of the new disease model have defined drug
addiction in terms of compulsive drug-seeking and use. This feature of
addiction is, perhaps, the most salient one in the minds of addicts themselves,
clinicians, researchers, and in the lay public. While there are many pictures of
addiction, from the proverbial skid-row alcoholics to the socialites who embezzle
thousands of dollars to shop for items they subsequently never use, the
common feature of these pictures is that their behavior seems - to them and to
others - not wholly voluntary.
When addicts talk about their experiences with their habits, they often
describe feeling out of control, compelled or controlled by a force outside of
themselves. Suzanne Vale, protagonist in Carrie Fisher's novel Postcards from
the Edge, is an actress who is addicted to opiates. Her therapist describes her
253
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as someone who "doesn't lead her life. She follows it around. " She reflects on
her habit:
The weird thing about all this is that I had been straight for
months - the whole time I was filming Sleight of Hand in London
and all through my vacation . But then I got home and BOOM!
four weeks of drugs. I hated it, I even wanted to stop, but I just
couldn't. It was like I was in a car, and a maniac had gotten
behind the wheel. I was driven, and I didn't know who was
driving. 2 54
Suzanne, like many addicts, had the sense that a force alien to her was
controlling her behavior. Even though she found the experience unpleasant
and wanted to stop, she felt that she could not.
Another important feature of compulsion is the conflict of desires of the
individual who experiences it; to be compelled is to feel on some level that you
don't want to do it, but then to do it anyway. For example, one question on a
Compulsive Behavior Inventory reads, "When I attempt to resist exercising,
there is a sense of mounting tension that can be relieved by exercising. "2 ss
Frequently, compulsion is described or defined in terms of actions, desires,
thoughts, etc. that occur "against the will" of the individual. The fact that these
seem to occur against the individual's will indicates that the individual both
wants and doesn't want to do (or think, feel, desire, etc.) the object in question.
People who experience compulsion are caught between desires that accord with
the will and those that occur against the will. People who exercise
compulsively, for example, know on some level that the amount they exercise is
unhealthy, and they want to refrain from doing that. However, they also want

Carrie Fisher. Postcards from the Edge. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.) p. 1 2 .
Richard W . Esterly and William T . Neely. Chemical Dependency and Compulsive
Behaviors (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.) Appendix B, p. 99.
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to do it anyway, often to relieve the tension that arises if they don't. This
conflict of desires is a central feature of compulsion. 256 Other features of
compulsion include preoccupation, denial, and progression of intensity over
time. 257
Thus, while doing something frequently, strenuously, or repetitively
might signal compulsion, these may sometimes be features of uncomplicated,
uncompulsive behavior. Frequent, strenuous or repetitive behavior is neither
necessary not sufficient for compulsion. Similarly, doing something that
damages oneself or others may be a reason to suspect compulsion, but this,
too, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the behavior to be compulsive.
Damage to oneself or others signals a problem, but not necessarily the problem
of compulsion.
The internal conflict that I take to be essential to compulsion fits the
intuitions of both disease model frameworks ("they do it because they can't help
it"), and moral model frameworks ("they do it even though they know better") .
However, unlike these models, the existential model of addiction does not
require that addicts are compelled, but rather simply that they feel compelled.
It should be noted that there are many other phenomenological (i.e.
experiential) features that are frequently associated with addiction - for
example, addictions tend to create more desire than they can satisfy. Addicts
256
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and professionals alike describe addiction as characterized by preoccupation
and denial. However, at this point the only experiential feature of addiction
that I am willing to describe as essential is compulsion.
While disease model and moral model theories get caught in the gridlock
of the empirical question ''.Are addicts compelled to behave as they do?" we need
not take a position on it; the important aspect of compulsion on the existential
model is how it feels to be addicted. The two other models stand or fall on the
truth of the empirical question as to whether we are actually compelled: if
addicts truly can't control their behavior, we should not try to make them;

if

they can, we should. However, contrary to the disease model, the evidence (as
discussed in chapters two and three) suggests that addicts can (and do) change
their behavior. Further, contrary to the moral model, it suggests that such
changes are extremely hard to make, and that they happen through attention to
habit rather than through sheer force of will (or, for that matter, by "restoring"
control with medications) .
It seems to be that case that the amount of control addicts have over
their behavior varies from individual to individual and from time to time
depending on the situation. Control is a matter of degree; we cannot generalize
and say the "addicts are" or that "addicts are not"

in

control of their actions;

only (at best) that this addict �as in control of her behavior to this degree. For
this reason, the freedom/ determinism debate may be seen as unnecessarily
complicating the issue of addiction. Rather than asking the question, "Are
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humans free?" we ought to ask, "How can we help this person to acquire more
control in her life?"
The problem of control, however, is not the problem of achieving
total control; it is not whether we can gain control over all that
influences what we are and what we do. The problem is whether it
is possible to increase the control we have. And we can do that
even if we acknowledge, as it is reasonable to do, that no one can
ever have total control.258
This is not to say that the answer to the question of freedom is not
important; only that its importance can be overstated.

Brain-disease model

advocates, for example, will maintain that compulsion can be understood in
terms of brain states : that when enough is known about the brain we will be
able to describe , predict, and understand compulsion. We will lmow to what
degree addicts are compelled and to what degree they are free. It is true that

if

we could know for certain that a particular addict had a particular level of
control over her addiction, that would affect legal and therapeutic decisions
regarding that individual. However, I suggest, it would not have as profound an
effect as we might think, especially therapeutically. The most effective methods
for treating addiction for the long term concern attention to habit. Having
access to precisely how much control an addict has over her addiction might
streamline such treatment a bit, but it will remain essentially unchanged.
One problem engendered by regarding the addict's experience of
compulsion as a criterion for addiction might be termed "prereflective
compulsions" . Some people's lives are so unproblematically arranged around
an addiction that they do not experience the conflict of desires that has been

258 John Kekes. Moral Wisdom and Good Lives. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 995.)
p. 80.
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cited as an essential feature of compulsion. This, in tum, would imply that
such persons are not addicts, since they do not experience their behavior as
compulsive. Criminologist Mariana Valverde notes, with regard to alcoholism:
"The inclusion of emotional and ethical criteria has a peculiar effect: people who
drink extremely heavily without ever trying to cut down will be less likely to be
pathologized than those individuals who for one reason or another worry about
their drinking. " 2 59 She adds, "... we are left with a psychological disorder that
waxes and wanes depending on one's moral scruples, one's occupation, the
moral standards of one's spouse ... "260
Two responses are possible. The first is that it seems quite unlikely that
many such people have truly never thought about the issue before. What is
likely is that most people who might be described as having a prereflective
compulsion are in the very early stages of what 1 2-step programs call denial.
The problem has occurred to them, and it is troubling, so they put it out of their
head. They might even use the addiction in question to help them do just that.
Furthermore, people who arrange their lives around an addiction (for instance,
arranging their work schedules, friendships, etc. to fit in with their drinking) so
that they are never forced to experience the conflict of desires I describe, know
on some level what they are doing and why.
The second possible response is that the experience of compulsion may
be latent. Even such carefully-crafted lives come apart at some point, at which
the compulsion in experienced with an intensity that often surprises the
individual. So perhaps others can see that an individual has arranged her
2s9
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whole life around (for example) work, although she herself really just doesn't see
it. At some point, something will happen to bring the problem sharply into
focus.26 1 In the same way that one can "realize" that one has had a headache
all morning without really being aware of it, one can realize that one has been
experiencing compulsion without really being aware of it. People who come to
describe themselves as TV addicts might say, for example, "I never knew how
much I needed the TV until it broke. "
Whether it is latent or experienced directly, the feeling of compulsion is
essential to addiction. The conflict of desire that is a component of compulsion
is therefore important for understanding addiction. A better understanding of
the nature of this conflict will go a long way towards understanding addiction.
Conflicts of desire occur even in ordinary experiences (i.e. those not affected by
addictions or compulsions) . They are not compulsions until they involve a
"driven" or "out of control" experience. In tum, a compulsion is not an
addiction until it becomes entrenched as a habit.

Like compulsion, using habit to describe addiction is natural. Addictions
are often described as habits: "the liquor habit" "a drug habit" and so on.
However, the use of the term is not universal. The debate as to whether
addictions are diseases or "just habits" has sometimes been a version of the
moral model/ disease model debate, in which habits are considered to be under
the control of the individual and thus appropriate objects of blame. However,
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the two models need not be at odds with one another with respect to
recognizing the importance of habit. In fact, contemporary disease model
advocates make connections between behavioral descriptions and neurological
descriptions of the same phenomena.
As mentioned earlier, John Dewey has supplied us with an account of
habit that proves to be particularly helpful for understanding addiction. One
reason is that, for Dewey, habits are dynamic forces between the individual and
the environment; that is, habit emphasizes both the role of the individual and
the role of the social context in explaining behavior. This has promising
implications for avoiding the difficulties into which the freedom/ determinism
dyad leads us. The other reason is that, for Dewey, habits are powerful forces
- much more powerful than we usually think of them as being. This feature of
habit may be used to respond to the criticism that addictions can't "just" be
habits.
For Dewey, habits are organizing forces of thoughts, desires, and
capabilities: "they constitute the self. " 26 2 He also refers to habits as
systemizations of minor elements of action, formed by many specific acts. 2 6 3
Each repetition of the action gathers some force (how much force surely
depends on many variables.) Since habits are acquired by the repetition of
many acts , they are more intimately a part of us than our conscious choices
are. Conscious choices, after all, can be superficial and fleeting, and can come
from sources that are outside ourselves (e.g. "Mom says I shouldn't bite my
nails, so I hereby resolve to stop biting my nails " can't compete with the
262
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gazillions of times I bit my nails and the force that each successive instance of
nail-biting has gathered.) For Dewey, we are our habits; the self is composed of
its habits. However, since the self is always situated in a context, habits involve
the environment as well. They are acquired modes of responding to the
environment. Thus, to place responsibility for habits exclusively on the agent
or exclusively on the environment is to falsely separate people from their
surroundings . 264
Because habits are acquired, they are dynamic in quality; each action
"sets up" which choices are live. One choice may open up certain other choices
and eliminate certain other choices, or it may maintain the status quo.
Deciding against going running every day from January to October precludes
the choice of running a marathon in November (for most of us, anyway). It
doesn't preclude the choice of running a bit one day (or even every day) in
November, though. This has important implications for addiction, as we shall
see. Addicts - that is, people who have compulsive, inauthentic habits should not expect to change simply by sheer force of will265 • Habits have to be
changed by changing the social conditions that allowed them to develop in the
first place. 266
No habit occurs in a vacuum, and no habit that involves other human
beings occurs in a social vacuum. 267 So it is with addictions. And while
Dewey's notion of habit emphasizes the importance of social context, it does not
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct pp. 40-42.
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 18.
265 Jane Fritsch "Scientists Unmask Diet Myth: Willpower." New York Times Oct. 5,
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neglect the role of the individual and need not be at odds with neurological
descriptions of addiction. Addictions, like most habits, are socially
contextualized. Even the solitary alcoholic has to buy liquor from someone:
many such drinkers describe the elaborate measures to which they went in
order to avoid buying too much liquor from the same merchant so they wouldn't
seem like drunks. " . . [S}ince habits involve the support of environing conditions,
a society or some specific group of fellow-men, is always accessory before and
after the fact. " 268 Attending to this is helpful in terms of understanding both
what addictions are and how they come about, and also what kinds of
strategies will be helpful in fixing the problem. Again, this is not to say that
physiological features of addiction are irrelevant, but rather that the
physiological features should play a supporting role rather than a central one in
describing addiction.
It is abundantly clear that context is important in the etiology and
maintenance of alcohol and other drug dependence . . . When the
problem is seen as lying within the person, there is little reason to
attend to (let alone get involved with) the social environment. 269
Identifying addiction "within the person" (as both moral models and disease
models do) engenders the danger that we will not attend to the social
environment - the context out of which addictions arise.
A second virtue of Dewey's view of habit for describing addiction is that it
accommodates the intensity with which habits organize the individual. While
we may be tempted to think of habits as innocuous, no more than a collection
of quirks and preferences, Dewey argues that habits, both good and bad, are
268
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powerful forces. The fact that everyone has habits but that not everyone is an
addict may make it seem less plausible that addictions, too , are habits .
However, since even ordinary habits - those that organize our daily lives - are
powerful forces, then habits that are fueled by angst, are deeply entrenched in a
social context, have physiological features, and may profoundly affect one's
mood can be expected to be extremely difficult to overcome. Habits are hard to
break, to be sure, but addictions have force beyond what is usually expected
from "just a habit," and often have far more serious consequences than
behaviors we think of as bad habits.
The argument that addictions aren't habits - advanced, often, by classic
disease model advocates - seems to rest on two features: the intensely
compelling experience of addiction and the physiological features that some
addictions have. After all, it seems implausible to put drug addiction in the
same category as biting one's nails, or saying "nuculer. " However, this neglects
the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that habits can accommodate rich
neurological descriptions, it and underestimates the strength with which habit
organizes (indeed, constitutes) the individual. According to Dewey, habits are
the will of the individual. Individuals' thoughts, desires, capacities and choices
are formed by their habits. 270 Furthermore, habits, like compulsions,
addictions, and so many other phenomena, are on a continuum. Some are
more socially entrenched than others, some have physiological features that
others do not have. Each of these possible features affects where on the
269
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continuum the habit belongs. Addictions are on one end of the continuum.
The force of these compulsive habits is far greater than the force of what one
might call "mere habit. "
Habits can be endorsed, unendorsed, or unreflective. Unreflective habits
may be endorsable or unendorsable upon reflection. Addictions are, under the
proposed description, unendorsed - or at least unreflective-but-unendorsable
- habits. Other habits may begin as endorsed habits that lose the individual's
endorsement for one reason or another. Addictions to objects that have few
social sanctions associated with them are more likely to fall in this category
than addictions to things that are socially unacceptable. Shopping, eating,
drinking and the like all may begin as endorsed habits that progressively
become compulsive and lose the individual's endorsement. In such cases, the
individual rejects the habit because of its compulsive nature rather than the
activity itself. In contrast, habits that are socially disapproved of even in
moderation - illegal drugs, for example - are less likely to begin as endorsed
or unreflective habits. However, since social context determines what is socially
acceptable, these examples will not be universally generalizable. In some social
contexts, illegal drugs are not only acceptable but socially required; in others
(e.g. the world of high fashion) normal eating is unacceptable. Regardless,
addictions are compulsive habits that the individual does not endorse: they may
be unendorsed (i.e. the individual disapproves of the habit) or unreflective but
unendorsable (the individual has not considered the question, but would not
endorse the habit if she gave the matter much serious thought.)
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Although it officially subscribes to a disease model of addiction, much of
the success of M and other twelve-step programs of recovery is attributable to
its focus on changing the habits of their members to those that support their
sobriety (or other relevant form of recovery, e.g. abstinence from gambling.)
Valverde describes this process in terms of hupomnemata - ''ancient
scrapbooks for daily ethical meditation . " 27 1 This process, for the ancient Greeks
and for contemporary twelve-steppers, is one of acquiring virtue by the
accumulation of good habits. In literature and in meetings, the twelve-step
philosophy is to do "what works" to stay sober. An important feature of this
strategy, noted in chapter two, is that sobriety in M (and "recovery" in other
twelve-step programs) is not simply refraining from drinking. Sobriety is a new
way of thinking and acting. Twelve-steppers know (as Dewey, too, remarks)
that simply trying not to do something can only be effective in the short term.
Cultivation of sober habits - changing preferred beverages, friends, routines,
etc. - supports and strengthens one's resolve. To refrain from drinking but fail
to cultivate these new, sober ways of life - called "white-knuckled sobriety" is to court relapse.
The advantages of using the notion of habit to explain addiction were
discussed in chapter two, especially with regard to Fingarette's notion of
alcoholism as a central activity rather than a disease. Briefly, these advantages
include bypassing the freedom/determinism debate (with the various problems
facing each side), creating an obvious role for the community to play in helping
addicts overcome their problems, and demystifying addiction. My description of
27 1
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addiction owes a debt to Fingarette in that it borrows from his account of the
evolution of addiction in the individual and the importance of understanding
the individual as situated in a community. Both accounts describe addiction as
the product of the many choices - some of them seemingly inconsequential that an individual makes over a lifetime. My description goes further than
Fingarette's account in emphasizing the existential aspects of addiction.
Focusing on the existential features of addiction (i.e. authenticity and angst)
has two advantages: for one, it helps to make clear how alcoholism, for
example, appears both in wealthy, well-educated persons and poor, relatively
uneducated ones, but selectively in both socioeconomic groups. For another, it
provides a more vivid and more accurate account of how it feels to be addicted.
That is, my account agrees with Fingarette's view that addictive habits are not
different in kind from other habits, but emphasizes that they are different in
power and scope from other habits.
Authenticity
Much of the philosophical literature on addiction focuses on how
addiction limits freedom . The central question of this literature concerns
whether people with established addictions choose to engage in their addictions;
that is, whether they could have done otherwise. A related, but often
overlooked, dimension of the issue is how addiction limits authenticity.
Framing addiction in terms of authenticity rather than in terms of
freedom facilitates our understanding of the experience of addiction, without
getting mired in the age-old philosophic quandary about freedom. For example,
a claim that is consistent with the classic disease model is that addiction
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"makes" people do things that they would never do otherwise: say inappropriate
things, lie, cheat and steal to support the addiction, etc. "That wasn't me that was the whisky talking." Some anti-disease theorists, notably Peele,
dispute this . According to Peele, an addiction is actually an expression of
addicts' values, and drugs, alcohol, etc. don't "make" anyone act against their
own will. 272 "New" disease model theorists respond that drugs do indeed "hijack
the brain, " and that these persistent neurological changes constrain addicts'
behavior. Nevertheless, each of these argue that addicts should be held
responsible for their actions. This dialogue shows that the moral/ disease
dilemma and the freedom/ determinism dilemma are not productive frames for
addiction. Both generate questions that steer us away from the more important
questions, i.e. those that will help us to prevent and ameliorate addiction. An
advantage of the proposed existential model of addiction is that it does not
depend on an answer to the questions posed by these binaries.
Like many terms, "authenticity" is used differently by different people.
As for Heidegger and other existentialist thinkers, authenticity here refers to
living with an awareness of one's life as one 's

own -

"the self that has explicitly

grasped itself'. 273 In this context, authenticity should be viewed as an ongoing
process that admits of degrees rather than a static state that is attained once
and-for-all. However, the term (as it is, in the form of a noun) is misleading, as
it implies a status that can be "achieved" . Better, perhaps, is "living
authentically." Another possible coinage is the "authentic self," in which the
self is a project rather than a thing. For Diana Meyers, an authentic self
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emerges through the exercise of what she calls autonomy competency.
Autonomy competency is the set of skills that enables people to ask of
themselves, "What do I really want, need, care about, etc.?" and to carry out
their decisions. 274 They also need to be able to recognize and make corrections
when they "get the answer wrong" - i.e. come to believe that they have made a
mistake in answering these questions. The principal feature of the account of
authenticity used here are mine-ness or "ownliness", which involves facing
angst. Other features include acceptance of facticity, honesty, and courage.
Each of these features is necessary, but not sufficient, for authenticity.
Another feature, coherence, is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is included
here as it often indicates authenticity.
There are features of every life that individuals did not choose, e.g. race,
gender, etc, and factors that they had little choice in, e.g. skills and
predilections. Authentic individuals respond to such features of their lives
("facticity") by accepting them, asking themselves what they can realistically do
under the circumstances, and following through with the choice they make.
Meyers uses the example of a woman who wishes to have an abortion. She
can't obtain one, which means she can't do what she wants to do with her life;
she is prevented by circumstance from acting according to her autonomous
choice. However, she acts authentically in the manner in which she parents

273

Heidegger, Being and Time p. 12 1 .
214 Diana Meyers. Self, Society, and Personal Choice. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1989.) p. 53.

179

her child. 275 Circumstances can limit which choices are available, but
individuals can still live authentically within those constraints.
Furthermore, to live authentically is to live both honestly (authentic
individuals do not deceive themselves or others) and courageously (authentic
individuals acknowledge all aspects of their lives, whether they are painful or
pleasant.) Authentic individuals do evolve, and so can come to change their
minds about goals, values, etc. However, these changes, when they occur, are
the result of reflective endorsement, not whim, caprice , or the desire to gain
external rewards. They involve an honest appraisal of one's past, present, and
possibilities. Changes in values, goals and the like that are authentic are not
made in bad faith; authentic individuals neither refuse to accept the facts about
the past and present, nor deny that they have the capacity to change.
Authenticity in the sense of "mine-ness" or "ownliness 11 requires indeed, implies - endorsement. Authentic people are willing to "own" the
various components of their lives. Since authenticity is a continuum concept,
we might say that people are authentic to the degree that they can endorse their
own actions, choices, desires, and so on. Actions, choices, desires, and the like
can be endorsed (i.e. the individual acknowledges and embraces them)
unendorsed (i.e. the individual refuses to acknowledge them or disavows them)
or nonendorsed (i.e. the individual has not reflected on them.) However, even
endorsement does not guarantee authenticity, as one might "endorse" a choice
one minute and change one's mind the next. (We might call this "mere"

27 s Ibid p. 162.
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endorsement.) Living authentically is not based on loyalty to pursuing one's
fleeting preferences, but rather involves a continuing process of evaluation.
In contrast to mere endorsement, reflective endorsement requires a
certain kind of ongoing consideration. Some have suggested that authentic
choices are those that the individual could endorse after considering them
through a course of psychotherapy. 276 However, even ongoing, reflective
endorsement - with or without the benefit of therapy - is not necessarily the
same as existential endorsement. Existential endorsement requires more than
just reflection; the reflection has to involve one's life as such. That is, the
0

reflection has to include what I want my life to be about" or "who I want to be" ;
it needs to involve a particular kind of self-awareness. People can still be
inauthentic when making reflectively endorsed decisions if they only take
practical considerations into account, for example, or if they only worry about
what the neighbors might think.
As Michael Gelven notes in his analysis of Being and Time, there are
many kinds of self-awareness. One can be aware of oneself as a physical being,
as a rational being, and so on. However, authentic self-awareness is different
from these; it is awareness of oneself as "my own" . (The word "authentic", he
notes, is a translation of the German eigentlich; the root eigen means "own" as
in "my own. ")277 Thus, authentic reflection necessarily involves attention to
one's own life as such. Heidegger refers to this as being open to "the call of
conscience" . Openness to the call of conscience is the willingness to face one's
276
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life as one's own, to face one's freedom and therefore to acknowledge that one's
actions were indeed one's own. 278 Thus, the call of conscience requires one to
face the possibility that one has done wrong; that one has done something that
goes against what one wants to say that one's life is about. The courage to do
that is the courage to experience angst. 279 Existential endorsement requires
attention to angst, and reflection upon how to deal with it.
Angst, then, is related to authenticity in that authentic choices are
motivated by angst. However, angst (defined as a state of anxiety about the
possibility that one is "getting life wrong") can inspire both authentic and
inauthentic responses; thus, angst is necessary, but not sufficient, for
authenticity. When individuals respond authentically to angst, they ask the
questions engendered by autonomy competency, i.e. "What do I want, need,
care about?" These are hard questions, and angst is an uncomfortable state.
Further, authenticity requires another set of skills included in Meyers' notion of
autonomy competency: the skills of knowing the limits of one's situation and
making choices that reflect this understanding. For example, one can't
authentically choose to be a professional football player if one is five feet tall,
one hundred pounds, and not athletic - even if one really, really wants to be a
professional football player. Such recognition of one's limitations can also be
difficult and uncomfortable. Thus, inauthenticity often eases angst more
readily than authenticity, at least in the short term. It is more comfortable, for
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example, to dream of becoming a professional football player than to face the
various, realistic alternatives.
The concept of coherence helps to clarify the concept of authenticity.
Coherent lives are those in which there is little conflict between actions, goals,
values, relationships, work, desires, and so on. Completely coherent lives are
not possible, but people are authentic (roughly) to the degree that their lives are
coherent. (An important exception follows.) For example, a person who claims
to endorse safety but rides in the car without buckling up is living a slightly
incoherent life, and (perhaps) is not being authentic about which desire is the
endorsed desire (i.e. safety or freedom from seat belts.) Pushing the example, a
person whose life's work has been risk management in transportation, who
lectures worldwide on the subject of highway safety, but who frequently rides a
motorcycle at excessive speeds without a helmet while drunk is living a
seriously incoherent life, and (we might charge) is not being authentic about
either the penchant for safety or the penchant for helmet-less high-speed
drunken motorcycle riding.
Since everything we do precludes other possibilities, a measure of
coherence in one's life requires reflection on one's own desires. This includes
an appreciation of facticity regarding these desires. Some desires, while not
incoherent in the abstract, are incoherent in point of fact; i.e. something about
one's particular situation makes them incoherent. An example might be the
desire to perform excellently in one's job and the desire to be an involved,
attentive parent. These are not incoherent desires, but to claim to endorse both
of them equally is inauthentic if the demands of either elbow the other one
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another out. Inattention to facticity precludes authenticity. Kierkegaard calls
this fear of the limits of actuality the aesthetic orientation. 280 Aesthetic persons
live only in the present moment, without attention to past or future. They focus
on what is immediately appealing, and refuse to acknowledge that sometimes
people have to choose between two desiderata. Elsewhere he describes this as
possibility's despair. "Instead of taking the possibility back into necessity, he
chases after possibility - and at last cannot find his way back to himself. "

28 1

Coherence, both over time and at any given time, is a mark of an
authentic person. However, it is not an essential feature of authenticity.
Incoherence can reflect existential dissonance (disconnections between
important features of individuals' lives) , which can be part of the process of
living authentically. Individuals who are engaged in the process of living
authentically may at some times adopt values, goals, habits, etc. that contradict
their current values, goals and habits. During such times of exploration, such
individuals are not less authentic than they were before (when their lives were
more coherent.) While coherence is a useful heuristic, it is not absolutely
necessary for authenticity. Furthermore, coherence is not sufficient for
authenticity. Individuals can be utterly inauthentic while living coherent lives if
they do not allow themselves to experience and be motivated by angst.
(Tolstoy's Ivan Illych2 82 is such a person.)
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Authenticity and Addiction

Addiction - and the feeling of compulsion which I take to be essential to
it - limits addicted persons' authenticity by creating a conflict of desires
between those that are endorsed (but strenuous) and those that are unendorsed
(but easily alleviate angst). Rather than being a momentary respite in order to
rest, after which the individual returns to facing anxiety, an addiction interferes
with the experience of anxiety and therefore with living authentically. (Angst,
as noted earlier, is necessary, though not sufficient, for living authentically.) As
Harry Frankfurt notes, the concept of the verb "to want" or "to desire" is difficult
to pin down. His famous distinction between first-order desires and second
order desires is useful here. First-order desires are simply desires to do (or not
to do) one thing or another, but second-order desires are desires to have (or not
to have) certain other desires. 283 Using this distinction, we might say that
second-order desires are endorsed desires, and that first-order desires can be
endorsed, unendorsed, or non-endorsed.
Some disease model theorists will say that this conflict is essentially
neurological; that the addictive desire is the result of the effects of certain drugs
on the human brain. I suggest that while it is sometimes useful to view drug
addictions as "hijacking the brain," it is better to think of addiction primarily in
terms of damaging authenticity. Emphasizing the existential features of
Leo Tolstoy. "The Death of Ivan Illych. " in Great Short Works of Leo Tolstoy with
introduction by John Bayley, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967.) pp. 245-302.
2s2
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addiction puts the focus on its etiology and phenomenology rather than on its
consequences. However, these ways of framing the addiction problem should
not be seen as mutually exclusive. As neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp notes,
''our existential capacities are interpenetrant completely with our
psycho biological tendencies. " 284 The inclusion of neurological features for
diagnosis and treatment is a valuable part of recovery for some addicts.
In the same way that other kinds of extreme discomfort (fear, pain,
hunger) can prompt people to do things that they would not ordinarily do , the
discomfort of existential anxiety and the force of addictive habits can do the
same. Resurrecting the notion of "value options " from chapter two, we can
describe addiction as limiting possible objects of value for addicts. Addiction,
then, is not a force that "makes" addicts do things against their will (as some
disease model advocates claim) nor is it "an expression of addicts' values" (as
disease-model critic Stanton Peele claims) but rather it is a compulsive habit
that expresses what has become most immediately compelling to the addict.
This developmental dimension is an important feature of addiction which both
of the major models tend to ignore.
Everyone has conflicting desires, many of which are unendorsed, some of
which can be very compelling. Moreover, everyone acts on unendorsed desires
from time to time . Addictions, however, seem to involve the most extremely
compelling of unendorsed desires, and addicts seem to go from unendorsed
desires to unendorsed behavior with stunning alacrity. Addictive desires are
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intensely compelling because, in addition to simply being attractive to the
addict, they ease the addict's existential anxiety and are sustained by the force
of habit. It should be noted that addictive desires are focused; that is, addicts
are not necessarily people with poor impulse control in general; rather, they
have trouble abstaining from one particular behavior. If they are addicted to
more than one thing, then they have difficulty abstaining from more than one
behavior, but not, qua addict, from any whim that happens by.
As noted, addiction produces powerful desires which are at odds with
individuals' endorsed desires. That addicted individuals do not endorse their
own desires appears in their narratives about their addictions. Likewise ,
endorsement of their desires appears in non-addicts' narratives about their
habits. Renee Himmel, protagonist in Rebecca Goldstein's novel The Mind-Body
Problem offers insight as to the distinction between an addict and a non-addict:
" . . . I'm philosophically committed to smoking. It' s an act of
existential freedom."
"Is it? I always thought it was simply an indication of wealmess of
will."
"For some, it is. You see, there are two kinds of smokers, heroic
and unheroic . . . Unheroic smokers are worried about the health
hazards of smoking, which is weakness one, and would like to
quit, which is weakness two. Heroic smokers don't worry. Worry
is for little minds. That goes double for worrying about mere
physical dangers. Fear for the body should never govern one's
actions . . . Heroic smokers disdain death. They laugh at death
with every inhaling breath." 28 5
Renee's "heroic smoker" is not an addict, if she is being genuine about her
beliefs and values. If she truly is not worried about the health hazards of
smoking and really does not want to quit, then smoking for her is an authentic
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choice. It is not in conflict with what she wants and cares about ; rather , it is in
concert with it. It should be noted that "heroic smokers" (unless they smoke so
rarely that they do not court smoking-related health problems) would have to
have an unusual set of values and projects. These probably couldn't include
close relationships, given the correlation between smoking and cancer ,
emphysema, heart disease , etc. But surely heroic smokers are possible. In
contrast, "unheroic smokers," which are much more common, are addicted to
smoking because they continue to smoke even though they want to quit.
The authenticity criterion can help distinguish addicts from others who
may be troubled or unusual, but are not addicts. Addicts' reactions to their
own habits give us a clue as to whether they are, in fact, addicts. The conflict
of desires is one such clue. Unendorsed desires - .ones that are not what the
individual wants to say her life is about - signal the possibility of addiction.
Conversely, if what might look like an addiction is what the individual genuinely
wants to say that her life is about, then she's not as addict. Such individuals
may very well have serious problems - including, perhaps, chemical
dependency- that result from their choices . However, these problems lack
the existential features that characterize addiction. It seems likely that such
people are quite rare. They are interesting because of their unusual life
choices, but not because they're addicts in any m�aningful sense. At the end of
her life, a non-addict who drank heavily might say, "I've lived a good life. I've
had some wonderful binges." A person who was addicted to alcohol will say, at
the end of her life, "I wish I hadn't spent so much of my life on drinking.
Drinking took so much away from my life."
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The consequences of one's addiction are important to address here; a
non-addict might dislike the consequences of a hobby or habit, but find these
consequences worth the trouble. For example, my friend Melissa plays the
guitar, but doesn't like the fact that she has to keep her fingernails very short
in order to do it, and that her fingertips have calluses on them from the guitar
strings . But she'll tell you that having ugly fingers (her words, not mine) is
worth being able to play music. In contrast, the consequences of addiction
produce real anguish, sometimes because they are more serious than ugly
fingers, but more interestingly because they are the consequences of an
inauthentic force in one's life. Playing the guitar is part of Melissa's identity,
she's proud of it, and she can regard her callused fingertips as a badge of honor
- part of what one must accept to have the pleasure of being musical. Addicts,
however, don't regard the unhappy consequence of their habits as badges of
honor. You don't hear many smokers say, "Yeah, I 've got yellow fingers and a
nasty cough. But I'm proud of them; that's what it takes if you want to be a
smoker." Rather, they say. "I've got yellow fingers and a nasty cough. These
are two of the reasons that I wish I could quit." Their addiction might be part of
their identity, but not a part that they're proud of, or even neutral about.
An apparent problem with the existential model of addiction is that it
seems to make the criteria for addiction subjective in nature. As such, it does
not seem to account for the fact that addicts' own attitudes about their
addictions may not be authentic. There are a couple of varieties of inauthentic
attitudes about addictions. For one, it is possible for people to be in denial
about their habits (which is discussed ad nauseum in the addiction literature).
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For another, it is possible for people to feel overly guilty about their (non
addictive) habits - and therefore to wrongly think of themselves as addicts because they are situated in unusually repressive social settings. It is easy to
imagine, for example, the daughter of a Baptist preacher thinking of herself as
an alcoholic because she drank a beer or two one weekend. What is considered
excessive in one setting might be quite moderate in another , and individuals'
attitudes develop in the context of particular settings.
A response to this objection is that the important features of addiction
concern the individual's endorsed desires and the experience of compulsion.
Both of these are matters of degrees; desires can be more or less endorsed and
can feel more or less compulsive. If our preacher's daughter experienced little
or no compulsion about drinking the beer , but experienced a feeling of shame
or regret later , it may be that her authentic character is emerging. Her desire
not to drink, perhaps, is being tested, and at this time is less authentic than
her desire with regard to drinking will be later , when she either decides {based,
in part, on her experiences) that the desire to abstain is authentic, or that
(again, based on her experiences) that her desire has changed. Not all conflicts
of desire signal an addiction, or even a lack of authenticity. Indeed, it is by way
of such conflicts of desire that authenticity develops. Addicted persons are
caught in the continuing tension of such a conflict, unable to resolve the crisis
of identity. Conflict of desires is only one feature of the proposed description of
addiction; the preacher's daughter shows neither compulsion to drink nor the
habit of drinking, which are the other two features.
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As mentioned earlier, another inauthentic attitude concerns denial about
one's addiction. Many addicts - or, at least, many people who certainly seem
like addicts - deny that their (putative) addiction involves unendorsed desires.
Denial is a problem for the existential model: what to do with addicts who peer
out from the wreckage of their lives and claim they like it that way? That they
don't want to stop? That this really is their authentic and genuine choice? The
difficulty of assessing addicts' self-reports leads many people to turn to models
with "scientific" criteria that can be measured, which is understandable. To do
so, however, is a mistake. As mentioned in chapters two and three, using
models with objective criteria because it makes diagnosis easier makes
misdiagnosis easier, too - which works against the goal of helping people quit
their addictions. Furthermore, to do so overlooks the possibility of availing
oneself of important informal information; that is, the observations of family,
friends, and others who know the addict well.
It would be easy to mistakenly characterize the existential model as
saying that people are addicts if and only if they say they are. Addicts' self
reports are pieces of the puzzle, to be sure, but they cannot be the whole
picture. Authenticity is not a purely "inner" phenomenon any more than our
lives are. As I suggested in chapter one, 286 there is not an easy or certain
answer to this problem. There is no litmus test for authenticity, and even the
possibility that there may be one someday - some kind of authenticity
verifying MRI - is frightening, to say the least. However, those close to addicts,
both professionals and their families and friends, usually get a good sense of
286
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addicts' authentic desires over time. Their assessment can provide a
touchstone against which one might compare a (possible) addict' s self-report.
The conflict of desires that marks addiction is accompanied by dissonance in
the rest of addicts' lives, and often this dissonance is well-known to those who
know them. Determining whether to believe someone who says "I want my life
to be this way" is not a task for a stranger to that person, but may not be
difficult for a friend.
Finally, although its members would not recognize the existentialist
vocabulary, the M tradition has an interesting note to add to the discussion of
addiction and authenticity. The AA slogans "fake it 'til you make it" and "act as
if' seem, at first blush, to be authenticity-threatening. Both of these slogans
can be interpreted as something like "you are an alcoholic , but act like a sober
person until you really are sober. " Since these direct the individual to "pretend"
to be something that (according to M's notion of alcoholism) they are not, it
might seem like a threat to authenticity. However, these slogans may be seen
as authenticity-promoting because they are encouraging individuals to act in
accordance with their more authentic desires rather than their less-authentic ,
addictive desires. This technique is used elsewhere , to cope with other life
situations (e .g. phobias) . People are encouraged to repeat a counterfactual
affirmation in response to troublesome emotions or cravings: e.g. "I am a non
smoker" at the urge for a cigarette, or "I love to fly" when panic at the thought of
a plane trip sets in.
As I've noted elsewhere, the notion of sobriety in AA is much more
substantial than simply not drinking. In fact, the term dry drunk is used to
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refer to people who are no longer drinking, but are not fully sober because they
are not "working" the steps to recovery. The related slogan is, "If you put down
the bottle without picking up recovery, you don't have a drinking problem but
you still have a thinking problem. " Recovery in M is a process of removing
such "character defects" as grandiosity, dishonesty (with oneself as well as with
others) , self-pity, self-righteousness, rationalization, excessive anger, etc.
Sobriety in M is holistic in nature, involving a state of spiritual, emotional and
physical recovery. Quitting an addiction, then, can be a mechanism by which
people become more authentic than they were prior to developing the addiction .
Many kinds of crises strengthen character; addiction can certainly be one such
crisis if the individual uses it to advance the project of living an authentic life.
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Chapter Five: Implications or the Existential Model of Addiction

The existential model of addiction combines features of addiction that are
already familiar, but does so in an unusual way. The result has some
important benefits and some interesting implications. The ramifications of this
model appear in theorizing addiction and in philosophy. Furthermore , this
model generates questions for addiction research. Finally, this model would
change the practice of responding to addiction, both at the level of public health
and in individual therapeutic settings.
Thinking of addiction in terms of compulsion, habit, and authenticity has
several advantages: it accords appropriate importance to the various features of
addiction as the brain-disease model does not, and includes moral components
for addiction in a way that is not harsh or overly judgmental. Furthermore,
such a conception of addiction can include nonsubstance addictions, which are
excluded from many disease models but share important experiential,
etiological and therapeutic features with chemical addictions. Finally, an
advantage of this framework is that it defines addiction with a notion of
authenticity that acknowledges the social context of the authentic individual,
which balances the respective roles of the individual and society. While
conceiving of addiction in terms of authenticity does not - and is not meant to
- preclude discussing it in neurological terms as well, authenticity is a better
frame for the issue than neurology is.
Defining addiction as "a compulsive habit that the individual does not
endorse" has several advantages over calling addiction a brain disease . The
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advantages include all the advantages of avoiding the disease models, which are
discussed earlier in chapters two and three. It also eludes the disadvantages of
the moral models, and allows for theory and practice, law and treatment, to be
coherent. It accounts for the important features of addiction (e.g. neurological,
social, experiential, etc.) and places the appropriate emphasis on each factor,
rather than overemphasizing the physiological features, as I've argued that the
disease models do.
It should be noted that the existential model of addiction is compatible
with much of the contemporary disease model. Neurological features of
substance addictions can remain salient (though they are not essential) on this
model, and there's nothing to say that addiction treatment cannot include
drugs or other medical-model therapies. The important difference concerns the
framing of the problem. Disease models put the emphasis on the wrong
features of addiction. Doing so points us toward less effective treatment
modalities, diminishes the volitional features of addiction, emphasizes cure
rather than prevention, neglects nonsubstance addiction, and leads to
inconsistencies between law and treatment. There is no single fix for so
multidimensional a problem as addiction; but the most important lines of
offense and defense are best indicated by the existential model.

Theory

There are a number of interesting implications for theorizing addiction
that follow from this existential model of addiction. The scope of the present
work allows for mention of just a few here; more careful analysis of these
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should be undertaken in future. One such implication is that addiction can
occur with both substances and non-substance related habits, because
addiction occurs when a person does not endorse a compulsive habit - which
need not involve substances. Another is that addiction would seem to be
endemic in the contemporary United States. That is, on this model, an awful
lot of us appear to be addicted to at least one thing, especially when
nonsu bstance addictions are included. Thirdly, on this model addictions
belong on a continuum with other habits.
In addition to the implications for theorizing addiction, there are
philosophical implications that follow from this model. One, concerning ethics,
relates to the fact that it places the responsibility for addiction on both the
individual and the social circumstances in which addiction was allowed to
flourish. Another concerns rejecting the dilemma of freedom and determinism
in favor of the notion of habit.
The first implication for addiction theory is that addictions comprise a
much broader set of behaviors than just substance abuse. While I will not go
so far as Stanton Peele does and argue that addiction can occur with any
potent experience, at the same time I am reluctant to place firm lines of
demarcation on what can or cannot be the object of addiction. (That is, Peele
may be right, but I will not explicitly defend his position here.) It is important,
however, to acknowledge that there are nonsubstance addictions - that
addiction is not merely a metaphor when used to describe habitual compulsive
gambling, eating, Internet use, and the like. Dividing addiction into substance
and nonsubstance addiction is sometimes useful, but since they share
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important etiological and experiential similarities (angst and compulsion,
respectively), they both ought to be classified as addictions. This broadening of
the scope of addiction theory makes it more complete. Further, it should make
addiction treatment more effective, because the similarities between addictions
are highlighted. It helps explain, for example, why some people who eat
compulsively break that habit by dieting and exercising compulsively, and why
many people who stop smoking start overeating. Attending to the similarities
between the various addictions should make crossover" addiction less likely.
II

The second theoretical implication of the existential model is that
addictions would seem to be endemic, especially since compulsive, inauthentic
habits can include such things as Internet use, video games, etc. as well as
drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol. (It bears emphasizing that this model would not
implicate all Internet use any more than it would implicate all alcohol use: only
compulsive, unendorsed, habitual Internet use qualifies for an addiction.)
Some will argue that this implication shows a wealmess in the model; that if
everyone is an addict, the term loses its force. However, that needn't be the
case. Obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the United States lately, but
that doesn't weaken the term. Indeed, the CDC recently made a decision to use
height and weight charts that are based on optimal height and weight instead of
nonnal height and weight because normal (i.e. average) weight-to-height ratios

have increased to the point that "normal" deviates significantly from "optimal".
Similarly, it does seem possible that more people than we might initially expect
are involved with compulsive, inauthentic habits, and if this is the case, it does

not minimize the degree to which it is a problem. An underlying assumption in
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this argument is that addiction is not a natural or inevitable feature of the
human condition, but that certain kinds of societies foster conditions in which
addictions flourish. This claim has some indirect support in the work of Rollo
May2 B7 and in some addiction literature . 288 As noted below, such an empirical
assumption requires support from empirical research.
Thirdly, a feature of this model that has both advantages and
disadvantages is that addictions are at one end of the continuum of
"unendorsed habit" . (Another continuum, comprising "endorsed habits," would
not include addictions.) At the other end of this continuum are non-compulsive
unendorsed habits. One advantage to this is that addiction admits of degrees;
there is room in this description for minor addictions and severe addictions,
which fits both intuitions about addiction and the experiences that many
addicts report. Whether an addiction is minor or severe on this account
depends more on the degree to which the habit is compulsive than the
dangerousness of the addictive object. Thus, it is possible to have a minor
heroin addiction, or a serious shopping addiction. The disadvantage is that is
would be very difficult to say precisely on what place on the continuum a habit
becomes an addiction. Everyone has habits, and everyone develops habits that
they don't endorse. At what point is the inauthentic desire to indulge a habit
properly called an addiction? At what point is it compulsive? However, this
problem of indistinguishability plagues every continuum. The fact that there is
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no universal criterion for deciding at what point blue turns to purple does not
mean that we can't ever distinguish blue from purple.
Some implications of this model are more broadly philosophical. For
example, there are ethical implications related to the effect of placing
responsibility on both individuals and the society in which they reside. The
vision of human beings implicit in the existential model of addiction situates
people in the context of other people, whereas traditional accounts of ethics
tend to focus on the agent. (This is not to say that traditional accounts of
ethics deny the interconnectedness of human beings; but simply that they do
not emphasize it.)

This indicates that the social context is a morally relevant

feature in determining a particular agent's responsibility. This subtle shift in
the locus of responsibility has ramifications for both theoretical and applied
ethics. We might, for example, hold that a decision that would be
impermissible (or less permissible) if the agent had had sufficient social support
might be permissible (or more permissible) if the agent was socially isolated and
had no one to tum to for help. Members of the Donner party, who had to make
ethically delicate decisions without the assistance of disinterested advisors,
might be excused from their actions on the grounds that their isolation limited
their ability to make such decisions.
Finally, the existential model supports the trend of avoiding the freedom
determinism dilemma . As mentioned in chapter one, a theory of freedom that is
effective for discussing addiction will involve degrees of freedom, and will regard
freedom as a process in which degrees of freedom can be gained or lost.
Furthermore, such a theory of freedom will need to account for the role that
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other people play in enhancing or inhibiting an individual's freedom. The idea
that freedom varies from person to person is gaining popularity, as is using the
notion of habit instead of one of the more traditional theories (i. e. , hard
determinism, soft determinism, and libertarianism.) This model supports that
trend, as well as lending it a rich source of examples.

Research

As for any theory, the existential model of addiction will require extensive
research to corroborate, refute, and refine. There are challenges to doing
research of this nature, due in part to the emphasis this model places on
addicts' experiences . This emphasis would require researchers and clinicians
to rely on addicts' self-reports and on the third-person, subj ective reports of
others. These data are harder to interpret and are less reliable than
quantifiable data. Diseases are easier to investigate. However, there is the
tradition of existential psychotherapy that can be drawn upon to help, together
with the filed of phenomenological research.
One claim that needs to be supported by empirical research is that
addicts use their addictions to escape existential anxiety. A similar assertion is
a staple in the paraprofessional and laical addiction literature; often in terms
like "filling the void in one's life" , "loosening one up" , and "quieting one's
demons" . Whether these descriptions can reasonably be interpreted as avoiding
any reference to angst needs to be corroborated. Likewise , the frequency with
which addicts (that is, people who seem to fit the profile of an addict on the
existential model) report experiencing angst should be measured. If people who
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intuitively strike us as addicts are not found to use their habit to relieve angst,
this model will be weakened. Researchers should take care to look for angst
prior to individuals' developing their addictions, since we don't want to mistake

angst caused by addictions for angst that causes (or contributes to) addiction.
Secondly, the assumption mentioned in the previous section on theory,
that addiction is worse in societies that foster alienation, meaninglessness, and
the like, bears some investigating. An obvious challenge in such research is
how to determine whether another society is (or was) marked by high levels of
angst (i.e., in which a high percentage of persons experience more angst than
they can handle) . The dangers of revisionist history and ethnocentrism are
apparent. However, careful research design can overcome these issues to a
significant degree. If other societies with high levels of angst are not found to
have high levels of addiction, this model is not necessarily disconfirmed, since
on this model addiction is an inauthentic response to angst. However, such
results would inspire additional research and analysis on the topic of
authenticity and authentic responses to angst.
Thirdly, there needs to be more research into the efficacy of treatment
modalities that focus on habit and community supports, with psychotherapy
and pharmacotherapy as ancillary, optional features. There are already some
promising results to this effect, such as community reinforcement approach
(CRA) and CRA with family therapy (CRAFT) studies. The cornerstone of this
approach involves training addicts' family, friends, and others to offer positive
social rewards when the addicts are sober (or "clean", as the case may be) but
to withhold these when they are drunk or high. Other features of this approach
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include rehearsing drink or drug refusal, relaxation techniques, disulfiram
(Antabuse,) and counseling regarding employment and leisure, and so on. This
approach compares favorably with other treatment methods . 289 Additional
studies and support may make this effective approach a more popular
treatment option.
Fourthly, addiction research in general needs more long-term studies
that evaluate treatment efficacy. Successful outcomes are usually evaluated on
relapse within two years of completing treatment . Two years is a fine start, but
it isn't enough. (Would we say that a treatment for cancer - or a program for
rehabilitating criminals - was "successful" if remission only lasted two years?)
Short-term successes can be extremely misleading, especially if they are
followed by failures that are just out of range of past analyses. Approaches that
follow from the existential model are likely to take more time to complete and be
more effective in the long term. More longitudinal studies on approaches of all
kinds are necessary for adequate comparison.
Finally, I shall offer a word on an important limitation of neurological
research. Neurological research unquestionably plays an important role in
understanding addiction. The emphasis that the scientific community places
on it, however, often leads the public (and, indeed, some of its own members) to
misunderstand the role such research plays in understanding behavior. For
example, author and nutrition activist Neal Barnard, M.D. recently claimed that
people aren't to blame for indulging in . . . cheese. Recently-conducted (but
hitherto unpublished) research has revealed that casein, one of the proteins in

289

Meyers and Miller, eds. A Community Reinforcement Approach to Addiction.
203

milk, produces "casomorphins" when digested. Thus, he argues, food is
physically addictive and people should stop blaming themselves for overindulging
in it. Dr. Barnard goes on to extend his support for lawsuits against
McDonalds, asserting that "Big Food" ought to be held accountable for
addiction to its products in the same way that "Big Tobacco" has been. This
leap -- from noting the presence of a chemical that shares some features with
opiates, to the moral claim that those who were unknowingly exposed to it are
no longer responsible for their behavior -- needs little more than to be revealed
in order to be refuted.
It may well turn out that every substance and experience has some effect
on the brain (indeed, it would be surprising to learn otherwise) . Such effects, of
course, will vary widely. (Maybe there ARE casomorphins in cheese. Are we
expected to believe that these "opiate-like substances" are as powerful as
heroin? as morphine? or merely as . . . cheese?) Such information will,
doubtless , be interesting and useful. For example, there will be some surprises,
as when it was discovered that cocaine and marijuana don't produce tolerance
and withdrawal symptoms (and thus could not be considered "classically"
addictive.) A better sense of how clifferent variables affect our brains will enrich
our understanding of addiction. As with all empirical research, however, how to
assign praise and blame will remain outside the scope of science.

Practice

The existential model states that addiction is an inauthentic response to
angst. It follows from this model that treatment for addiction should include
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measures aimed at strengthening authenticity and reducing angst to
manageable levels. The implications of this are far-reaching; the most complete
interpretation involves a fundamental change in contemporary American life.
The edict to change society so that it fosters meaning in order to ameliorate
addiction is overwhelming. The aim of the claim is not to suggest that there's no
treatment short of the revolution, but rather that the existential model indicates
an important component of treatment, both at the individual level and at the
public-health level. At the public-health level, it is worth remembering that ER
physicians were among those who campaigned for seat-belt laws; by extension,
it may be that addiction healers should advocate other kinds of social reform
that can be expected to alleviate addiction rates. At the individual level, an
important component of each addict's personal treatment approach should be
to find central activities that are meaningful and inoculate against addiction.
This claim is supported by a number of sources, not the least of which are John
Dewey, Herbert Fingarette, and clinicians who use the community
reinforcement approach. Finally, the existential model makes room for the
possibility of facilitated authenticity - discussed later in this chapter - as a
treatment strategy. Facilitated authenticity, a kind of Ulysses contract, aims at
strengthening authentic goals through the supported exercise of autonomy
competency.
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Public Health
If it is the case that certain social contexts tend to promote addiction,
then it makes sense to say that an important course of addiction "treatment" is
to nurture those social contexts that inoculate people against addiction.
Just as researchers responded to the high incidence of dog bites in Garfield
Park, Chicago by putting pressure on city officials to round up feral dogs (as
noted in chapter three), we need to root out the factors that promote
experiences such as meaninglessness and isolation, which (I have argued) are
fundamental causes of addiction. This task will be far more difficult than
rounding up feral dogs, for several reasons. Perhaps the biggest challenge to
doing this is that contemporary American society is focused on earning and
entertainment- which, as discussed in chapter four, are too self-focused to
provide life with meaning. Another significant challenge is that it is not clear as
to how to go about changing society in ways that promote meaning. ("Step One:
Change the World. Step Two: ... ") A third challenge is promoting authenticity
as a value without resorting to the kinds of marketing techniques that would
ensure its failure. (New from Milton Bradley: Meaningful Dialogue

TM

-- The

game that promotes Interpersonal Connection!) The solutions to these
challenges lie in such diverse arenas as neighborhood planning, spirituality and
religion, economic and environmental justice, education, and a host of others.
Changing the social climate that contributes to meaninglessness will be
met with much resistance- both from those who stand to lose money and
power with such change, and from those who have a " good enough" life for now
and can't see the possibility of anything better. An even more obvious problem
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is that meaning is highly individualized: it would be impossible to impose one
particular source of meaning on everyone and expect people to be fulfilled.
Even so, there are forces that rob many people of meaning in their lives. Erich
Fromm29°, Herbert Marcuse29 1 , Chellis Glendinning2 92 and others have written
forceful accounts of this phenomenon. While we cannot (and should not
attempt to) instill each person's life with meaning for them, it does seems
plausible that a socially responsible society should try to remove obvious
barriers to sources of meaning for its members. As noted in the beginning of
chapter four, barriers to meaning include isolation from family and friends
(exacerbated by our "mobile" society) alienation from one's work, living
disaffected from the sources of what sustains us, and the generally self-focused
nature of our culture today. With nothing more impressive or important to
believe in than ourselves, meaning becomes hard to find. Expanding our sense
of community is a good place to start.
Therapeutic
Stanton Peele agrees that the most effective solutions to addiction reside
in communities. Case in point is the story of Chet, a man with a 1 0-year
history of alcoholism and homelessness. One day, he started helping some kids
at a community center with basketball, something for which he had real talent.
The community center director offered him the opportunity to referee games
and help out during practice at a boys' club, but told him that he had to be
sober to do it. The first time he showed up drunk, she asked him to leave 290
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but to come back sober to the next game. He did, and he showed up on time and

sober for the rest of the season. When the director congratulated him and
remarked that she had not thought that he could stay sober for that long, he
replied, "I never had any reason to before." 293 Chet's life was lacking in
meaning, and the only thing that mattered to him was drinking. Trying to get
him to stop drinking without there being some other thing in his life to make it
worthwhile would be futile, maybe even cruel. We all need something to live for,
after all, even if it is nothing but the next drunk. When he had something to do
that was important to him, he rose to the challenge.
Trying to get people to quit their addictions without replacing the
addiction with something that will give life meaning is a little like trying to give
birth with no drugs, but neither with any of the other methods used to relieve
childbirth pain used in "natural" childbirth. Simply taking the drugs away
won't do it. A drug-free birth needs a variety of techniques - immersion in
water, Lamaze breathing, walking, etc. etc. - to facilitate labor and relieve
enough of the pain to make childbirth bearable for the mother. These methods
should be selected by the mother, according to her preferences and needs.
Similarly, a drug-free (and other addiction-free) life needs a variety of features
that facilitate the flourishing of the individual and relieve enough of the pain to
make life bearable. And similarly, these features should be selected by the
individual, according to her preferences and needs. One other similarity is that
both childbirth and life itself involve unavoidable pain. In both cases, the pain
is not a desirable end in itself, but focusing primarily on avoiding it interferes
292

Glendinning, My Name is Chellis and I'm in Recovery from Western Civilization.

208

more with the process than accepting the inevitability of some pain and
learning to deal with it effectively.
Peele also rejects the notion of powerlessness as used by AA; he believes
that alcoholics do in fact have the power not to drink (or to drink moderately)
and that telling them that they are powerless, even over just this one feature of
their lives, is disrespectful and ultimately destructive .

The connection between

powerlessness (which he rejects) and life projects (which he embraces) is a kind
of balanced sense of one's own importance. Contra Peele, I suggest that AA's
theme of powerlessness is important, because of the way it relates not only to
drinking (for the alcoholic) but to facticity (for all of us.) Being sober requires
working toward serenity. (Sobriety in AA, as I've mentioned, is not merely not
drinking; it includes rigorous personal honesty, service to others, and other
principles .) Serenity, as in the Serenity Prayer, dutifully recited at 1 2 -step
meetings of all kinds, involves accepting the things one cannot change. A
version of this kind of powerlessness can be understood to facilitate a balanced
humility, which contributes to one's capacity to find meaning in life, and thus
affords some protection against addition.
Facilitated Authenticity
I use the term "facilitated authenticity" to describe a therapeutic
consideration that has implications for both public health and clinical settings.
If addiction is a compulsive habit that the individual does not endorse, and if
addiction limits authenticity by creating powerful desires that conflict with
individuals' endorsed desires, it follows that a central component of addiction
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treatment should attempt to restore addicted individuals' authenticity. To that
end, paternalistic responses to addiction may be permissible if they are used as
methods of enhancing individuals' authenticity (as opposed to merely
controlling their behavior "for their own good") . Such paternalistic methods, I
suggest, should be put into place only at the request of the individual, and
should be (at least potentially) temporary. Voluntarily placing certain
limitations on one's own liberty can be a useful tool in the project of enhancing
the authenticity of one's life.
There are some interesting implications of this description of addiction.
Ordinarily, in terms of the law and medical policy we assume that addicted
persons are competent to make their own decisions . Addicts who are in
treatment, unless they have been placed there by the courts, are free to sign
themselves out of treatment. They have , in the past, been considered
competent to consent to being research subjects (although Louis Charland's
recent work, "Cynthia' s dilemma," questions addicts' competence to be research
subjects that involve their addiction.) They continue to have access to the
object(s) of their addiction; alcoholics may have their drivers' licenses revoked,
but their right to drink remains intact. Because we are loath to interfere with
competent adults' decisions, we do not interfere with addicted persons'
decisions about their addictive objects, unless they cross legal boundaries.
Some kinds of paternalistic actions may be justified in responding to
addicted persons on the grounds of enhancing authenticity. While any mention
of paternalism should be considered with great caution and attention to
protecting the liberty of individuals, it is also important to guard against
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abandoning those in need of help. The moral tension between abandoning
addicted persons and infringing on their liberty can be mediated by an interest
in promoting the authenticity of the individual.
Paternalism is morally questionable because it does not respect the
autonomy of the individual. However, addiction interferes with the authenticity,
and therefore the autonomy, of the individual. I suggest that paternalistic
responses that take the form of contracts made with an addicted person's
authentic desires in mind reflect greater value for personal autonomy than do
responses that privilege an addict' s stated (but inauthentic) desires. The use of
such moral devices as Ulysses contracts can be authenticity preserving,
especially in contexts such as addiction. Indeed, the use of drugs such as
Antabuse, which makes individuals sick if they drink alcohol after having taken
the drug, rests on a similar moral principle. Privileging decisions that an
individual makes autonomously is respecting the authentic desires of the
individual. An addicted person who is developing her authentic self may need
additional support for her autonomous choices. Examples of this kind of
support might include not allowing persons in treatment for addiction to sign
themselves out of treatment, or limiting access to addictive objects to addicted
persons (e.g. substances, credit cards, etc.)
Responses like this should not be adopted in any kind of automatic
fashion; and certainly not without the addicted person's agreement and
endorsement. However, some addicts do wish that someone would impose a
mechanism they could use to get a better grip on themselves and their more
authentic desires . For such persons, paternalism in the short run may be a
21 1

valuable tool in enhancing authenticity in the long run. Facilitated authenticity
is intended to be a temporary measure that strengthens individuals and is to be
removed so they can flourish on their own.

Conclusion

The dissertation has made a case for rejecting the popular disease model
of addiction, as well as the less popular moral model of addiction, in favor of a
model that emphasizes compulsion, habit, and authenticity. Since
disadvantages of the moral and the disease models of addiction have been
discussed at some length in earlier chapters, I'll mention them only briefly here .
Disease models absolve the addict of responsibility. They absolve the
community of responsibility. They suggest medical (mostly pharmaceutical)
cures, which have not been shown to be effective in the long run. They
stigmatize as much as, albeit differently than, moral models of addiction. They
lend themselves more to curing addiction rather than preventing it. They
promote an "identity of disease" for people who struggle with addictions.
Finally, consistent adherence to disease models would lead to unworkable
social policies: for example , alcoholics who drive under the influence of alcohol,
if they are truly in the grip of a disease, ought to be treated differently in the
legal system than people who just happen to be driving drunk - which seems
counterintuitive . On the other hand, moral models of addiction absolve the
community of responsibility. They stigmatize addicts and make them less likely
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to seek help. They do not recognize the force addictions have over the
individual. They are overly judgmental and harsh.
In contrast, calling addiction a compulsive habit that the individual does
not endorse neither stigmatizes addicts not absolves them. It places
responsibility for developing the habits in question on individuals and their
communities, and places responsibility for changing those habits in the same
places, rather than placing it in the hands of the medical establishment and
pharmaceutical companies. This description logically points to solutions that
are effective in both stopping and preventing addiction.
Theory and practice can be more coherent on this existential account of
addiction. As Jon Elster points out in his Strong Feelings, the DSM-IV defines
substance dependence as the copresence of any three of seven defining
features. 294 He argues that this description is theoretically unworkable, but is
adequate for the more pragmatic concerns of diagnosis and treatment. 295 I
argued in chapter three that this kind of gap between theory and practice is
tolerated in addiction world, but to the peril of those involved. 296 Competing
conceptions of addiction at the level of theory and practice lead to
inconsistencies in social policy and treatment. There is no virtue in diagnostic
criteria that are misleadingly clear.
Another reason to frame addiction as a compulsive habit rather than as a
disease or a moral failing is that to do so humanizes addiction. The moral and
scientific contributions to the discussion must be used judiciously, and in ways
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that do not divide the different features of human existence (e.g. neurology,
spirituality, psychology, etc .) Understanding addiction as part of a continuum
of behavior - not "a disease that can strike anyone arbitrarily" , nor a sin, nor a
vice - makes addicts and their problems understandable , accessible, less alien.
Finally - and perhaps most importantly - this description accounts for
the most important features of addiction, and places appropriate emphasis on
each factor. The essential features of addiction, as I suggest in chapter three,
are experiential and behavioral . Moral models of addiction focus on how
addicts affect others - an important feature to be sure, but certainly not the
most important feature of addiction. If the effect that addicts have on society
were the most important feature of addiction, then the idea of addiction as such
would disappear, melding into a variety of other obnoxious, anti-social or illegal
behaviors . The notion of well-behaved addicts would be nonsensical, and yet
there certainly do seem to be people who suffer with addictions but cause no
legal or social trouble. Disease models focus on the brains of addicts, which , as
I argue in chapter three, misses the point. The essential features of the
experience of compulsion, the force of habit as a motivating factor of behavior,
and the conflict of desires that addiction produces deserve the most attention,
while other features are simply supporting cues or calls to pay attention for the
essential features of addiction.

296 Chapter Three, page 28.
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